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Abstract 
 
Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at 
its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the 
contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In 
particular, it aims to answer two questions: (1) What is the most adequate conception 
of fundamental properties? (2) What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by 
adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions 
requires us to embrace a novel conception of powerful qualities, according to which 
properties are at once dispositional and qualitative. By adopting the proposed 
conception of powerful qualities, an original theory of fundamental properties comes 
to light. I call it Dual-Aspect Account. In this thesis, I defend the Dual-Aspect Account 
and its superiority with respect to rival views of fundamental properties. I illustrate 
this claim by examining Dispositionalism, the view defended among others by 
Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, Categoricalism, which has been advocated 
notably by David Lewis and David Armstrong, and the Identity Theory of powerful 
qualities, primarily championed by C. B. Martin and John Heil. The latter is the 
standard conception of powerful qualities. However, in the literature, the Identity 
Theory faces the charge of contradiction. A preliminary task is therefore to show that 
a conception of powerful qualities is coherent. To accomplish this aim, I introduce the 
notion of an aspect of a property. On this interpretation, powerful qualities can be 
thought of as having dispositional and qualitative aspects. I show that such a 
conception allows us to disambiguate the claim that a property’s dispositionality is 
identical with its qualitativity, and evade the charge of contradiction. Aspects bring us 
other theoretical benefits. I illustrate this claim by showing how the Dual-Aspect 
Account offers us a promising theory of resemblance. I then compare its merits with 
David Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. The conclusion of this thesis is that the 
Dual-Aspect Account is better suited to capturing the world as we find it in everyday 
life and scientific investigation as compared to the theoretical positions examined. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Metaphysics is an ambitious subject: it aspires, among other things, to give an account 
of the fundamental constituents of any reality and an exposition of how these 
constituents mesh to give us the reality in question. Indeed, some metaphysicians aim 
to deal not just with the actual but with all possibility as well. I myself think actuality 
is enough to be going with. (Campbell 1990, 1) 
 
In the present climate of metaphysics nothing is more important, I think, than the 
recognition of properties and relations as fundamental constituents of reality. 
(Armstrong 1992, 14) 
  
1.1 Aims 
 
Everything that exists is in some ways or others. These ways are properties (Armstrong 2010, 
6–7; Heil 2012, 3–4). Snow is white, glass is fragile, and electrons are negatively charged. 
Being white, being fragile, and being negatively charged are ways snow, glass and electrons 
respectively are. Accordingly, these ways are properties of snow, glass, and electrons. 
 Standardly, properties are held to be entities that can be predicated of things. On this 
view, properties are abundant: for any predicate, be it gerrymandered as you like, there is a 
corresponding property. Yet we have an overwhelming sense that some properties are natural 
while others are not (Lewis 1983). Being negatively charged, being disposed to exert 
gravitational force, and being fragile are few examples of natural properties. In contrast, 
being a member of the Parliament, being blue or green, and being self-identical are some 
examples of non-natural properties. In turn, some properties appear to be more natural than 
others. For example, being negatively charged seems to be more natural than being fragile. 
 Natural properties carve reality at its joints. They ground objective similarities among 
things and their causal powers (Lewis 1986a, 60). Among them, there is a privileged 
minority whose members “suffice to characterize things completely and without 
redundancy” (ibid.). These privileged natural properties “figure in a minimal basis on which 
all else supervenes” and are such that no two possible worlds having the same pattern of 
their instantiation “could differ in any other way” (Lewis 2009, 205). These are the so-called 
fundamental properties. 
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 This dissertation is about the fundamental properties of our world. It aims to answer 
the following questions: (1) What is the most adequate conception of fundamental 
properties? (2) What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by embracing such a 
conception? 
 These two questions are related. It goes without saying that an answer to (2) 
presupposes an answer to (1). But the tenability of a conception of fundamental properties 
partially depends on the plausibility of its resulting big picture world-view. We need to 
impose some constraints on the investigation that I will pursue in the following chapters. 
 To begin with, an adequate conception of fundamental properties ought to 
accommodate the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific theorising. To abide by 
this constraint, the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity play a central role in the 
present work. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain 
circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like independently from its 
dispositions. As it happens, qualitativity is often confined to the manifest image of the world 
we receive from everyday life. In contrast, dispositionality is typically associated with its 
scientific image. It is no dramatic revelation that the contrast between dispositionality and 
qualitativity mirrors the clash between these two images. The challenge to accommodate 
dispositionality and qualitativity in a unified way is therefore difficult for it requires 
overcoming the apparent clash between the scientific and ordinary pictures of the world. 
 Two dominant conceptions of fundamental properties reflect the division between 
dispositionality and qualitativity. The possession of dispositional properties empowers their 
bearers with distinctive dispositions that are manifested in appropriate circumstances. The 
possession of qualitative properties, which are often called “categorical”, contributes to how 
their bearers are like without necessarily conferring upon them any dispositions. Call 
Dispositionalism the view that all fundamental properties are dispositional. Call 
Categoricalism the view that all fundamental properties are qualitative. As it will become 
clear in due course, the choice between Dispositionalism and Categoricalism leads to two 
opposing pictures of the world and its laws of nature. 
 In the interest of capturing the world as we find it, we need a conception of 
fundamental properties that reconciles the dispositional and the qualitative. We make sense 
of the world by how things affect us in various possible circumstances. Yet things are not 
always manifesting what they are disposed to do. The world appears to be overtly qualitative. 
Of course, we could embrace a form of dualism and maintain that some fundamental 
properties of our world are dispositional and others qualitative. However, the assumption of 
dualism as a starting point would offend against a principle of parsimony; dualism ought to 
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be our last resort when all monist views fail. Fortunately, there is another monist view 
available that does not bifurcate dispositionality and qualitativity. 
 The view in question is the powerful qualities view primarily championed by John 
Heil (2003; 2012) and C.B. Martin (2008). According to it, every fundamental property is at 
once, in a sense to be clarified, dispositional and qualitative. Yet the standard version of the 
powerful qualities view faces the charge of contradiction. Metaphysical orthodoxy maintains 
that the qualitative is non-dispositional. At first glance, the powerful qualities view appears 
to be incoherent: on such a conception, no property could be simultaneously dispositional 
and qualitative. My aim in this dissertation is two-fold: first, I will examine whether the 
contradiction objection against the powerful qualities view is sound; second, I will articulate 
and defend a novel account of powerful qualities that evades this objection. I will show that 
the proposed view is superior to the standard version of powerful qualities and its main 
rivals, namely Dispositionalism and Categoricalism.  
 The criteria for deciding between the proposed account of powerful qualities and its 
rivals are the standard ones: internal coherence, explanatory power, trade-off between costs 
and benefits, simplicity, empirical adequacy, and so on. It is not easy to spell out these 
criteria. The question of how to evaluate them in precise terms remains opaque. I shall leave 
these worries aside and assume that we have a sufficiently good grasp of them. 
 I cannot start from scratch, however. In what follows, I will lay out some assumptions 
which I shall presuppose throughout the next chapters. At any rate, these assumptions are 
shared by the leading participants in the debate that I will address. After that, I will outline 
the structure of the dissertation.  
 
1.2 Property Realism 
 
Whether the reader approves or not, I will embrace property realism. As I shall 
understand it, this is the view that natural properties are real entities of the world’s furniture, 
which “exist independently from the classifying mind” (Armstrong 1978a, xiii). Such a 
characterisation does not force us to embrace the view that all abundant properties exist 
mind-independently. This is a stronger claim which I do not endorse. The restriction to 
natural properties allows us to escape the intuitive implausibility of admitting some mind-
independent abundant properties. Here is an example: consider the abundant property of 
being a graduate student at the University of Glasgow. Intuitively, this property cannot exist 
mind-independently. Were humans cease to exist, so it would be for the property of being a 
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graduate student at the University of Glasgow. To be a realist about this property implies 
that it can exist even if no human exists or ever existed. This does not seem quite right.  
Property realism opposes views that consider properties as “parasitic on predicate 
expressions” (Searle 1969, 120). On these views, to say that a thing has a property is nothing 
more than for a predicate to apply to that thing. There is nothing in virtue of which the 
predicate applies to such a thing (cf. Armstrong 1978a, 13). For example, to say that a marble 
has the property of being white means that the predicate “is white” applies or is true of that 
marble, and that is all.  
In similar vein, property realism contrasts with views according to which the 
possession of properties is nothing more than belonging to certain classes or sets (cf. 
Armstrong 1989a, 8–9). On these views, something has the property of being negatively 
charged if it is a member of the class of negatively charged entities.  
 To emphasise the difference, property realism can be understood as the view that an 
object’s natural properties offer a ground for the applicability of certain predicates and class-
membership. For example, it is in virtue of the property of having elementary charge that 
electrons can be grouped together or that the predicate “has elementary charge” applies to 
each of them.  
 
1.3 Property Monism 
  
 My focus will be on views that adopt property monism, the doctrine that all 
fundamental properties belong to the same kind only. Therefore, I will not examine dualist 
proposals that deny this doctrine. The assumption is methodological: for the sake of 
ontological parsimony, dualism ought to be our last resort. The idea is to begin the 
investigation of the most adequate conception of fundamental properties from a monist 
perspective. Only if the conception in question fails to accommodate some relevant cases, 
the drift into dualism is permissible. 
 Dualism is prima facie unattractive. It faces the difficult challenge to explain how the 
different kinds of property admitted in one’s ontology are related. A standard approach is to 
posit a distinctive relation that serves the purpose. However, it is well-known that this 
strategy is problematic: the mere existence of a relation does not warrant that the kinds of 
property in question are related in “the right way”. It seems that we need to invoke a further 
relation to ensure that the first one we posited and the properties are adequately related. But 
a vicious regress arises. The initial problem is reiterated (cf. Bradley 1893, 32–33). It is 
matter of debate whether we can successfully resist the regress without invoking irreducible 
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relations (see MacBride 2016 for an overview of the strategies). My claim here is different, 
namely that it is best to avoid entering this debate insofar as is possible.   
  
1.4 Natural Properties 
 
 David Lewis’s distinction between natural and non-natural properties is part of 
contemporary metaphysics orthodoxy (1983). In what follows, I will embrace the orthodoxy. 
Namely, I will assume a joint-carving distinction between natural and non-natural properties 
without further comment. However, I acknowledge difficulties in making the idea of 
naturalness more precise. In a famous passage, Lewis depicts natural properties as follows:  
 
Sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are 
intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their members are ipso facto not entirely 
miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterize things completely 
and without redundancy. (1986a, 60) 
 
Lewis’s characterisation of natural properties comprises a number of distinct notions: 
qualitative similarity, “joint carving”-ness, specificity and what can be called 
“completeness” (Bennett 2017, 107). It is unclear how these notions relate to naturalness. 
Here various interpretative strategies unfold. However, I shall not attempt to fix on one of 
these interpretations. Nor I will discuss the differences among them (Schaffer 2004; Dorr 
and Hawthorne 2013; Bennett 2017, 126). Rather I will assume that naturalness can be 
understood as a theoretic term which describes a certain role that some natural properties 
can play.  
 Natural properties are best understood in opposition with abundant properties. The 
latter do not account for objective resemblances among particulars. Nor do they capture the 
powers of things for they are causally irrelevant. Abundant properties can be extrinsic or 
disjunctive, and they “far outrun the predicates of any language we could possibly possess” 
(Lewis 1986a, 59). If we follow Lewis, who conceives of properties as sets, then properties 
are as abundant as the sets themselves. For each set, there is the property of belonging to that 
set (Lewis 1986a, 60). In the following chapters, I shall restrict my attention to natural 
properties only.   
 Lastly, I recognize a distinction between two conceptions of natural properties 
(Schaffer 2004). According to a scientific conception, natural properties are those invoked 
by all scientific disciplines such as physics, chemistry, biology, and so on. According to a 
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fundamental conception, the natural properties are only those invoked by fundamental 
physics. The account of properties that I will defend does not force us to choose sides. It is 
in fact compatible with both conceptions. 
 
1.5 Fundamental Properties 
 
 This dissertation concerns the fundamental properties of our world. I will assume that 
there are in fact fundamental properties. This assumption is methodologically profitable. By 
making this assumption, however, I concede that our world might be such that there is no 
absolute fundamental level (Schaffer 2003). If this were the case, the fundamentality in 
question must be understood in a relative sense. That is, the fundamental properties would 
be those that are more fundamental than any other ones—given a dummy fundamental level.  
 As for naturalness, let us stipulate that to be fundamental is to play a certain 
theoretical role. The assumption is therefore that there are properties that play the role of 
being fundamental. However, I will not attempt to define what it is for a property to be 
fundamental. This task would require a separate investigation. In what follows, I will 
conceive of the fundamental properties in a Lewisian sense: they are those privileged natural 
properties described in §1.1, which “suffice to characterise things completely and without 
redundancy” and provide a “minimal basis on which all else supervenes” (Lewis 1986a, 60; 
2009, 205). The conceptions of properties that I will discuss in the following chapters are 
suitable for different views of fundamentality. Therefore, my claim is not that a Lewisian 
conception of fundamental properties is the most adequate one. Rather my claim is that a 
Lewisian conception captures some desirable features of a workable notion of 
fundamentality. 
 There are two main reasons for remaining uncommitted on fundamentality. First, the 
views of properties that I will discuss can fit different conceptions. Second, there is no 
consensus on how to understand precisely the notion of fundamentality. As such, it is best 
to avoid this discussion for it would divert us from the purposes of this work. 
 The views of properties that I will discuss are sympathetic to the idea that physics, 
among other things, is in the business of discovering the fundamental properties of our 
world. Some classic examples of putative fundamental properties are charge, mass, and spin. 
However, physics is inevitably work in progress. We ought to proceed with caution. I will 
often mention these properties for illustrative purposes only. It might well be that charge, 
mass, and spin will be turn out to be less fundamental than other physical properties in light 
of future discoveries. 
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There is a related problem. The formalism of physics does not “wear an ontology on 
its sleeves” (Esfeld 2014, 259). In the following chapters, the question of how to read off the 
ontological commitment from a physical theory will remain unaddressed. The empirical 
adequacy of a theory of natural properties is of course a decisive choice-point in its favour. 
Our fundamental ontology must be metaphysically adequate as well as scientifically 
informed. However, the question of how to formulate an account of fundamental properties 
is not the business of physics.  The spirit of the dissertation is nicely captured in C. B. 
Martin’s words:  
 
Ontology sets out an even more abstract model of how the world is than theoretical 
physics, a model that has placeholders for scientific results and excluders for tempting 
confusions. Ontology and theoretical science can help one another along, we hope, 
with minimal harm. (Martin 2008, 42) 
  
1.6 Tropes and Universals 
 
Properties are invoked to account for similarities among things. The more properties 
two objects share, the more they are similar. A cat and a jaguar might have the same colour, 
but they might differ in size; all electrons have the same charge; a ceramic mug and a crystal 
vase are resembling with respect to their fragility. There is an unsettled dispute on how to 
make sense of the idea of sharing some properties. Two standard conceptions are available: 
universals and tropes. 
 Traditionally, a universal is a property that is capable of being possessed by many 
entities. Accordingly, objects can share a universal in the sense that one and the same 
property can be possessed by numerically distinct objects which might be differently located. 
For instance, all scarlet marbles share the property of being scarlet. If being scarlet were a 
universal, all scarlet things would instantiate one and the same property of being scarlet. 
 In contrast, a property thought of as a trope, or particular is possessed by only one 
entity. Accordingly, objects cannot really share tropes; at most, they can have numerically 
distinct and yet exactly resembling tropes. If being scarlet were a trope, two scarlet marbles 
would be similar in the sense of having two numerically distinct properties, scarlet1 and 
scarlet2, which are nonetheless qualitatively identical.   
 Both conceptions have costs and benefits. However, the choice between universals 
and tropes rests on independent factors. With minor amendments, the views of properties 
that I will discuss can be adapted to fit either view. The assumption of a real distinction 
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between tropes and universals is open to criticism (e.g. MacBride 2005). However, I shall 
not discuss further this issue. For illustrative purposes, however, I will treat properties as 
universals. This allows us to avoid some unnecessary complications which could obscure 
the main goal of this work, namely setting out and defending a novel account of powerful 
qualities. Two remarks are needed: first, the conception I will offer is available for both the 
tropes theorist and the friend of universals; second, the standard version of the powerful 
qualities view is presented as tropes view. However, as I will explain, this is an independent 
commitment that we are not forced to endorse. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The plan is as follows. The dissertation has two parts: in the first part, which comprises 
Chapters 2 and 3, I will examine the debate between Dispositionalism and Categoricalism; 
in the second part, which comprises Chapters 4 through 6, I will elaborate my own account, 
and defend the thesis that all fundamental properties are powerful qualities.  
 In Chapter 2, I will present an overview of Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. In 
this chapter, I will offer an overview of these views. I will also discuss what is at stake with 
the distinction between dispositional and qualitative properties. I will argue, however, that 
the canonical distinction is ill-conceived. The discussion will lay out the ground for 
introducing the powerful qualities view as a promising alternative to Dispositionalism and 
Categoricalism.   
 In Chapter 3, I will characterise the powerful qualities view. To accomplish this aim, 
I will introduce the novel notion of an aspect, which will play a crucial role in the remainder 
of the dissertation. I will then discuss the Identity Theory of powers, which is the standard 
version of the powerful qualities view. As its name suggests, the Identity Theory holds a 
distinctive identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the 
literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction. This is because the 
qualitative and the dispositional are, on a canonical understanding, mutually exclusive. In 
order to free the Identity Theory from the contradiction objection, I will propose a distinction 
between two senses of the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity. I will argue that such 
a distinction allows us to reformulate the identity claim in a three plausible, non-
contradictory ways. However, I will also offer some consideration against each of the 
proposed interpretations. We should therefore explore an approach that does away with the 
identity claim.  
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 In Chapter 4, I will articulate a more promising account of powerful qualities that is 
not committed to the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative.  In this chapter, 
the original notion of an aspect will play a central role in developing an alternative account 
of powerful qualities. I shall call the proposed view “Dual-Aspect Account”. I will then 
discuss a comparison between the Dual-Aspect Account and the Identity Theory. 
 The introduction of aspects in our ontology complicates the framework. But this is 
cost that is worth paying because of the theoretical benefits that aspects bring us. I will 
discuss some of these merits in Chapter 5, where I will focus on the topic of resemblance.  I 
will argue that an aspect view of properties such as the Dual-Aspect Account has two 
important advantages. First, it is able to accommodate a greater variety of resemblances. 
Second, it allows us to specify in a precise way the conditions for resemblance among 
properties. To make my case, I will discuss a comparison between the Dual-Aspect Account 
and the Identity Theory. To emphasise its merits, I will also compare the Dual-Aspect 
Account with David Armstrong’s theory of Partial Identity, which differs greatly from the 
Identity Theory.  
 In Chapter 6, I will eventually concentrate on the thesis that all fundamental 
properties are powerful qualities. I will begin by discussing three arguments in favour of this 
thesis. After that, I will move to assess the resulting “big picture” world-view that emerges 
from the perspective of the Dual-Aspect Account. As a test case, I will focus on the question 
of consciousness and its place in nature. It is an undeniable fact of our world that some beings 
are conscious. Every theory of fundamental properties that aspires to account for everything 
that exists faces the challenge of accommodating the fact that some entities have the property 
of being conscious while others do not. The immediate question is whether the property of 
being conscious is fundamental. A negative answer to this question paves the way to a 
broadly physicalist outlook. The challenge is explaining how some fundamental physical 
properties are related with the property of being conscious. By contrast, a positive answer 
leads to a view in the vicinity of panpsychism, the doctrine that at least some fundamental 
properties are, in a sense to be explained, mental. The challenge for this view is to elucidate 
the sense in which some fundamental physical properties may be conscious. I shall discuss 
these two strategies from the viewpoint of the powerful qualities view. In particular, I will 
argue that the Dual-Aspect Account makes a version of panpsychism more attractive than it 
is usually thought of. This is a point in favour of its applicability. I will conclude this chapter 
by pointing out future works that need to be done in light of the proposed conception of 
powerful qualities.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CATEGORICAL–DISPOSITIONAL DISTINCTION 
 
I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a 
change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the 
slightest cause though it be only on one occasion, has real being. For I set up as a 
definition which defines the things that are, that it is nothing else than power. (Plato, 
Sophist 247d-e) 
 
[...] Properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. (Lewis 1983, 346) 
 
2.1 The Importance of the Dispute 
 
2.1.1 A Preliminary Characterisation 
Many philosophical problems arise from everyday talk and thought. Questions about what 
is right and wrong, what constitutes knowledge, and what it is like to be conscious are just a 
few examples. Yet talk of fundamental properties is not common sense practice. Why should 
we undertake a philosophical investigation of the most adequate conception of fundamental 
properties? 
 Here is my reply. Properties are a pervasive feature of the reality that we inhabit. 
Everything that exists is in some way or other. These ways are properties. We make sense 
of the world as we find it in everyday experience and scientific theorising by invoking 
properties. We handle glassware with care because of its fragility. We describe the behaviour 
of particles in terms of charges and masses. We discriminate similarities and dissimilarities 
among things with respect to their properties. Black cats resemble each other with respect to 
their colour, but they might differ with respect to their shape. Electrons and muons have the 
same charge, but they differ with respect to their mass. And so on. 
We have an overwhelming sense that some properties are more basic than others. At 
least intuitively, mass, charge and spin are more basic than being a member of the 
Parliament, being grue, and being a Golden Retriever. The interest in fundamental properties 
reflects such an intuition: once we acknowledge that some properties are more basic than 
others, it is natural to wonder what the most basic ones are. But investigating a conception 
of fundamental properties is not the mere satisfaction of a philosophical curiosity. As I will 
explain in this chapter, the decision between competing views of fundamental properties 
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leads to clashing pictures of the world and its laws of nature. The present enquiry is therefore 
relevant for both philosophy and science. 
 The aim of this dissertation is to answer two questions: (1) What is the most adequate 
conception of fundamental properties? (2) What is the “big picture” world-view that we get 
according to such a conception?  
 It goes without saying that an answer to (2) presupposes an answer to (1). I shall 
postpone the discussion of (2) to Chapter 6. In this chapter and the following ones, I shall 
concentrate on (1). It is useful to begin the investigation by illustrating the best options on 
the table. In order to do so, we need to introduce a recognised distinction between two 
dominant conceptions of fundamental properties: dispositional and categorical. 
 Dispositional properties essentially empower their bearers. The nature of these 
properties is characterized dispositionally (Bird 2007a, 45): to be a dispositional property, 
or power is to essentially dispose a bearer to bring about some effects in appropriate 
circumstances. These effects the so-called manifestations. A classic example of a 
dispositional property is charge. By being negatively charged, a particle is essentially 
disposed to exert and experience an electric force when it interacts with other negatively 
charged particles. This is a circumstance in which negative charge is manifested. 
 Categorical properties are essentially qualitative. Metaphysical orthodoxy maintains 
that qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like rather than what that thing would do in 
certain circumstances. Canonically, categorical properties do not essentially empower their 
bearers (Armstrong 1997, 80): the nature, or essence of categorical properties is not 
dispositional. Albeit contentious, examples of categorical properties are size, shape and 
occupying a certain location. For example, being trilateral does not appear to dispose a 
triangle to bring about any characteristic effect in some characteristic circumstance. Rather 
it is a matter of how a triangle is occurrently like. More needs to be said about the distinction 
between dispositional and categorical properties. I will fulfil this task in this chapter. 
However, such a preliminary characterisation suffices for grasping the relevance of what is 
at stake with these two conceptions. 
 Call Dispositionalism the view that all fundamental properties are essentially 
dispositional, or powers. Call Categoricalism the view that all fundamental properties are 
essentially qualitative, or qualities. This chapter is devoted to illustrate these views and what 
is at stake with the decision between them. The plan is as follows. In the remainder of §2.1 
I will motivate the importance of the categorical–dispositional distinction. I will then offer 
a detailed overview of Dispositionalism and Categoricalism in §2.2 and §2.3 respectively. 
In these sections, I will discuss some standard objections against each of these views. Lastly, 
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in §2.4, I will discuss some reasons for rejecting an ontologically robust distinction between 
categorical and dispositional properties. On some popular conceptions, the distinction 
neglects an important feature of dispositional properties. Consequently, it fails to demarcate 
a real difference between kinds of property. This discussion will lay the groundwork for the 
following chapters. 
 
2.1.2 What Is At Stake 
 The categorical–dispositional distinction is worthy of attention for two main reasons. 
The first regards its implications; the second concerns the motivations for endorsing it. The 
distinction between categorical and dispositional properties have serious consequences. It is 
not just a matter of conceiving of properties in different ways. The views that incarnate these 
conceptions, respectively Categoricalism and Dispositionalism, come with a cluster of 
heavyweight commitments. As a result, the decision between these two views leads to 
opposing picture of the world and its laws of nature. 
 To some extent, the categorical–dispositional distinction mirrors the clash between 
the manifest and the scientific images of the world (Sellars 1963). Our world, as experienced 
in everyday life, comprises a sundry array of qualities. Objects have shape, colours, and 
smells. Qualities of objects are ostensibly wholly present when we perceive them 
(Ingthorsson 2013). We can grasp adequately qualities such as colour and shape in non-
dispositional terms. In contrast, the scientific image of the world abounds with dispositional 
properties. Charge is the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force, gravitational mass 
is the disposition to generate a gravitational force, and fragility is the disposition to shatter, 
and so on. It seems that apprehending these properties only in non-dispositional terms fails 
to capture something important about their possession: namely, that by having these 
properties, things are disposed to manifest distinctive effects in appropriate circumstances. 
 The clash can be stressed further. Physics is said to produce the best theories of our 
world. But physical entities are characterised in terms of how they are disposed to affect 
other physical entities and measuring devices in certain conditions (Eddington 1928; Russell 
1921; 1927). The manifest qualities we ordinarily perceive do not appear in physical theory. 
Nor are they mentioned among the fundamental forces responsible for the workings of the 
universe. Yet experience teaches us that things do have qualities. 
 The question of whether all fundamental properties are qualitative or dispositional is 
a substantive one. Of course, there is room for disagreement. For example, it is unclear 
whether positional properties such as that of being located at a certain position in space-time 
are qualities or powers. But despite opposing views, categoricalists and dispositionalists 
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seemingly agree that qualities and powers are mutually exclusive. For example, David 
Armstrong, who is a leading advocate of Categoricalism, says: 
 
The Categoricalist goes to the other extreme [with respect to the dispositionalist]. All 
true properties […] are non-dispositional. [Categorical] properties are self-contained 
things, keeping themselves, not point beyond themselves to further effects brought 
about in virtue of such properties. (Armstrong 1997, 80) 
 
In same vein, Alexander Bird, who champions Dispositionalism, says:  
 
What we mean by ‘categorical’ must be understood in negative terms. That is, a 
categorical property does not confer of necessity any power or disposition. […] To say 
that a property is categorical is to deny that it is necessarily dispositional. (Bird 2007a, 
66–67) 
 
Perhaps, the clearest example of the mutual exclusivity of categorical and dispositional 
property has been offered by Brian Ellis, who writes:  
 
Categorical properties are thought of as properties that things may have independently 
of how they may be disposed to behave: they are considered to be essentially non-
dispositional. Dispositions [dispositional properties], on the other hand, are supposed 
to be essentially dependent on how things are disposed to behave in various possible 
circumstances. (Ellis 2002, 68) 
 
On such a conception, the mutual exclusivity of the categorical and the dispositional is 
evident: a fundamental property is either essentially dispositional or it is not. But if we 
endorse it, we are forced to decide between categorical and dispositional properties; between 
the manifest picture and the scientific one. Whatever option we prefer, the resulting view 
faces some difficult challenges.  
 A world of fundamental powers appears to be in tension with the qualities 
experienced in ordinary life. Here we face the challenging task of accommodating qualities 
in our ontology. In contrast, a world of fundamental qualities is seemingly inadequate for 
capturing the causal happenings that occur in the natural world. Here the challenge is to 
accommodate the workings of nature without invoking dispositional properties. As it will 
become clear in the coming sections, there are various ways to address these challenges. At 
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this stage, however, it suffices to note that the distinction between dispositional and 
categorical properties comes with two opposing views of the world: one that the world is 
fundamentally powerful; the other denies it. 
 
2.1.3 Humean vs. Anti-Humean Metaphysics 
 The implications of the choice between Categoricalism and Dispositionalism run 
deeper. In contemporary metaphysics, there are two dominant world-views: one is Humean, 
the other is anti-Humean. Traditionally, Categoricalism is Humean. In contrast, 
Dispositionalism is typically anti-Humean. The adoption of either Categoricalism or 
Dispositionalism implies taking a stand with respect to the Humean outlook.  
 The “Humeanism vs. Anti-Humeanism” debate revolves around the question of 
whether our world is a Hume world or not (Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, 279–281; Ellis 2001, 
45–47). A Hume world has two distinctive features: (i) it is a world where there are no causal 
links between its properties; (ii) there are no necessary connections among properties. 
 Proponents of the Hume world believe that there is a neat distinction between how 
things are and what they are disposed to do. How things are depends on their qualities. What 
things are disposed to do depends on laws of nature. Crucially, a change in the laws of nature 
would affect the power-profile of things.  
One of the loci classici for a depiction of the Hume world is a famous passage from David 
Lewis:  
 
Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater [sic] denier of necessary 
connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local 
matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is no part of the 
thesis that these local matters of fact are mental.) We have geometry: a system of 
external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points. Maybe points of 
spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether ﬁelds, maybe both. And at 
those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need 
nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an 
arrangement of qualities. And that is all. All else supervenes on that. (Lewis 1986b, x) 
 
For present purposes, we can ignore thesis of Humean Supervenience. Lewis’s passage is 
relevant for it links the Hume world with Categoricalism: each tile of the vast mosaic is a 
fundamental categorical property, or quality.  
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 In the Hume world, every fundamental quality is an essentially self-contained 
property that does not necessarily dispose a bearer to bring about any manifestation in any 
specific circumstance. Charge, for example, would not empower a particle to experience and 
exert an electric force by virtue of its nature in a Hume world. The connection between 
charge and the property of exerting and experiencing an electric force would obtain in virtue 
of some law of nature.   
 The categoricalist typically believes that our world is a Hume world; the 
dispositionalist denies it. For example, Ellis, who endorses a mixed view of powers and 
qualities, urges to adopt a view that takes the world to be “essentially active,” in which “all 
things have causal powers and are therefore agents of one kind or another” (Ellis 2002, 141). 
More or less tacitly, the dispositionalist endorses this idea. 
 The metaphor of the mosaic is useful to emphasise the contrast between 
Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. From the viewpoint of Dispositionalism, the tiles are 
dispositional properties which essentially empower their bearers in various ways. As a 
consequence, there are necessary connections between the possession of dispositional 
properties and what bearers are disposed to do by virtue of having them. The clash with 
Categoricalism is striking: the dispositionalist admits necessary connections; the 
categoricalist denies it. Note that this is different from claiming that dispositional properties 
manifest their effects with some kind of modal force. Dispositionalists endorse this idea, but 
disagree on the modality in question (cf. Mumford and Anjum 2011; Marmodoro 2016). 
Here I shall not explore this issue. 
 The question of whether our world is a Hume world is one of the key battlegrounds 
in contemporary metaphysics. However, the answer does not seem to depend entirely on 
armchair’s speculations. For example, the empirical adequacy of the Hume world is 
questioned by physics (Butterfield 2006; Maudlin 2007). Yet both categoricalists and 
dispositionalists agree that favouring one view or the other implies taking a stand on whether 
our world is a Hume world or not. 
 
2.1.4 Laws of Nature  
 At stake with Categoricalism and Dispositionalism, there are two opposing 
conceptions of laws of nature. Our world appears to present regularities. This allows us to 
make predictions which for most practical purposes are reliable. Examples of regularities are 
not hard to find. In usual circumstances, water boils at a certain temperature; cats produce 
offspring of the same species; and the gravitational attraction of objects is a function of their 
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mass and distance. At first approximation, laws of nature can be understood as 
generalizations from regularities.  
 Laws of nature play a crucial role in scientific theorising. They account for the natural 
happenings in our world. The categoricalist and the dispositionalist disagree about how we 
ought to conceive of laws of nature and their role. It is not possible to explore in details the 
topic of laws of nature for it would divert us from the purposes of this chapter. For the 
purposes of this chapter, a general overview will suffice (for a more informative discussion, 
see Armstrong 1983; Carroll 1994; Bird 2007a; Lange 2009; Mumford 2004). 
 From the viewpoint of Categoricalism, laws are nomic connections holding among 
categorical properties (Armstrong 1978b, 129–130; 1989b, 75–107; 1997, 223–230). These 
nomic connections have two distinctive features: first, they are metaphysically contingent; 
second, it is in virtue of an obtaining nomic connection that certain properties but not others 
appear in a law of nature.  
 Following David Armstrong, who advocates the idea that laws of nature are 
metaphysically contingent, we can think of a law as a relation between two qualities. For 
example, suppose that L relates qualities F and G. On this view, L entails that everything 
that has F has also G. A merit of this approach is its explanatory force. The law L gives us a 
ground for the observation that all Fs are Gs. Namely, we can argue that all Fs are Gs because 
L obtains. Crucially, on this view, L is metaphysically contingent. It is therefore possible 
that L could have related F with another quality. 
 Standardly, the dispositionalist embraces an opposing view: (i) laws of nature are 
held to be, in some sense, necessary; and (ii) it is the nature of properties that determines 
which laws obtain (Bird 2007a, 43–48; Ellis 2001, 206). Laws of nature reflect, as it were, 
the dispositional nature of properties. For example, on this view, the Coulomb’s Law reflects 
the nature of charge, which is to bestow upon its bearers the disposition to exert and 
experience an electric force. 
Recall that properties, on Dispositionalism, are essentially dispositional. In every 
possible world, a dispositional property empowers a bearer in the same way. The law that 
describes its dispositional nature would be the same in every possible world. Thus if laws 
reflect the dispositional nature of properties, then these are necessary. 
One might wonder if the dispositionalist view of laws is indeed plausible. Many 
properties such as charge and mass appear in different laws of nature (cf. Bird 2017). Does 
it mean that charge and mass have many dispositional natures? Here dispositionalists 
disagree. The answer depends on how one think of powers. I shall return to this issue in §2.2, 
where I will present in more detail the metaphysics of powers.  
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2.1.5 Quidditism 
 By favouring either Categoricalism or Dispositionalism, we respectively embrace or 
reject a peculiar view about property identities. This view is known as “Quidditism”. It is 
widely accepted that Quidditism is a substantive metaphysical thesis. However, there are a 
number of diverse views under its banner. It is therefore important to clarify which one is 
under scrutiny. 
 Quidditism stands to properties as Haeccetism stands to individuals. As I shall 
understand it, Haeccetism is the doctrine that the identity of individuals across possible 
worlds does not supervene on their qualitative features (Lewis 1986a, 220). On Haeccetism, 
Mary, who has a certain height and weight in our world, is the same individual in a world 
where her height and weight are different. Quidditism can be understood as the view the 
property identities across possible worlds do not supervene on their dispositional features. 
Let us stipulate that “dispositional features” is a shorthand for the nomic roles that properties 
play or, more generally, the dispositions associated with their possession.  
 A consequence of Quidditism is that a property preserves its identity in possible 
worlds where it has different dispositional features. For example, charge is one and the same 
property in possible worlds where it does something different from disposing to generate an 
electromagnetic force. This formulation of Quidditism as a view about property identities is 
often attributed to Robert Black (2000). So let us call this view Black’s Quidditism.  
 Categoricalism embraces Black’s Quidditism. By contrast, Dispositionalism does not 
permit it. I shall discuss Black’s Quidditism in more detail in §2.3.4 and §2.3.5. Here it 
suffices to note that at stake with the categorical–dispositional distinction there are opposing 
views about what determines the identity of property. To illustrate the opposition, let us 
consider an example. Think of charge as the property associated with the disposition to 
produce a force in accordance to Coulomb’s Law. Categoricalists are committed to two 
claims: (i) charge is only contingently associated with that disposition; (ii) such a disposition 
does not determine the identity of charge. The categoricalist believes that charge is one and 
the same properties in possible worlds where it has different dispositional features. For 
example, charge would be the same property in possible worlds where it disposes objects to 
evaporate. This view amounts to Black’s Quidditism. 
 The dispositionalist blocks Black’s Quidditism for she maintains that a property is 
identified with its dispositional features. For example, charge is the property of disposing a 
bearer to produce a force in accordance to Coulomb’s Law. So in a possible world where 
charge disposes a bearer to do something else, that property is a different one.  
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 Before moving on, a short but important digression is needed. We ought to 
distinguish Black’s Quidditism from doctrines that hold that there are quiddities. This is 
because Black’s Quidditism does not entail the existence of quiddities. Thus one can endorse 
Black’s Quidditism while denying the existence of quiddities. 
 It is hard to tell what quiddities are. David Chalmers proposes a distinction between 
two conceptions (2012, 347–353). On a thin conception, the quiddity of a property P is what 
makes P numerically distinct from every other property.  This seems to be the view that 
Armstrong (1997) and Lewis (2009) endorse. On a thick conception, the quiddity of a 
property P is what makes P having a “substantial nature of some sort” and being numerically 
distinct from every other property (Chalmers 2012, 350). This appears to be the view 
embraced by early Armstrong (1989a). In light of Chalmers’s distinction, we can distinguish 
between Thin Quidditism and Thick Quidditism. Thin Quidditism is the view that at least 
some properties have a thin quiddity; Thick Quidditism is the view that at least some 
properties have a thick quiddity. Once again, it is worth noting that Black’s Quidditism 
entails neither Thin Quidditism nor Thick Quidditism. So the categoricalist who embraces 
Black’s Quidditism is not necessarily committed to the existence of thin or thick quiddities. 
Such a commitment rests on independent factors (cf. Smith 2016). 
 Some philosophers, however, do conceive of qualities as quiddities. For example, 
this seems to be the view held by Chalmers (2012, 347–351) and Heil (2012). Other ones 
appear to think of quiddities as higher-order properties of qualities. In my understanding, 
this is the view that early Armstrong (1989a) favours. Both views appear to be problematic 
if understood in accordance with a thick conception. 
 Thick quiddities raise a number of epistemic concerns. Our knowledge of properties 
is confined to their dispositional features. What we know about of properties is restricted to 
the way they contribute to the manifestable behaviour of their bearers. If qualities are thick 
quiddities, then their nature is distinct from their dispositional features. But we would not 
have access to it. This view appears to make us irremediably ignorant about the nature of 
qualities. While not everyone thinks of this as an implausible consequence (e.g. Lewis 2009), 
an alternative view is preferable. It is also unclear why positing thick quiddities in the first 
place. Our knowledge about the world does not seem to require them (Hawthorne 2001). It 
would be methodologically parsimonious to adopt a view that fits such a fact. I leave the 
task of motivating the admission of these entities to the friend of thick quiddities. 
The view that quiddities, thin or thick, are higher-order properties is not exempt from 
problems either. One might wonder what the relation between a property and its quiddity is. 
Similarly one might ask whether quiddities constitute an addition to being with respect to 
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their properties. These are difficult questions. Fortunately, not every categoricalist must 
address them. Categoricalism is sometimes accused of implausibility due to its commitment 
to quiddities. But this accusation demands caution as Categoricalism does not entail the 
existence of quiddities, whether thin or thick. To repeat, Categoricalism only embraces 
Black’s Quidditism, which is a view about property identities.  
 So far I presented an overview of what is at stake with the categorical–dispositional 
distinction. Now I will turn to illustrate Categoricalism and Dispositionalism in more detail. 
Since qualitative properties are usually characterised in opposing terms to dispositional ones, 
it is useful to begin with Dispositionalism. 
 
2.2 Pure Powers Views of Properties 
 
2.2.1 Fundamentally Powerful 
 Dispositionalism is committed to the thesis that all fundamental properties are 
essentially dispositional, or powers. In similar vein, Alexander Bird characterises it as the 
view that “fundamental natural properties have an essentially dispositional character” 
(2007a, 9). 
 The dispositionalist holds that the world that we inhabit and the entities it contains 
are fundamentally powerful. The laws of nature reflect the powers of things: the Coulomb’s 
Law captures the power to exert and experience an electric force that every charged particle 
has, Newton’s Law of gravitation captures the power to produce a gravitational force that 
every massive particular has. And so on and so forth. The dispositionalist individuates and 
identifies fundamental properties with what they are power for. For example, from the 
viewpoint of Dispositionalism, charge is the power to produce an electric force, and 
gravitational mass is the power to produce a gravitational force.1 
 Two significant motivations sustain Dispositionalism: one concerns scientific 
theorising, the other has to do with the clash between Humeanism and Anti-Humeanism 
(§2.2.4).2 
 Let us begin with the first motivation. It is widely held that the properties posited by 
physical theory are dispositional in character (Ellis 2002, 47; Mumford 2006, 476–477). 
Charge can be regarded the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force, gravitational 
                                                          
1 For simplicity’s sake, I will ignore some complications related to the fact that charge and mass are 
presumably determinable properties.  
2 A conception of properties as powers is said to offer a novel insights with respect to a number of 
philosophical topics such as causation, modality, agency, and perception. Of course, these applications 
makes it more attractive. However, they do not require a commitment to the view that all fundamental 
properties are powers. 
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mass can be regarded as the disposition to generate a gravitational force, and so on. The 
adoption of Dispositionalism gives us an ontological ground for explaining why certain 
physical properties, and in particular putative fundamental ones, are dispositional in 
character (Ellis 2001, 145–150; Chakravartty 2007, 119–126). On Dispositionalism, charge 
disposes to produce an electromagnetic force because its nature is to bestow upon bearers 
that disposition. That is, disposing to produce an electromagnetic force is what charge does. 
On Dispositionalism, what a property does determines what it is. Accordingly, charge is the 
property of disposing bearer to produce an electromagnetic force. The same goes for every 
other power. As I will explain in the next section, a power can dispose a bearer to do more 
things. It is therefore more accurate to say that every disposition that a power bestows upon 
a bearer partially determines its identity. The merit of Dispositionalism is to give us a 
straightforward answer to a question such as “Why does charge dispose to produce an 
electromagnetic force?” The answer is “Because charge is the property of disposing to 
produce an electromagnetic force”. 
 The second motivation that underlies Dispositionalism is its opposition to the 
Humean outlook. Dispositionalism is a natural ally for the anti-Humean. In fact, it imposes 
severe constraints on the contingency in nature: properties and their dispositional features 
cannot swap freely. If it is a nature of a power to bestow upon a bearer a certain disposition, 
then this is so in every possible world. Against the humean, the dispositionalist accepts the 
existence of necessary connections in nature (§2.2.4).  
 In what follows I will discuss the question of how to formulate Dispositionalism in a 
more precise way. I will then consider some traditional objections against it. The aim of this 
section is to offer a precise answer to the question: what is for a property to a power? Before 
proceeding any further, I will lay out few preliminary remarks. 
 First, I will not discuss the ascription of dispositional predicates or concepts. My 
focus will be on what it is for a thing to have a dispositional property rather than the 
conditions for ascribing it a disposition. An overview of the variety and flexibility of 
dispositional ascriptions can be found in Stephen Mumford’s seminal work Dispositions 
(1998). 
 Second, a note on the use of the term “essentially”. The locution is useful for 
illustrative purposes: it emphasises the contrast and, sometimes, incompatibility between 
Dispositionalism and its rivals. However, it has several interpretations. On some readings, 
to say that property is essentially dispositional means that it has a dispositional essence. This 
would suggest an ontologically heavyweight sense of the term which requires the 
commitment to essences. On a more liberal reading, to say that a property is essentially 
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dispositional does not commit us to essences as robust entities in addition to properties (cf. 
Lowe 2018). Dispositionalism understood according to the former interpretation is known 
as Dispositional Essentialism (cf. Bird 2007a; Yates 2013). Despite this ambiguity, I will 
use the term “essentially” to capture the idea that if a property P is essentially so-and-so, 
then P is so-and-so by virtue of its nature. As is customary, a consequence of this 
characterisation is that if P is essentially so-and-so, then necessarily P is so-and-so (Della 
Rocca 1996; Fine 1994; Yates 2013). Thus if a property is essentially dispositional, then it 
necessarily bestows upon its bearers some disposition by virtue of its nature. I will not 
discuss further how to make sense of the essentiality of properties (see Yates 2015 for a more 
detailed overview). Unless specified, talk of essentiality should be understood in accordance 
with the liberal reading. The same goes for other views of properties that I will discuss in 
the following chapters. 
 
2.2.2 The Metaphysics of Powers 
 Dispositionalism is the view that all fundamental properties are essentially 
dispositional, or powers. The immediate follow-up is: what is it for a property to be a power? 
The aim of this section is to answer this question. 
 The literature abounds with a variety of locutions that pick out the notion of a 
dispositional property. Here are a few examples: “power”, “disposition”, “capacity”, 
“ability”, “propensity”, “tendency”, and “potential”. Such locutions carry subtle nuances, 
but refer to a conception of properties with distinctive basic features. I shall restrict the idiom 
to “power” and assume that we can safely neglect the subtle differences carried by other 
locutions. 
 At first blush, powers are powers to do something in some circumstance. When a 
power is actually doing that something, it is manifested (or exercised or exerted). That 
“something” is the so-called “manifestation”.  There is no consensus on how to conceive of 
the manifestations of powers. On some views, the manifestations of a power are kinds of 
effects or outcomes brought about in some circumstances (e.g. Mumford and Anjum 2011). 
On other views, the manifestations are the occurrence of certain kinds of properties (Bird 
2007a; Marmodoro 2010). On further others, they seem to be the obtaining of certain kinds 
of events or states of affairs (e.g. Molnar 2003). My aim in this chapter is to offer a general 
overview of Dispositionalism. As such, I will not fix on a specific view about manifestations. 
In what follows I will use the colloquial expression “to bring about a manifestation” as a 
placeholder: how this expression is to be understood more precisely depends on the 
conception of manifestations that one has in mind. 
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 According to the dispositionalist, a paradigmatic example of a power is charge. From 
the viewpoint of Dispositionalism, charge can be regarded as the power to exert and 
experience an electric force in some circumstances, for example, when a charged particle 
interacts with other charged particles. When this happens, the charged particle’s power is 
manifested, namely there is a manifestation of electric force. Another example is fragility, 
the power to shatter. A fragile vase manifests its power when someone strikes it, for example. 
As noted by Bird (2016), the question of how fundamental, micro-powers (e.g. charge) and 
non-fundamental macro-powers (e.g. fragility) are related has received little attention among 
dispositionalists. Since my focus is on fundamental properties, I will neglect this question. 
Occasionally, I will mention some macro-powers for illustrative purposes only. Recall that 
Dispositionalism is a thesis about the nature of fundamental properties. The view that all 
fundamental and non-fundamental properties are powers is a stronger view which is called 
Pandispositionalism (Mumford and Anjum 2011).  
 From this initial characterisation, we can say that dispositional properties are powers 
directed to a distinctive manifestation. The possession of a power bestows upon a bearer a 
disposition, which manifestation can be brought about in an appropriate circumstance. More 
precisely, we can formulate the notion of a dispositional property as follows. 
 
Dispositional Property: a property P is dispositional if and only if there is at least a 
manifestation M and there is at least a circumstance C such that for every 
particular x that has P, were x in C, x would bring about M.  
 
According to Dispositional Property, if charge is a power and its manifestation is the 
production of electric force, then there is a circumstance such that if a charged thing were to 
undergo it, then it would produce electric force. This seems quite right: when a charged 
particle interacts with other charged particles, it does exert electric force. The interaction 
with other charged particles is an appropriate circumstance for the manifestation of charge. 
 Dispositionalism can be understood as the view that the nature of every fundamental 
property is characterised by Dispositional Property or something akin. There is an important 
reason for formulating the notion of a dispositional property in counterfactual terms: a power 
may never manifest. For example, a charged particle has the disposition to exert and 
experience electric force independently from whether or not it will ever do so. It is important 
to differentiate this question from the one of whether some powers are constantly manifested. 
Anna Marmodoro (2017, 58–62) and John Heil (2017, 96) suggest that most powers, in 
particular fundamental ones, are constantly manifesting. But a change in the circumstance 
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would interrupt even a constantly manifesting power. To put it differently, even a constantly 
manifesting power may exist unmanifested. 
 In a posthumous work, George Molnar (2003) identifies five basic features of 
powers, which are listed below as (a)-(e). Orthodoxy’s view of Dispositionalism endorses 
(a)-(c). In contrast, (d)-(e) are more controversial. In addition, I shall consider two additional 
features (g)-(h) which ought to be considered by any serious powers theorist. 
 
(a)  Directedness 
 
Directedness captures the link between a power and its manifestation. According to 
Molnar, Directedness is an “essential feature” of dispositional properties (2003, 60). 
Each power is “directed” or “oriented” towards a distinctive manifestation. For 
example, gravitational mass is directed toward the production of gravitational force, 
charge is directed toward the production of electric force, and so on. Directedness 
gives us a criterion for discriminating between powers and non-powers: powers are 
essentially directed toward a certain manifestation; in contrast, non-powers are not. 
There is no consensus on how to specify the relation of Directedness and what its relata 
are (cf. Bird 2007a, 105–114: Tugby 2013). For the purposes of this chapter, we can 
avoid discussing this issue. 
  
(b) Independence 
 
 The second basic feature of powers is what Molnar calls Independence (Molnar 2003, 
82–83). It conveys the idea that powers are ontologically independent from their 
manifestation. Given Independence, a token of charge, for example, can exist without 
producing an electric force (its manifestation); a vase can have the power to shatter 
even if it will never do so, and so on. The existence of unmanifested powers is the 
source of puzzlement. It raises epistemic worries which are the target of traditional 
objections against Dispositionalism. I shall discuss them §2.2.3. 
 
(c) Actuality 
 
The third basic feature is Actuality. It expresses the idea that to possess a power is, for 
something, to have an actual property (Molnar 2003, 99-101). Powers are therefore 
occurrent features of their bearers. What is not needed be to be actual is their 
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manifestation. The charge of an electron, for example, is one of its actual properties 
whether or not that electron is actually manifesting electric force. The commitment to 
Actuality is meant to oppose a conception of powers as hypothetical properties (e.g. 
Ryle 1949). According to such a view, powers are properties that things have just in 
case a particular condition occurs. But this is not what the dispositionalist has in mind: 
powers are not conditional properties; a thing has its powers unconditionally—powers 
have the feature of being actual properties of their bearers. 
 
The features of Directedness, Independence, and Actuality are widely recognised as the 
basic, or essential features of powers. However, Molnar’s list includes two other features: 
Intrinsicality and Objectivity. Whether these features should be taken as essential is a 
controversial matter. As I will explain, it seems that a conception of fundamental properties 
as powers does not require them. 
 
(d) Intrinsicality 
 
According to Molnar, powers “seem intrinsic characteristic of their bearers” (2003, 
102; original italic). How to spell out the notion of intrinsicality more precisely is 
notoriously a difficult matter. Molnar proposes the following definition: 
 
F is an intrinsic property of a if and only if a’s having the property F is ontologically 
independent of the existence, and the non-existence, of any contingent b such that a is 
wholly distinct from b; and a’s not having the property F is ontologically independent 
from the existence, and the non-existence, of any contingent b such that a is wholly 
distinct from b. (Molnar 2003, 39–40) 
 
What motivates Intrinsicality is the aversion to the idea that powers are relational 
properties. Given Actuality and Independence, a relational conception of powers is 
problematic with respect to the possibility of unmanifested powers. It seems to commit 
us to the existence of a relation between something actual (a power) and something 
non-actual (its manifestation). While there are ways to address this concern (e.g. Bird 
2007a, 105–114; Tugby 2013), a relational view of powers is conceptually 
unattractive. 
 There are, however, two more serious reasons for not taking Intrinsicality as an 
essential feature of powers: (i) it seems that being intrinsic is not a necessary condition 
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of a property for being a power; (ii) Intrinsicality appears to be empirically inadequate 
to capture putative fundamental physical powers. 
 It is reasonable to suppose that Molnar’s features, by virtue of being essential to 
powers, are also necessary. Thus Intrinsicality would be a necessary feature of a 
power. But this does not seem quite right. It is in fact possible that some powers are 
extrinsic (McKitrick 2003; Bauer 2011). A thing may have some powers that depend 
on the existence of other things. An electromagnet, for example, has the power to 
produce a magnetic force by virtue of an electric current. The power disappears as the 
electric current ceases. 
 If we take Molnar’s features to be necessary, then it seems that Directedness, 
Independence, and Actuality are jointly sufficient for a property to be a power. 
Directedness captures the ideas that powerful properties dispose their bearers toward 
some manifestation. Independence captures the fact that not every power is constantly 
manifested. Lastly, Actuality removes the charge of lack of reality: powers are 
occurrent properties of their bearers.  
Now let us consider the other worry. Dispositionalism aims to offer an 
ontological ground for the properties invoked by science and, in particular, the 
fundamental physical ones. It is unclear why we should rule out from the armchair the 
possibility that some powers are extrinsic. For all we currently know, empirical 
evidence favours the view that fundamental physical properties are extrinsic 
(Butterfield 2006; Esfeld 2010). For instance, on some views, mass and charge are 
dependent on the existence on certain fields. The dispositionalist is better off by 
accepting that some powers are extrinsic. It would be at least unfortunate if the 
empirical adequacy of Dispositionalism were to be undermined by the insistence on 
Intrinsicality.   
 
(e) Objectivity  
 
The last feature of Molnar’s list is Objectivity. It expresses the idea that powers are 
mind-independent properties (Molnar 2003, 112). What motivates Objectivity is the 
opposition to a “projectivist” view according to which powers are imposed into the 
world by the observing mind. Arguably, a view of this sort is aligned with the spirit of 
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Humeanism (§2.1.3). Thus the commitment to Objectivity can be regarded as an 
expression of the spirit of Dispositionalism, which is typically anti-Humean.3  
 Like Intrinsicality, Objectivity does not seem to be a necessary feature of powers. 
A property can be a power without being objective. Significantly, it is beneficial to 
leave open the possibility that some powers are mind-dependent. For example, some 
form of idealism may be true and, therefore, fundamental physical properties could be 
in some sense mind-dependent. We do not need to abandon a conception of powers 
just because idealism or a view in its vicinity is true. Nor does Dispositionalism require 
us to rule out idealism. On a different topic, some power enthusiasts claim a conception 
of powers offers some philosophical insights with respect to mind-dependent 
phenomena such as free will or agency (e.g. Greco and Groff 2012; Mumford and 
Anjum 2015; Vihvelin 2004). We are not forced to delegitimize these approaches just 
because they violate Objectivity. 
 
Molnar (2003) identifies Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality, and 
Objectivity as the five basic features of powers. If we consider these “basic features” in terms 
of necessary features of powers, then only Directedness, Independence and Actuality seem 
to deserve the label; Intrinsicality and Objectivity ought not to be treated as such. 
 There are two additional features (f)-(g) which are worthy of consideration. As for 
Intrinsicality and Objectivity, their status is contentious. Yet power views usually take a 
stand on each of them. So the resulting list of features (a)-(g) gives us a general 
characterisation of what a power is. 
 
(f) Reciprocity 
 
The first additional feature can be called Reciprocity. It captures the idea that the 
manifestation of a power occurs in concert, so to speak, with the manifestation of 
others powers. On this model, powers manifest when matched with their “reciprocal 
disposition partner” (Martin 1993; Martin and Heil 1999; Heil 2005, 350). For 
                                                          
3 Physical powers are traditionally conceived of as mind-independent properties of objects. However, 
this commitment demands caution with respect to the dynamic properties subatomic fundamental 
particles (spin direction, momentum, and position). According to some interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, the values of such properties is observation-dependent. If these properties were powers, then 
it is unclear whether they can be regarded as mind-independent. This case suggests that Objectivity 
cannot be applied unrestrictedly to all physical powers.  The dispositionalist who thinks that the dynamic 
properties of fundamental particles are powers must to be prepared to accommodate observational-
dependence (and consequently the mind-dependence) as a feature of some fundamental properties of 
the universe. The philosophical implications of this view are left to speculation.   
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example, consider the solubility in water of salt crystals, which can be understood as 
the salt crystals’ power to dissolve in water. The dissolving manifestation seems to be 
the product of the concurrent manifestation of the water’s power to dissolve crystal 
salts. Those who advocate Reciprocity (e.g. Martin 1993; Heil 2003; Mumford and 
Anjum 2011) claim that the dissolving manifestation ought to be understood as the 
mutual manifestation of two distinct powers: the salt crystal’s power to dissolve in 
water and water’s power to dissolve salt crystals. 
 There is no consensus on whether the mutual manifestation model can adequately 
account for the effects that powers bring about (Austin 2016; Anjum and Mumford 
2017). It suffices to note that it opposes the traditional stimulus-response model, 
according to which a power is manifested only when the appropriate stimulus triggers 
its manifestation (cf. Bird 2007a). For example, the shattering manifestation of a 
fragile vase occurs when someone strikes it. The striking of the vase is the stimulus 
that triggers the shattering response. By contrast, on the mutual manifestation model, 
powers manifest when they match with their reciprocal disposition partners, which are 
themselves powers.  
 
(g) “Multi-track”-ability  
 
The second additional feature is what can be called “Multi-track”-ability. Multi-track 
powers have more than a single type of manifestation or can be manifested in more 
than a single type of circumstance. By contrast, single-track powers have only a single-
type of manifestation in only a single type of circumstance. Someone who adopts a 
multi-track view of powers would say that mass has different manifestations. For 
example, one of its manifestations would be as an inertial force. Another one would 
be as a gravitational force. In contrast, the advocate of single-track powers would say 
that these two manifestations correspond to two different powers: inertial mass and 
gravitational mass. 
 The question is whether fundamental powers are multi-track. Plausibly, we could 
think of multi-track powers as conjunctions or disjunction of single-track powers (e.g. 
Bird 2007a, 21–24). However, Bird (2016, 358–360) notes that this strategy is 
problematic for conjunctions or disjunctions of powers are not always genuine powers. 
For powers P and Q it is not always that case that there is a circumstance in which P˄Q 
can be manifested. In same vein, it is not always the case that there is a circumstance 
in which P˅Q can be manifested. Since Directedness is the mark of powers, if there is 
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no circumstance in which P˄Q and P˅Q can be manifested, then P˄Q and P˅Q are not 
powers. The question whether fundamental powers are multi-track remains. Here 
power theorists disagree (cf. Heil 2003; Bird 2007a). 
 
The list (a)-(g) offers an overview of the general features of powers. I argued that only 
Directedness, Independence, and Actuality are good candidates for being essential, and 
therefore necessary, features of powers. Having clarified what a power is, let us consider 
some standard objections against Dispositionalism. 
 
2.2.3 Finkish Dispositions 
 Powers are properties whose nature can be characterised dispositionally (Bird 2007a, 
44–45). A way to make sense of this claim is to say that powers’ nature can be analysed in 
counterfactual terms. A canonical analysis of dispositions is the so-called “conditional 
analysis” (CA for short). According to CA, a thing is disposed to manifest M in a 
circumstance C just in case were that thing in C, it would manifest M.  
 A traditional problem with CA is that the existence of “finkish dispositions”, or finks 
undermines its plausibility (Martin 1994). To understand the notion of a finkish disposition, 
we have to observe that in many cases the manifestation of a power does not occur 
instantaneously. It takes time for water to dissolve crystal salts. Likewise, from the 
perspective of special relativity, it takes time for the gravitational force of a massive particle 
to affect another one. And so forth. The time interval between the triggering of a power and 
its manifestation allows the possibility of preventing the manifestation. As Bird puts it, it 
“provides an opportunity for the disposition to go out of existence and so halt the process 
that would bring about the manifestation” (Bird 2007a, 25).   
 A power is finkish if it ceases to exist between the triggering and the occurrence of 
its manifestation. As a result, a finkish power’s manifestation never takes place. However, a 
finkish power does have a manifestation that could be brought about. C.B. Martin illustrates 
the idea with the example of an electro-fink (1994, 2-4). This is device can make an electric 
wire disposed to conduct a current when connected to a conductor. When the electric wire 
conducts a current is “live”, otherwise it is “dead”. The electro-fink has also another feature: 
it can detect whether the electric wire is connected to a conductor.  
The peculiar function of the electro-fink is to make the wire “dead” every time is 
connected to a conductor. This case undermines CA. The wire has the disposition to conduct 
a current when connected to a generator. But the electro-fink prevents the manifestation of 
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the wire’s disposition. Therefore, it is not the case that if the wire were to be connected to a 
conductor, it would conduct a current.  
 The possibility of finks and other manifestation “blockers” shows that CA is not the 
best guide for determining whether a thing has some powers. However, there are ways for 
improving CA. For example, it is possible to reform CA so that it is immune to finks (Bird 
2007a, 31–41). Alternatively, one can argue that there are no blockers or finks at the 
fundamental level (Bird 2007a, 60–63).  I will not explore these strategies here. 
Dispositionalism is a view about the nature of fundamental properties. The question of 
whether we can provide a satisfactory analysis of powers in counterfactual terms is a 
different topic. Therefore, the shortcomings of CA have little impact with respect to the 
tenability of Dispositionalism. At most, they show us that we should not characterise in 
counterfactual terms the nature of powers. But this does not represent a fatal threat for the 
thesis that all fundamental properties are powers.  
 
2.2.4 The Actuality Objection 
 Another standard objection against Dispositionalism is that powers lack of enough 
reality. This charge is usually expressed with a regress objection which targets the idea that 
powers are pure.4 Here the notion of purity is informal: it captures the idea that a power is 
exhausted in the way it empowers a bearer. A pure power is nothing but, as John Heil puts 
it, “its contribution to the dispositionalities of its possessors” (2003, 97). 
 Suppose that all properties are pure powers. Suppose also that the manifestations of 
powers are properties of powers. On this view, the manifestation of a power P is a power P*. 
Since every power has a distinctive manifestation, also P* has it. In turn, P*’s manifestation 
is itself another power. And so on, ad infinitum. A vicious regress arises: 
 
“If all properties and relations that are supposed to be real are causal powers, then their 
effects can only be characterized by their causal powers, and so on. So causal powers 
are never manifested. They just produce other causal powers in endless sequence.” 
(Ellis 2002, 171) 
 
“If a property is nothing but its capacity to enter into nomic relations to further 
properties, the same must be said of these further properties and so on indefinitely 
                                                          
4 Regress objections exist in many forms. Some of them target the identification and individuation of 
pure powers (e.g. Lowe 2010, 2012). Here I am focusing on regress objections that target the actuality 
of powers. See Bird (2007a, 131–138) for an overview of other regress objections. 
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unless we return in circle to the original property or properties.” (Armstrong 1983, 
162) 
 
On a pure powers view, it seems that powers never actualise their manifestations. Of course, 
this would be an implausible consequence of this view. As David Armstrong puts it: 
 
“Particulars would seem to be always re-packing their bags as they change their 
properties, yet never taking a journey from potency to act.” (Armstrong 1997, 80) 
 
Regress objections aim to elicit the shortcomings of an ontology of nothing but pure powers 
(for a more detailed discussion, see Bird 2007b). They do not affect views that accept the 
existence of non-powers (e.g. Ellis 2001) or non-pure powers (e.g. Heil 2003; Taylor 2018). 
For example, if one takes the manifestation to be a non-power, the regress is blocked. By 
contrast, if one does take the manifestation of a power to be a power, the regress seems to 
be inevitable (examples of these views are Marmodoro 2010 and Mumford and Anjum 
2011). 
 The dispositionalist can resist the objection by arguing that there is more to the nature 
of a power than its powerfulness. As illustrated in §2.2.2, powers are held to possess a 
number of features. It is therefore possible to defuse the regress by pointing out a 
mischaracterisation of the notion of a power. It is worth noting, however, that if a power is 
more than the ways its possession empowers a bearer, then it is unclear how to understand 
its purity (cf. Taylor 2018). I will not discuss this issue for it would lead us astray with 
respect to the purposes of the chapter. However, I recognize that the label “pure power” is 
misleading. The dispositionalist should clarify whether or not the purity of powers play a 
relevant theoretical role. If not, then it is worth renouncing it for the sake of clarity. 
 A different strategy is to accept the regress but argue that it is beneficial. On certain 
views, such as that of Mumford’s and Anjum’s (2011), that the manifestation of a power is 
itself a power is a consequence of admitting nothing but powers in one’s ontology.  
A more promising way to block regress objections is to consider the feature of 
Actuality: powers are actual properties of their bearers. The appeal to Actuality is sufficient 
to block Armstrong’s worry that powers, if they were nothing but potencies, would lack of 
enough reality. However, Armstrong is on the right track: the nature of power does involve 
a potency—namely, something that has the potential to be actualised. An unmanifested 
power has the potential to be manifested. Insofar the manifestation is not brought about, it 
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exists as a mere possibility or unrealized state of affairs (cf. Bird 2007a, 105–113). It 
therefore appears that Dispositionalism is committed to the existence of potencies.  
The previous consequence raises a number of challenging questions that cannot be 
adequately addressed here. For example, the dispositionalist has to clarify how a power, 
which is an actual property, may involve something non-actual such as its potential 
manifestation. Relatedly, she has to clarify what kind of relation is better suited to capturing 
the link between an actual power and a non-actual manifestation. I will not explore possible 
answers to these questions for this will divert us significantly from the purposes of the 
chapter. Here the point is a different one: the potential nature of a power does not undermine 
its reality.  
It is crucial to distinguish between different senses in which the term “actuality” is 
invoked by the dispositionalist. In one sense, the term “actuality” picks out a basic feature 
of powers. In this sense, the powers are actual, here-and-now properties of their bearers. In 
another sense, “actuality” is meant to distinguish between the actualised manifestation and 
the unactualised ones. The shattering of a vase is an actualised manifestation of fragility. 
The potential shattering of a vase that is yet to be struck by someone is an unactualised 
manifestation. It will not be surprising if the regress objections that target the actuality of 
powers hangs on the ambiguity of the term “actuality”. 
 It appears that the traditional objections based on the possibility of finkish 
dispositions and the actuality objection do not jeopardise Dispositionalism. What underlies 
these objections is perhaps a sense of suspicion with respect to the dispositionalist’s “big 
picture” world-view or a commitment to Humeanism. A view that confronts 
Dispositionalism on these very themes is Categoricalism. This makes it the standard 
opponent of Dispositionalism.  
  
2.3 Pure Qualities Views of Properties 
 
2.3.1 Categoricalism 
 Categoricalism is the view that all fundamental properties are essentially qualitative, 
or qualities (Armstrong 1997, 2010, 2012; Lewis 1986a; Mackie 1978; Prior and Jackson 
1982; Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982; Prior 1985). At first approximation, qualitativity is 
a matter of how a thing is like rather than what a thing is disposed to do. In turn, how 
something is like is a matter of its occurrent or “categorical” features. For this reason, 
qualities are often called “categorical properties”.  
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 It is surprisingly difficult to give an informative characterisation of what a quality is 
(cf. Ingthorsson 2013, Taylor 2018). This is perhaps due to the generality of the notion of 
qualitativity. In what follows I will attempt to identify the basic features of qualities.  
 Traditionally, qualitative properties are opposed to dispositional ones. Powers are 
essentially dispositional; in contrast, qualities are not. This conception warrants the 
incompatibility of Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. Either all fundamental properties 
are essentially dispositional or they are not.  
 The idea that qualities and powers are mutually exclusive is shared among advocates 
of both camps. For example, David Armstrong, a categoricalist, says: 
 
“All true properties [...] are non-dispositional. Properties are self-contained things, 
keeping themselves to themselves, not pointing beyond themselves to further effects 
brought about in virtue of such properties” (Armstrong 1997, 80) 
 
David Lewis, another categoricalist, denies “the thesis of essential nomological roles” of 
properties (1986a, 162–163). This is to say that properties, in Lewis’s view, do not 
essentially dispose their bearers in any way. In similar vein, Brian Ellis, who defends a 
dualist view of powers and qualities, says: 
 
Categorical properties are thought of as properties that things may have independently 
of how they may be disposed to behave: they are considered to be essentially non-
dispositional. (Ellis 2002, 68) 
 
It is worth flagging that not everyone endorses the mutual exclusivity of powers and 
qualities. For example, John Heil thinks of qualities as merely actual properties of their 
bearers.  
  
Qualities are categorical; qualities are here and now, actual, not merely potential, 
features of the objects of which they are qualities. (Heil 2012, 59) 
 
The possibility of a conception of qualities in non-opposing terms to powers will play a 
central role in articulating a novel account of fundamental properties, which is the main aim 
of this dissertation. However, I will postpone this discussion to Chapter 3. In what follows I 
will present Categoricalism as traditionally understood, namely in opposition to 
Dispositionalism. 
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 A conception of qualities as non-essentially dispositional properties has an important 
consequence. It allows the possibility that one and the same quality is associated with 
different dispositional features in different possible worlds. Accordingly, it is possible, for 
instance, that quality that in our world has the dispositional feature of charge role could have 
the dispositional feature of mass in another possible one. Let us use “dispositional features” 
as a convenient shorthand for the dispositions associated with the possession of a certain 
property.  
The categoricalist is committed to a distinctive view of property identities. On this 
view, one and the same quality preserves its identity across possible worlds. To use the 
previous example, this is to say that the property of charge is the same even in worlds where 
it has the dispositional features of the mass. In §2.1.5 I called this view Black’s Quidditism 
(Black 2000), which I will discuss it in more detail in §2.3.3. Here it sufficient to note the 
clash with the characterisation of a power: “a categorical property does not confer of 
necessity any power or disposition. […] To say that a property is categorical is to deny that 
it is necessarily dispositional” (Bird 2007a, 66–67). 
 Unlike powers, there are no paradigmatic examples of categorical properties. Locke’s 
primary qualities such as size, shape and motion are often mentioned as examples of 
qualities. However, these examples are controversial. The dispositionalist would argue that 
Locke’s primary qualities are powers to do something. Albeit contentious, more promising 
examples of qualities are the so-called positional properties (Molnar 2003). These are 
properties such as that of being oriented toward a certain direction or being located at a 
certain space-time point. The idea that positional properties are qualities is shared by Ellis, 
who consider magnitudes to be categorical properties as well. For example, he says: 
 
[…] The most fundamental causal powers in nature have dimensions. They may be 
located or distributed in space and time, be one or many in number, be scalar, vector 
or tensor, alternate, propagate with the speed of light, radiate their effects uniformly 
and so on. […] These dimensions of the powers are the properties that I call 
categorical. (Ellis 2012, 17–18) 
 
However, controversy remains. The categorical properties mentioned by Ellis do not seem 
to be powers, but one may argue that they do not seem to be fundamental either. Recall that 
Categoricalism is a thesis about fundamental properties. Whether or not positional properties 
and magnitudes are qualities is insufficient to establish Categoricalism. One needs to show 
that positional properties and magnitudes are indeed fundamental. By way of example, 
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consider location. The question of whether location is a fundamental property depends on 
one’s view of space-time. On substantivalist views of space-time, locations exist 
independently from the things that can occupy them. They are therefore more fundamental 
than things that have a location. On relationalist views of space-time, locations, and other 
positional properties, are less fundamental than things that bear them. It is important to keep 
these issues separate: it is one thing to claim that location (or any other positional property) 
is a not power; it is another thing to claim that locations (or other positional properties) are 
fundamental. 
 Ellis claims that categorical properties “must be ontologically more fundamental than 
the causal powers” (2010, 18). An immediate question arises: why believe that the 
fundamental properties of our world are essentially non-dispositional qualities? 
 Two important ideas motivate Categoricalism: (i) that there are no necessary 
connections between a property and its dispositional feature; (ii) that dispositions need a 
ground for existing unmanifested.  
 The first idea reveals a commitment to Hume’s Dictum, which states that: ‘‘there is 
no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these objects in 
themselves’’ (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, §VI). It is better to avoid 
the discussion of status and grip of Hume’s Dictum for it would divert us from the purpose 
of this chapter (See Wilson 2010 for a more detailed discussion). It suffices to note that the 
categoricalist typically believes that the possession of certain dispositional features is a 
matter of metaphysical contingency. On this view, if Newton’s Law of gravitation had been 
different, gravitational mass could have been linked with the disposition of generating a 
different kind of force. 
 The second idea targets the possibility that dispositions can exist unmanifested. An 
electron is disposed to repel other negatively charged particles even if it is not occurrently 
doing so. But what warrants the existence of the electron’s disposition when it is not 
manifested? A popular strategy is to invoke categorical, non-dispositional bases that ground 
the existence of unmanifested dispositions (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982; Prior 1985). 
The idea is that an electron’s disposition to repel other negatively charged particles, when it 
is not manifested, is grounded in some other categorical property of the electron.  
 According to this view, the categorical basis of a property plays the role of being a 
“causally operative sufficient condition” for bringing about the relevant disposition (Prior, 
Pargetter, and Jackson 1982, 251). This is to say that in virtue of its categorical basis, a 
disposition is manifested when the appropriate circumstance occurs. To use the previous 
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example, the categorical basis of an electron’s charge is responsible for the manifestation of 
repulsive behaviour when it interacts with other electrons. 
 My aim here is to illustrate Categoricalism, so I will not discuss the force of the 
previous motivations. We are now in position to offer a more precise characterisation of 
qualitative, properties. In the spirit of Molnar’s list of basic features of powers (2003), here 
is an attempt to capture the basic features of qualities. 
 
(a) Qualities are essentially self-contained 
 
The essential feature of dispositional properties is their Directedness toward certain 
manifestations. By contrast, qualitative properties lack Directedness: as Armstrong 
puts it, they are essentially “self-contained” (1997, 69). If the property of occupying a 
certain location were a qualitative property, then it would not be directed toward any 
characteristic manifestation. 
 
(b) Qualities are categorical properties 
 
Qualitative properties are occurrent, here-and-now features of things. For this reason, 
they are also called “categorical”. Note that powers share this feature in virtue of 
Actuality (Molnar 2003, 99–101). It is therefore misleading to think of powers as non-
categorical properties. I will return to this point in §2.4. 
 
(c) Qualities lack modal character 
 
It is a contingent matter what dispositional features a quality has. To put it differently, 
the dispositional character of a quality is not “essential or metaphysically necessary” 
(Bird 2007a, 67). In our world, for example, charge bestows upon their bearers the 
disposition to exert and experience a force in accordance to Coulomb’s Law. In other 
possible worlds, charge bestows upon their bearers different dispositions. 
 
(d) Qualities have a primitive identity 
 
Categoricalism is committed to Black’s Quidditism, the view that a property’s identity 
is preserved across possible worlds (Black 2000). This allows for the possibility that 
the quality that has the dispositional features of charge in one possible world is the 
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same with the quality that has different dispositional features in another one. Here it 
useful to recall that Black’s Quidditism does not entail the existence of quiddities 
(§2.1.5). Categoricalism entails neither that qualities are quiddities nor that they have 
quiddities. Black’s Quidditism is in fact compatible with the view that there are no 
quiddities (Locke 2012).5  
 
The list of features (a)-(d) captures the basic features of qualities. Categoricalism can be 
therefore understood as the view that all fundamental properties have essentially features 
(a)-(d). As anticipated, there is no paradigmatic property that has (a)-(d). The property of 
occupying a certain location is a good candidate. It does not seem to be directed toward any 
distinctive manifestation. Since having a certain location is a matter of how a thing is like 
occurrently, it is also categorical. Given that it seems to lack of directedness, having a certain 
location may be associated with different dispositional features. Lastly, the categoricalist 
could argue the identity of the property of occupying a certain location is preserved across 
possible worlds. The same location can be occupied by different things in different worlds. 
So it would seem that the property of occupying a certain location is a quality. However, the 
question of whether location is a fundamental property remains. As I previously argued, this 
depends on one’s view of space-time. The dispositionalist has room for maintaining that all 
fundamental properties are powers while accepting that location is a non-fundamental 
quality.  
 
2.3.2 Qualities with Powers 
 If we endorse the mutual exclusivity of dispositionality and qualitativity, 
Categoricalism amounts to the view that all fundamental properties are not essentially 
dispositional. However, the categoricalist does not deny that the possession of qualities is 
associated with the possession of certain dispositions. The association is merely contingent. 
For example, Armstrong says:  “if a thing has a certain mass, it is certainly true that is 
disposed to act in certain ways” (Armstrong 1997, 81). The question is: how can the 
categoricalist accommodate the dispositionality of qualities? 
 Two main strategies emerge. The first one is to conceive of the dispositional features 
as higher-order properties that a thing has by virtue of having some lower-level, fundamental 
qualities. A view that adopts this strategy is the previously mentioned account defended by 
                                                          
5 Ellis suggested that another feature common to all qualitative properties is that they are “readily 
imaginable”; objects instantiating categorical properties “can be always pictured or drawn” (2002, 68). 
However, this is a controversial claim. This feature seems to pick out our ability as cognizers to think 
of qualities rather than a feature of qualities. So it ought not to be deemed as one of its basic features. 
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Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982). On this view, charge is associated with, for example, 
the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force. A thing has such a disposition by virtue 
of being charged. Despite its initial plausibility, this view faces a serious problem which has 
to do with the causal relevance of the higher-level dispositional property. Consider charge 
and the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force. When two charged particles 
interact, they exert an electromagnetic force. The question is: what property is responsible 
for the manifestation of an electromagnetic force? 
If two particles have the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force in virtue of 
being charged, it can be argued that the manifestation of electromagnetic force obtains at 
least partially in virtue of the property of being charged. But then, it becomes unclear what 
role the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force plays. It seems that the fact that the 
particles are charged and the fact that they interacted suffice for accounting the manifestation 
of an electromagnetic force. It seems that there is no need to invoke the disposition to 
produce an electromagnetic force at all. It is therefore unclear why positing it in the first 
place.  
There is a related problem: if a lower-level property qualitative property is causally 
responsible for a certain manifestation, then it is unclear why this property should not be 
considered a power. If the qualitative property of charge is causally responsible for the 
manifestation of an electromagnetic force, it seems that charge is indeed powerful. It appears 
that the strategy of conceiving of dispositions as higher-level properties threatens the very 
commitment that qualities are not powerful. Presumably, the categoricalist would argue that 
qualities owe their powerfulness to contingent laws of nature. 
This leads us to the second strategy, which appeals to laws of nature. A leading 
representative of this strategy is David Armstrong (1983, 1997) (it is worth noting that 
Dretske 1977 and Tooley 1977 defended a similar view.) According to him, qualitative 
properties are associated with certain dispositions by virtue of contingent laws of nature. For 
example, charge and the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force are linked because 
of a law that relates them. Crucially, such a law is nomologically necessary, but 
metaphysically contingent: a different law could have related charge with a different 
disposition. This strategy fits smoothly with the categoricalist’s view that there are no 
necessary connections between a property and its dispositional features. However, its 
tenability is hostage to the question of whether laws of nature are metaphysically contingent. 
The discussion shifts its focus from properties to laws of nature. The question of whether 
laws of nature are metaphysically necessary is an interesting but complicated question. For 
the purposes of the chapter, it suffices to note that this is a separate issue (however, it should 
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be now clear that choosing between these views might have some modal import on laws of 
nature). It would be methodologically unattractive if the tenability of Categoricalism were 
to hang on the modality of laws of nature. 
  
2.3.3 Black’s Quidditism 
 In §2.1.5 I pointed out that Categoricalism endorses Black’s quidditism, the view that 
properties have a primitive identity across possible worlds. As Robert Black’s puts it: 
 
“[N]othing constitutes the fact that a certain quality plays a certain nomological role 
in that world is identical with a certain quality playing a different in ours; they just are 
the same quality, and that’s all that can be said.” (Black 2000, 92) 
 
Black’s Quidditism allows the possibility of two kinds of swapped-powers scenario: (i) it is 
possible that the same quality is associated with different dispositional features in different 
possible worlds: (ii) it is possible that the same dispositional features are possessed by 
different qualities in different possible worlds. The categoricalist and the dispositionalist 
have contrasting views with respect to (i) and (ii). A toy example will clarify the 
disagreement. 
 Consider a possible world w where there are only two qualities: charge and 
gravitational mass. In w, charge is associated with the disposition to generate an 
electromagnetic force; mass is associated with the disposition to generate a gravitational 
force. Black’s Quidditism allows the possibility that in a different possible world w* charge 
is associated with the disposition to generate a gravitational force and mass with the 
disposition to generate an electromagnetic force. The categoricalist regards the previous 
possibility as unproblematic; in contrast, the dispositionalist spurns it. 
 The categoricalist, who is committed to Black’s Quidditism, holds that charge and 
mass in w are respectively identical with charge and mass in w*. The identity of such 
properties is primitive and independent from the dispositional features they have. By 
contrast, the dispositionalist identifies properties with their dispositional features. Thus she 
denies that charge and mass in w are identical with charge and mass in w*. Chargew bestows 
upon a bearer the disposition to generate to an electromagnetic force; chargew* bestows upon 
a bearer the disposition to generate a gravitational force. Therefore, chargew and chargew* 
are different. In same fashion, massw, which bestows upon a bearer the disposition to 
generate a gravitational force, is different from massw*, which bestows upon a bearer the 
disposition to generate an electromagnetic force. Significantly, the dispositionalist blocks 
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the possibility of worlds like w and w*. If chargew is the power to generate an 
electromagnetic force, then this is so in every possible world where charge exists. A similar 
reasoning holds for massw.  
 Whether or not we should accept Black’s Quidditism is a delicate issue. Here it is 
worth noting that the categoricalist embraces the consequences of swapping-power 
scenarios. In contrast, if we adopt Dispositionalism, these are blocked. 
 
2.3.4 Against Qualities 
 So far I have presented an overview of Categoricalism. I will now turn to illustrate 
some standard objections against it. The first objection targets the commitment to Black’s 
Quidditism. As I illustrated in the previous section, Black’s quidditism allows for the 
possibility of swapped-powers worlds such as w and w* (§2.3.3). The dispositionalist argues 
that Black’s Quidditism has worrisome consequences with respect to our knowledge of 
properties. If a quality is distinct from its dispositional features, and if our access is restricted 
to the latter, then it seems that we are irremediably ignorant of the nature of quality. For 
example, we would not be able to tell which quality is associated with the dispositional 
feature of disposing a bearer to produce an electromagnetic force. This is because such a 
quality is distinct from the disposing a bearer to produce electromagnetic force and, more 
significantly, any quality could play that role. A dire consequence is that we would be unable 
to tell whether we are in a world where the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force 
is associated with a quality Q or Q*. On Categoricalism, this piece of knowledge inevitably 
remains beyond our epistemic grasp. The objection here is that Categoricalism makes us 
ignorant of the nature of fundamental properties. It seems reasonable to hold that we should 
not endorse a view that imposes upon us such an ignorance. 
 The categoricalist, however, could respond that such an irremediable ignorance is 
unproblematic (Lewis 2009). We should be humble and accept it. After all, we still know 
something about fundamental qualities: we know that there are qualities that are associated 
with certain dispositional features. Whilst this is true, the question of whether we should 
embrace a conception of properties that makes us irremediably ignorant about some facts 
about remains. In contrast, Dispositionalism does not face such a worry. On 
Dispositionalism, a property is identified with its dispositional features. On this view, once 
we know the dispositional features associated with fundamental properties, we also know 
what these fundamental properties are. 
 Another objection against Categoricalism targets the link between qualities and 
quiddities. It is sometimes argued that “Categoricalism entails quidditism” (Bird 2007a, 78). 
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As I clarified in the previous section, Categoricalism entails at most Black’s Quidditism, the 
view that a quality preserves its identity across possible worlds (Black 2000, 92). However, 
some version of Categoricalism are indeed committed to the view that qualities have or are 
quiddities. An example of the former is Armstrong’s (1989a). On this view, quiddities can 
be plausibly regarded as higher-order properties of qualities. An example of the latter is 
Lewis’s (1986a). On this view, quiddities are first-order properties. The differences between 
these views are unimportant here: the arguments against quiddities apply to both views. For 
simplicity’s sake, call any categoricalist view that holds that qualities are or have quiddities 
Quidditist Categoricalism. 
 It is useful to recall Chalmers’s distinction between two conceptions of a quiddity 
(2012, 347–353; §2.1.5). On a thin conception, the quiddity of a property P is what makes P 
numerically distinct from every other property P*.  On a thick conception, the quiddity of a 
property P is what makes P having a “substantial nature of some sort” and being numerically 
distinct from every other property P* (Chalmers 2012, 350). Plausibly, some arguments 
against Quidditist Categoricalism target one conception but not the other. 
 The main argument against Quidditist Categoricalism is based on a principle of 
ontological parsimony, which has been nicely captured by Dustin Locke (2012): 
 
When given a choice between two metaphysical theories, one of which posits only 
ontological resources posited by empirical science, and the other of which posits the 
same resources of the ﬁrst plus something that is not posited by empirical science, we 
have, all other things being equal, reason to reject the second theory in favor of the 
ﬁrst. (Locke 2012, 349) 
 
By adopting the above parsimony principle (or something in its vicinity), a crude version of 
the argument against Quidditist Categoricalism goes as follows. 
 
(1) Quidditist Categoricalism posits quiddities. 
(2) Science does not posit quiddities. 
(3) If a view posits entities in addition to those posited by science, then it ought to be 
rejected. 
 
From (1)-(3), we obtain that: 
 
(4) Quidditist Categoricalism ought to be rejected. 
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This argument has a certain force for it relies on a parsimony principle that we ought to 
accept. However, it is too weak to rule out the existence of quiddities. 
 There is another argument against Quidditist Categoricalism which is worth 
mentioning. This is a semantic argument which targets views that identify categorical 
properties with quiddities, such as Chalmers’s (2012, 348) and Lewis’s (1986a) views. 
According to it, the fact that quiddities are unknowable affects our scientific claims 
(Hawthorne 2001, 367–368). The idea is that scientific knowledge requires us to know the 
referent of scientific terms. But on Quidditist Categoricalism this is not possible for we 
cannot know quiddities. Recall that qualities (here understood as quiddities) lie beyond our 
epistemic reach. Therefore, we cannot know the referent of terms such as “mass” and 
“charge”. As a result, science is subjected to a pervasive indeterminacy of reference. 
Arguably, this worrisome consequence represents a reason for rejecting Quidditist 
Categoricalism. 
 The last argument against Quidditist Categoricalism which is worthy of mention 
expresses a metaphysical concern. The acceptance of quiddities, whether thin or thick, 
allows the possibility of a plethora of dispositionally indistinguishable possible worlds. Two 
possible worlds w and w* can be indistinguishable with respect to the dispositional features 
instantiated, but differ with respect to the instantiated quiddities. Significantly, it seems that 
for every possible world w, there is a possible world w’ for any possible recombination in 
the pattern of quiddities instantiated in w such that w’ is dispositionally indistinguishable but 
“quidditistically” different from w. Those who think that this is an unacceptable proliferation 
will demur Quidditist Categoricalism.  
 The previous arguments express a distaste for quiddities on the grounds of their 
worrisome consequences. However, these arguments are far from being decisive. More 
importantly, they target only Quidditist Categoricalism (and other views that posit 
quiddities); they do not pose a threat to Categoricalism full stop, which is the view under 
scrutiny here. 
 The question of whether qualities, on a given conception, are or have thin/thick 
quiddities is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Yet Black’s Quidditism, which is 
endorsed by Categoricalism, imposes a severe constraint on our knowledge of properties. It 
should be now clear that such a restriction depends on the conception of fundamental 
properties that we adopt. If we favour Categoricalism, we are irremediably ignorant of the 
nature of fundamental properties associated with certain dispositions. In contrast, by 
adopting Dispositionalism, we escape ignorance for the nature of fundamental properties is 
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determined by their dispositions. Such a substantive difference concludes an overall 
overview of these doctrines. 
 
2.4 A Real Distinction? 
 
2.4.1 A Neglected Feature 
 In the previous sections I offered an overview of Dispositionalism and 
Categoricalism. The substantivity of the dispute between these doctrines depends on the 
robustness of the categorical–dispositional distinction. Only if there is a real, joint-carving 
distinction between the qualitative (categorical) and the dispositional, the decision between 
Dispositionalism and Categoricalism is an ontologically serious matter. Otherwise, the 
dispute between these views is non-substantive. Namely, it is not an ontologically serious 
matter. An immediate question arises: is there a real distinction between qualitative and 
dispositional properties? 
 On certain conceptions, the categorical–dispositional distinction fails to demarcate 
an ontologically robust difference between kinds of property. This is because an important 
feature of dispositional properties is neglected. In this section, I will explain how ignoring 
such a feature leads to an inaccurate characterisation of powers. 
 Canonically, powers and qualities are defined in opposing terms: powers are 
essentially dispositional; in contrast, qualities are not essentially dispositional. These 
definitions warrant that a property is either a power or a quality. But what ground do we 
have for believing that the mutual exclusivity between powers and qualities demarcates a 
distinction in reality? 
 The term “categorical” means “unconditional”. This is taken to justify the distinction 
between qualities, whose nature does not involve conditions, and powers whose nature does. 
Powers bring about their manifestations only in appropriate circumstances (Molnar 2003, 
82–83). The mistake is to infer that “categorical” is equivalent to “non-dispositional”. This 
understanding erroneously suggests that dispositional properties are non-categorical. 
Namely, that powers are properties whose existence depends upon the satisfaction of certain 
conditions. However, this is not how the dispositionalist conceives of powers.  
 Given the feature of Actuality (Molnar 2003; §2.2.2), powers are here-and-now 
properties of their bearers. If a thing has some powers, it has them unconditionally, or 
categorically. For example, if an electron has the power to produce an electromagnetic force, 
then this power is a categorical property of the electron. It is not that the electron has the 
power to exert produce an electromagnetic force just in case some condition occurs. It is 
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only the manifestation of electromagnetic force that is conditional for it obtains only in 
appropriate circumstances. 
 If the categorical–dispositional distinction is taken to imply that qualities are 
categorical while powers are not, then it fails to demarcate a real distinction between these 
kinds of property. Arguably, both dispositionalists and categoricalists see themselves as 
engaged in a serious ontological dispute. Thus both camps need to justify the robustness of 
the categorical–dispositional distinction in a more compelling way. 
 A more promising strategy is to consider Molnar’s feature of Directedness (2003). 
According to it, powers are essentially directed toward some distinctive manifestation. If we 
aim to preserve the mutual opposition between powers and qualities, it is reasonable to think 
of qualities as lacking Directedness. The idea is that if qualities are non-dispositional, then 
they are not essentially directed towards any manifestation. Accordingly, we can characterise 
dispositional and qualitative properties as follows.  
  
Dispositional Property: a property P is dispositional if and only if there is a 
manifestation M such that P is essentially directed toward M.  
 
Qualitative Property: a property P is qualitative if and only if there is no manifestation 
M such that P is essentially directed toward M. 
 
The categorical–dispositional distinction based on Directedness provides us with a workable 
criterion for distinguishing between powers and qualities. Significantly, it preserves the 
mutual exclusivity of powers and qualities, which both the dispositionalist and the 
categoricalist presumably desire. Either a property has Directedness or not. In same vein, 
the view that all fundamental properties have Directedness—as Dispositionalism contends—
is incompatible with the view that they lack of it—as Categoricalism maintains. However, 
the question of whether the categorical–dispositional distinction based on Directedness 
carves reality at the joints remains. We need some arguments to establish that there is a real, 
ontologically robust distinction between powers and qualities from their mutual exclusivity. 
I will now discuss some considerations for and against the idea of a real distinction between 
powers and qualities. 
 To corroborate the serviceability of the distinction based on Directedness, let us 
consider two persuasive examples. The first one is from Molnar (2003, 158–165), who 
argues that positional properties such as that of being spatiotemporally located at a location 
l lack of Directedness. Consider an electron located at l. If the electron were to move to a 
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different location l*, this would not affect its power-profile. The electron would not receive 
any novel power by virtue of its new location l*; the electron’s powers would remain 
“intact”, as it were (Molnar 2003, 160). However, Molnar acknowledges that positional 
properties affect the manifestation of powers. For example, by moving from l to l*, the 
electron exerts an electric force with a different magnitude on another charged particle. If 
we assume that the electron has one and the same property of charge in l and l*, we should 
accept that the change in location is causally relevant in determining the manifestation of the 
electron’s charge. We should conclude, as Molnar does, that positional properties play a 
central role in how powers are manifested (Molnar 2003, 163–164).6 If Molnar were right—
namely if positional properties were lack of Directedness—and if we embrace the 
categorical–dispositional distinction based on Directedness, then positional properties 
would be qualities. 
 The second example is from Ellis (2012), who singles out what he calls dimensions 
of powers as putative non-powers. For instance, he says that: 
 
[…] The most fundamental causal powers in nature have dimensions. They may be 
located or distributed in space and time, be one or many in number, be scalar, vector 
or tensor, alternate, propagate with the speed of light, radiate their effects uniformly, 
and so on. But these dimension of powers are not themselves powers. (Ellis 2012, 17) 
 
If we adopt the distinction based on Directedness, the properties mentioned by Ellis would 
not be directed toward any distinctive manifestation. This seems to capture the intuition that 
the “dimensions” of powers do not themselves empower their bearers in any distinctive way.  
 At first impression, the distinction based on Directedness appears to be more 
adequate than the one based on categoricality for it ensures the mutual exclusivity of powers 
and qualities. However, a problem remains: it does not warrant that there really is a robust 
distinction between powers and qualities. Two significant considerations threaten the 
robustness of the distinction based on Directedness.  
 First, the case of positional properties is controversial. These properties are 
intuitively non-powers, but there is no consensus on whether or not they are fundamental. It 
is therefore possible that positional properties are non-powers and yet non-fundamental. As 
previously mentioned, the question of whether or not positional properties are fundamental 
                                                          
6 It is worth noting that if one takes charge at l to be distinct from charge at l*, then it would be the case 
that having a different location empowers the electron in distinctive way. In my understanding, Molnar 
does not consider such a possibility. 
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depends on one’s view of space-time (§2.3.1). This calls into question the idea of invoking 
positional properties to reinforce the distinction based on Directedness. 
 Second, one can argue that inferring a real distinction from the distinction based on 
Directedness is mistaken for it is to draw an ontological distinction from a conceptual one. 
One could hold that Directedness is a matter of how we conceive of properties. Namely, it 
is a matter of regarding certain properties as directed toward certain manifestations. From 
the fact that some properties are thought of as having Directedness and others as lacking it 
does not follow that that is a real distinction between kinds of property. The analogy here 
would be with the famous case of the Morning Star and the Evening Star. We were wrong 
in inferring the existence of two distinct planets. It turned out that we were picking out one 
and the same heavenly body in different ways. The distinction based of Directedness does 
not rule out the possibility that powers and qualities are merely different ways of conceiving 
of one and the same property kind. 
 The above considerations against the robustness of the categorical–dispositional 
distinction are compelling. Unless one has already presupposed it, we cannot ensure that 
there is a real distinction between powers and qualities from the fact that we have different 
ways of conceiving of fundamental properties. In absence of a better argument, it is 
imprudent to inflate our ontology. We should therefore explore an alternative conception of 
fundamental properties that does not separate the dispositional and the qualitative. A 
promising approach is the powerful qualities view primarily championed by C.B. Martin and 
John Heil (Heil 2003, 2010, 2012; Martin 1993, 1997, 2008; Martin and Heil 1999). By 
taking seriously the idea that the categorical–dispositional is conceptual only, they propose 
a conception of fundamental properties which is superior to both Dispositionalism and 
Categoricalism. I will devote the next chapter to elaborate this claim. 
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CHAPTER 3   
POWERFUL QUALITIES 
 
Properties are not purely qualitative (the proponents of dispositionality are right about 
that). But neither are properties purely dispositional (in this we agree with those 
suspicious of pure dispositionality). Instead, every property is at once dispositional 
and categorical—or, as we prefer, dispositional and qualitative. Dispositionality and 
qualitativity are built into each property; indeed, they are the property. (Martin and 
Heil 1999, 46) 
 
3.1 “Nothing is Pure” 
 
3.1.1 A Distinction in Description 
Two dominant views embrace the robustness and mutual exclusivity of the power–quality 
distinction: Dispositionalism, which holds that all fundamental properties are essentially 
dispositional, or powers; and Categoricalism, which maintains that all fundamental 
properties are not essentially dispositional, or qualities. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the 
choice between these doctrines commits us to contrasting views about the world and its laws 
of nature. The Dispositionalism vs. Categoricalism dispute is therefore relevant for both 
philosophy and science. 
 Yet some properties of our world appear to be dispositional and qualitative in 
character. Consider mass and charge, two putative fundamental properties. By virtue of 
having a certain mass, a particle is disposed to produce a gravitational force. This would 
suggest that the property of having a certain mass is a power. At the same time, by having a 
certain mass, the particle has a certain quantity of matter that can be measured in kilograms. 
This does not seem to be a disposition. Rather it seems to be a matter of how the particle is 
occurrently like, or qualitatively. Now consider charge. By virtue of having a certain charge, 
a particle is disposed to produce an electric force. This would lead us to think of it as a power. 
However, by having a certain charge, a particle has also a certain quantity of charge that can 
be measured in coulombs. Like the possession of certain quantity of matter, the possession 
of certain quantity of charge does not seem to be a disposition. Rather it seems to be a matter 
of how the particle is qualitatively like. The problem for both Dispositionalism and 
Categoricalism is that they are unable to capture this fact. On both views, a property cannot 
be at the same time dispositional and qualitative. But if some properties appear to be 
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dispositional and qualitative, then we should explore a conception of properties that is able 
to accommodate them. 
 Fortunately, there is a theory of fundamental properties that is up for the task. This is 
powerful qualities view, primarily championed by C.B. Martin (2008) and John Heil (2003; 
2012).7 According to the powerful qualities theorist, every fundamental property is at once 
dispositional or qualitative—or, more informally, a “powerful quality”. 
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, I will show that a conception of 
fundamental powerful qualities is superior to both Dispositionalism and Categoricalism; 
second, I will clear the way toward a novel account of powerful qualities.  
In its canonical version, the powerful qualities view is committed to a controversial 
identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this 
view faces the charge of contradiction (Armstrong 2005, 315; Bird 2007b, 514; Barker 2013, 
649). We should therefore explore an alternative account of powerful qualities. To 
accomplish this aim, firstly we have to show that a conception of powerful qualities is 
independent from such an identity claim. As I will explain in due course, this is in fact the 
case.  
Here is the plan. In §3.1, I will present the discontent of the powerful qualities 
theorist with the categorical–dispositional distinction.  In §3.2, I will introduce the new 
notion of an aspect which will prove to be extremely serviceable in characterising powerful 
qualities. In §3.3, I will discuss the canonical version of powerful qualities and the identity 
claim. In order to disambiguate it, I will propose a distinction between two senses of 
dispositionality and qualitativity. In light of such a distinction, I will examine three plausible 
readings of the identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. This 
will free the view from the charge of contradiction. However, in §3.4, I will offer some 
considerations against each of the proposed readings. This is not bad news: my conclusion 
will be that even if the identity claim were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would 
be possible to adopt a conception of fundamental powerful qualities.   
 To begin with, the powerful qualities view demands the rejection of the mutual 
exclusivity of the dispositional and the qualitative. Of course, if one holds that the qualitative 
is the non-dispositional, a conception of powerful qualities will be contradictory. Some 
dispositionalists and categoricalists accept that powers and qualities are mutually exclusive. 
For example, Brian Ellis nicely summarizes the canonical incompatibility between these two 
conceptions as follows: 
                                                          
7 Others that adopted this view are Carruth (2016), Jacobs (2011), Jaworski (2016), Strawson (2008a), 
Taylor (2013), Robb (2017). 
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Categorical properties [qualities] are thought of as properties that things may have 
independently of how may be disposed to behave: they are considered to be essentially 
non-dispositional. Dispositions [powers], on the other hand, are supposed to be 
essentially dependent on how things are disposed to behave in various possible 
circumstances. (Ellis 2002, 68) 
 
The powerful qualities theorist has two strategies for rejecting the mutual exclusivity of the 
dispositional and the qualitative: one is to conceive of qualitativity in a compatible way with 
dispositionality, the other is to argue against the robustness of the categorical–dispositional 
distinction. Let us discuss them in order. 
 Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. In turn, how a thing is like is a matter 
of its qualities. For example, Heil says that “the ways things are are qualities” (2010, 70). 
Since how a thing is like is a matter of its actual or occurrent properties, we can think of a 
thing’s qualitativity as determined by its actual properties. As Alex Carruth notes (2016), it 
is important to distinguish between this conception and the qualitativity that is standardly 
associated with the phenomenal character of experience. The powerful qualities theorist is 
not committed to the view that a thing’s qualities are phenomenal in character. Here are some 
examples to illustrate the conception that the powerful qualities theorist has in mind: being 
negatively charged, having a rest mass of 9.11×10-31Kg, and ½ spin are qualities of an 
electron; these are ways the electron is occurrently like.  
This characterisation of the qualitative is not particularly informative, but it allows 
the possibility that a quality is indeed a power. If to be a quality is to be an actual property 
of a bearer, then a power may well be a quality. Recall that powers are actual properties of 
their bearers. The question of whether we can provide a more informative characterisation 
in positive terms of qualitativity remains. But this challenge does not burden only the 
powerful qualities theorist. Arguably, the categoricalist faces it as well. 
The second strategy is to deny the ontological robustness of the distinction between 
powers and qualities. If the distinction between them were conceptual or in description only, 
it would be possible to hold that the nature of fundamental properties is at once dispositional 
and qualitative. To defend this strategy, the powerful qualities theorist claims that we are not 
entitled to infer an ontological distinction from our ability to conceive of properties in 
different manners (Heil 2003, 111–115; Martin 2008, 64). Consider the fragility of a vase: 
sometimes we describe it in dispositional terms as the vase’s disposition to shatter; other 
times, we describe it in qualitative terms as the vase’s structural arrangement of its 
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molecules. The powerful qualities theorist contends that the distinct ways of describing 
fragility do not pick out distinct kinds of property of the vase. So it is possible that the vase’s 
fragility is at the same time dispositional and qualitative.  
In the previous sense, dispositionality and qualitativity are ways of considering 
properties. Crucially, the dispositional and qualitative ways of considering a property do not 
demarcate a distinction in reality. We can make sense of the claim that a property is 
simultaneously dispositional and qualitative by saying that the same property can be 
regarded, or described in dispositional and qualitative terms. Let us call this claim Partial 
Consideration and formulate it as follows. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
A remark on the proposed formulation: the powerful qualities view is a thesis about the 
nature of fundamental properties, but the idea that we can consider properties in different 
ways seems to concern also sparse and yet non-fundamental properties (cf. Schaffer 2004). 
In spelling out the idea of partial consideration, the examples invoked by powerful qualities 
theorists include those of a ball’s sphericality (Martin and Heil 1994, 45–46), the whiteness 
of snow (Heil 2003, 112–113), and the hardness of a diamond (Jaworski 2016, 55). This 
suggests that Partial Consideration is not restricted to fundamental properties only. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the powerful qualities theorist does not hold 
that all properties are powerful qualities. Nor does she claim that all properties can be 
considered in qualitative or dispositional terms.  
 The idea that we can consider the same property in different ways echoes the Lockean 
notion of partial consideration. To partially consider a property as dispositional or qualitative 
is to consider the whole and unitary property in a certain way. When we are dispositionally 
considering a property, we consider it as power; when we are qualitatively considering the 
same property, we consider it as a quality.  
 What “considering a property” precisely means is unclear. Here there is no need to 
discuss the cognitive abilities involved in this process. Two remarks will suffice. First, to 
partially consider a property is a mental act. Roughly, it is a matter of conceptualizing or 
describing a property in a certain way. Partial Consideration is therefore a conceptual claim. 
Second, to consider a property dispositionally or qualitatively involves a process of 
abstraction: it requires us to select a dispositional or qualitative feature of a property and 
then consider it as a whole according to that feature (Heil 2003, 172). This has a crucial 
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implication: a property has, in a sense yet to be illustrated, dispositional and qualitative 
features. The act of partially considering a property has to be distinguished from the mere 
ascription of dispositional and qualitative descriptions to a property. As I will explain in due 
course, this one of the central tenets of the powerful qualities view. 
 To illustrate Partial Consideration, Martin and Heil draw an analogy between 
properties and ambiguous figures (1999, 46–47). Think of the famous duck-rabbit 
illustration: sometimes we perceive it as a duck; other times as a rabbit. On both occasions, 
we are looking at the very same picture. Like ambiguous figures, the same property can be 
regarded in different ways. We can regard fragility as the power to shatter or the quality of 
having a certain structural molecular arrangement. 
 Partial Consideration is a conceptual claim about how we can think of properties. 
However, the powerful qualities view is a thesis about the nature of fundamental properties. 
As Martin puts it, on the powerful qualities view, “[…] properties to have a dual nature: in 
virtue of possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a 
particular qualitative character” (2008, 64). It is therefore important to distinguish between 
Partial Consideration and the ontological claim that all fundamental properties are powerful 
qualities.  
 Note that Partial Consideration and the ontological claim that all fundamental 
properties are powerful qualities are independent. Namely, someone could endorse one claim 
but not the other. Yet Partial Consideration alone does not get us at the heart of the issue: if 
we wish to develop a superior account to Dispositionalism and Categoricalism, then we have 
to embrace the ontological claim. Partial Consideration is in fact compatible with both 
Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. The dispositionalist can accept that we possess 
dispositional and qualitative ways of describing properties and yet maintain that all 
fundamental properties are essentially powerful. For example, Alexander Bird grants that 
“dispositional and non-dispositional expressions may co-refer” (2012, 279). In same vein, 
the categoricalist can maintain that the nature of all fundamental properties is essentially 
qualitative and yet endorse Partial Consideration. If we aim to preserve the difference 
among Dispositionalism, Categoricalism, and the powerful qualities view, then we need to 
treat them as distinct ontological theses. 
 Before proceeding any further, there is an important limitation that we need to 
acknowledge. Powerful qualities are properties that are at once dispositional and qualitative. 
It is tempting to regard them as conjunctive properties. As it will become clear in this chapter, 
this is not the conception that the powerful qualities theorist has in mind. Unfortunately, 
there is no satisfactory way to prevent the impression that powerful qualities are conjunctive. 
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One has to bear with the ambiguity. While such a problem is not a serious threat to the 
powerful qualities view, it obfuscates its merits. That said, if the attempt of elucidating the 
view is successful, it will become clear that merits of the view are worth tolerating the 
ambiguity.  
 
3.1.2 Against Pure Powers 
 Proponents of the powerful qualities view reject the idea that all fundamental 
properties are purely dispositional, or pure powers (Martin and Heil 1999, 46). This allows 
them to evade some of the objections against pure powers versions of Dispositionalism. At 
first approximation, a power is pure if all there is to its nature is “its contribution to the 
dispositionalities of its possessors” (Heil 2003, 97). Others have characterised pure powers 
in similar ways: 
 
What makes a property the property it is, what determines its identity, is its potential 
for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it. This means, among 
other things, that if under all possible circumstances properties X and Y make the same 
contribution to the causal powers of the things that have them, X and Yare the same 
property. (Shoemaker 1980, 114) 
 
[Pure powers are] nothing more than a set of connections to, and causal powers for, 
other properties. (Mumford 2004, 185) 
 
“Readiness for action” is all that pure powers are. (Marmodoro 2010, 29) 
 
[…] powers are at least partially individuated by their places in a causal structure—a 
type-causal structure of powers primitively related in specific ways to their stimulus 
and manifestation properties. Pure powers are wholly individuated by their places in 
such a structure. (Yates 2017, 3) 
 
Pure powers versions of Dispositionalism face the “always packing, never travelling” 
objection: if powers are nothing but readiness for action or directedness toward certain 
manifestations, then they are never actualised (Armstrong 1997, 80; Chapter 2, §2.2.5). In 
contrast, the powerful qualities theorist claims that there is more to the nature of a property 
than its readiness for action; a powerful quality also possesses some qualitative features. For 
example, charge is not exhausted in being the power to produce an electromagnetic force. 
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But it also qualitatively contributes to how charged things are like. For example, by 
bestowing upon them a certain quantity of charge. 
 The powerful qualities view has another advantage: it avoids the commitment to the 
existence of ungrounded powers (e.g. Molnar 2003; Mumford 2006). The ground of a power 
is an entity, which can be a property or something else, in “virtue of which a thing has the 
power” (Molnar 2003, 125). A standard objection against ungrounded powers goes as 
follows: if nothing grounds the existence of a power when it is not manifested, then there is 
no reason for believing in its existence when it is not manifesting. A conception of properties 
that come and go into existence so blithely looks suspicious. This objection threatens the 
claim that powers can exist unmanifested. 
 A standard strategy to avoid the previous objection is to hold that every power has a 
qualitative basis, which is a property that plays the grounding role (e.g. Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson 1982). On this view, powers ontologically depend on qualitative properties. 
Consequently, the qualitative is more fundamental than the dispositional. This view is 
therefore in the ballpark of Categoricalism. On the powerful qualities view, a property’s 
qualitativity can play the role of its qualitative basis. Thus the powerful qualities view avoids 
the commitment to ungrounded powers. However, it has to be distinguished from views that 
invoke a qualitative basis or ground for powers. There is no asymmetry in a powerful 
quality’s dispositionality and its qualitativity: the powerful qualities theorist holds the 
dispositional and the qualitative are “equally basic” (Martin and Heil 1999, 46). In contrast, 
on a qualitative basis view, the qualitative is more fundamental, or basic than the 
dispositional.  
 There are two arguments that can be extrapolated from Martin’s and Heil’s works 
(Martin 2008, 44–45; 64–65; Martin and Heil 1997, 45–47). Unfortunately, they are not 
presented explicitly. Yet it is worth considering a more precise reconstruction for they can 
be tweaked to support the adoption of powerful qualities. Accordingly, the conclusion of 
both arguments is that powers are not purely dispositional properties because they have a 
qualitative, non-dispositional feature. To discuss these arguments, we need to clarify the 
notions of pure power and dispositional feature. 
 A natural way of thinking of a pure power is to regard it as a property that possesses 
only dispositional features. More precisely, we can define a pure power as follows. 
 
Pure Power: a property P is a pure power if and only if P has only dispositional 
features. 
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Now we need to clarify what a dispositional feature is. Any realist about powers takes 
Directedness, Independence, and Actuality to be basic features of powers (Molnar 2003). To 
repeat, Directedness is the feature according to which every power is directed to, or point 
toward a characteristic manifestation (Molnar 2003, 60), Independence captures the idea that 
powers are ontologically independent from their manifestation  (Molnar 2003, 82), and 
Actuality is the idea that every power is an actual or occurrent property of its bearer (Molnar 
2003, 99–101). 
 A plausible way of regarding these features is to take them to be higher-order 
properties of powers in a liberal, ontologically lightweight sense. This is to say that claiming 
that a power has the property of Directedness, Independence, and Actuality does not amount 
to the view that these properties are over and above the power itself. This qualification is 
necessary for two reasons. First, if Directedness, Independence, and Actuality were 
properties in a robust sense, then every power would turn out to be a conjunctive property. 
But power theorists do not conceive of all powers as conjunctive properties whose conjuncts 
are Directedness, Independence, and Actuality. This, however, leaves open the possibility 
that some powers are conjunctive in the sense that they are conjunctions of powers. Second, 
a conjunctive view of powers clashes with the widely held view that fundamental properties 
are simple, namely not constituted by further properties. If Directedness, Independence and 
Actuality are properties of fundamental powers in a robust sense, then fundamental powers 
turn out to be complex properties. 
 Having clarified the notion of a dispositional feature, let us consider the argument 
hinted at by Heil (2003, Chapter 8; 2012, Chapter 4). Since it targets the feature of actuality, 
let us call it “Actuality Argument”. If sound, the Actuality Argument establishes that powers 
cannot be purely dispositional properties because their actuality is not a dispositional feature. 
It is worth flagging that the original version of the argument appears to target only power 
tropes (Heil 2003, 81–84; 125–127). While it seems possible to extend it without particular 
complications to a conception of powers as immanent universals, it is unclear whether the 
feature of Actuality applies to Platonic universals. In its simplest form, the Actuality 
Argument can be reconstructed as follows. 
 
(1) A power is pure if and only if it has only dispositional features. 
(2) Every power has the feature of actuality.  
(3) The actuality of a power is not a dispositional feature. 
 
From (1)-(3), we reach the conclusion:  
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(4) Every power is not pure. 
 
Premise (1) is the definition of Pure Power. Premise (2) is the feature of Actuality (Molnar 
2003, 99–101). Along with many dispositionalists, Heil accepts that powers are actual in the 
sense of being occurrent properties of objects (2003, 75–84; 125–127; 2012, 58–62). The 
crucial premise of the Actuality Argument is (3), which express the idea that the actuality of 
a power is not a dispositional feature. 
 The mark of dispositionality is Directedness, namely the idea that dispositional 
properties are directed to, or point toward some characteristic manifestations in characteristic 
circumstances. A property or feature that lacks Directedness is not dispositional. Premise (3) 
can be therefore understood as the claim that the actuality of a power lacks Directedness. 
This seems quite right. The actuality of a power does not seem to be directed toward any 
distinctive manifestation. Nor is it manifested in any distinctive fashion. Rather it is just a 
way an actual power is like. For example, consider an electron that has the power to produce 
an electromagnetic force. This power is an actual property of the electron, namely it has the 
feature of actuality.  But the actuality of the power to produce electromagnetic force is not 
manifested in any distinctive way. The production of electromagnetic force is a 
manifestation of the power to produce an electromagnetic force; it is not a manifestation of 
its actuality. Here I acknowledge that such an interpretation is controversial. However, Heil 
seems to support it. For example, he says that “actuality is one thing, potentiality something 
else altogether” (Heil 2012, 59). This strongly suggests that we should not think of actuality 
in dispositional terms. 
 From premises (1)-(3), we reach the conclusion (4): powers are not purely 
dispositional. Such a conclusion threatens the prospects for an ontology of pure powers. 
However, it does not establish that powers have a qualitative feature. In order to do so, we 
need an additional premise such as (5) or something in the vicinity:  
 
(5) If a feature of a property is not dispositional, then it is a qualitative. 
 
If (5), then from (1)-(4), we get the conclusion:  
 
(6) Every power has a qualitative feature. 
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Premise (5) is of course controversial: without further qualification, this conditional is 
seemingly false. In fact, (5) presupposes that dispositionality and qualitativity are the only 
two kinds of feature. But this is a substantial claim that needs some defence.  For example, 
suppose that “being self-identical” is a feature of a power. Arguably, being self-identical is 
not directed toward any distinctive manifestation. Namely, there are no characteristic 
circumstances in which being self-identical is manifested. Yet it is dubious whether being 
self-identical is a genuine qualitative feature. Does being self-identical qualitatively 
contribute to how a property is like? There is no clear answer to this question. Every 
property, be it gerrymandered as you like, has the feature of being self-identical. It seems 
that this feature is best understood as a logical feature or, as E. J. Lowe (2006) puts it, manner 
of existence: a feature that describes how every property goes about the business of existing. 
We should allow the possibility that properties may have dispositional, qualitative, and 
logical features (or, more generally, other features that are neither dispositional nor 
qualitative).  
For the sake of the argument, however, let us grant that (5) can be made more 
plausible. The Actuality Argument would have then the surprising conclusion that powers 
are dispositional and qualitative, namely powerful qualities. 
 The Actuality Argument can be resisted in a number of ways, however. To begin 
with, the pure power theorist can argue that (1) fails to capture the relevant notion of purity. 
Alternatively, she can deny (2) and admit unactualised powers. Premise (3) can be rejected 
as well. The obvious strategy is to argue that the actuality of a power is indeed a dispositional 
feature. This is to say that the actuality of a power has a characteristic manifestation in a 
characteristic circumstance. Think of a continuous stream of a fountain. One could argue 
that it is the manifestation of the actuality of the power of the fountain’s engine. Something 
similar could be argued for the actuality of every power. 
 While the Actuality Argument can be resisted, it carries a certain force. Premise (1) 
is a quite plausible formulation of what a pure power is. To reject (1) leaves unclear the sense 
in which a powers may be pure (cf. Taylor 2018). The admission of unactualised powers is 
an unlovely strategy for it goes against the spirit of Dispositionalism (Chapter 2, §2.2.1). 
This is captured in the Eleatic Stranger’s dictum, which paraphrased states that to be is to be 
a power to make a change in what is going on in the world (Plato, Sophist 247d-e). Arguably, 
unactualised powers make no difference in worldly happenings. 
 Despite its initial plausibility, the strategy of taking actuality as a dispositional 
feature of powers has some implausible consequences. If the actuality of a power P is a 
dispositional feature of P, then P has a power in virtue of its actuality. But this affects the 
65 
 
identity and nature of P. Think of charge as the power to generate an electromagnetic force. 
The identity of charge is determined by the way it empowers its bearers, namely by disposing 
them to produce an electromagnetic force. However, if the actuality of charge is a 
dispositional feature of this property, then charge has an additional power in virtue of its 
actuality. Thus an instance of charge is the power to generate electromagnetic force and the 
power to do something else in virtue of its actuality. Consequently, the identity of such an 
instance of charge is partially determined by its actuality. The same goes for its nature: if the 
actuality of an instance of charge is a dispositional feature, then its nature is partially 
determined by its actuality. But intuitively, the nature of charge has nothing to do with its 
actuality. 
 The above implications sound odd. The pure power theorist is better off by accepting 
that the actuality of a power is not a dispositional feature. Note this is not to say that the 
property of being actual cannot be thought of as a power. Here it is important to distinguish 
between actuality as a property that actual particulars have and actuality as a feature of 
properties. The previous considerations target only actuality understood as a feature of 
properties.  
 If the Actuality Argument is sound, an ontology of pure powers is undermined. 
However, the conclusion of the Actuality Argument does not threaten Dispositionalism. In 
fact, we can hold that all fundamental properties are powers provided that they are not purely 
dispositional properties. 
 The second argument against pure powers is implicitly defended by Martin (1993, 
519–520; 2008, Chapters 5–6). Since it is based on the feature of Independence of powers 
(Molnar 2003, 82–98), let us call it “Independence Argument”. Like the Actuality Argument, 
the original formulation appears to target trope powers and their manifestations (Martin 
2008, 84–88). However, it could be extended at least to powers as thought of as immanent 
universals. The Independence Argument establishes that powers have a non-dispositional 
feature because they can exist when they are not manifested. In its simplest form, it can be 
reconstructed as follows. 
 
(1) A power is pure if and only if it has only dispositional features. 
(2) Every power has the feature of being ontologically independent from the occurrence 
of its manifestation. 
(3) A power’s feature of being ontologically independent from the occurrence of its 
manifestation is not a dispositional feature of it. 
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From (1)–(3) we reach the conclusion: 
 
(4) Every power is not pure. 
 
Premise (1) is the definition of a pure power. Premise (2) captures the feature of 
Independence. For example, an electron has the power to produce an electromagnetic force 
even if it is not occurrently doing so (Chapter 2, §2.2.2). It is more difficult to elucidate 
premise (3). Martin suggests that when a power is not manifested, it exists as a “disposition-
base” (1993, 518). This base is neither “potential being” nor “unactualized possibilia” 
(Martin 2008, 140; presumably, the plural of “possibilia” reflects Martin’s view that the 
same power can be manifested in different ways). Rather the disposition-base is conceived 
of as actual “readiness” or directedness towards some manifestations (Martin 2008, 29); an 
unmanifested power, so to speak, “waits ready to go” (Martin 2008, 55). Recall that the mark 
of dispositionality is Directedness. However, the readiness of an unmanifested power has no 
distinctive manifestation. It is seemingly contradictory to say that an unmanifested power 
has a distinctive manifestation. This is different from claiming that an unmanifested power 
is directed toward a distinctive manifestation. An example will clarify. Consider once again 
the property of having a certain charge. When unmanifested, it exists as a disposition-base 
or actual readiness of an electron, for example. Yet it would be directed toward the 
generation of an electromagnetic force. But its existence as disposition-base or actual 
readiness has no characteristic manifestation.  
 In similar way to the Actuality Argument, it is possible to link the Independence 
Argument with the powerful qualities view. To reach the conclusion that pure powers have 
a qualitative feature, we need the following additional premise, which is the same as the 
Actuality Argument: 
 
(5) If a feature of a property is not dispositional, then it is qualitative. 
 
From (5), we reach the conclusion:  
 
(6) Every power has a qualitative feature. 
 
The Independence Argument is more difficult to resist than the Actuality Argument. Also in 
this case, the pure powers theorist can argue that (1) fails to capture the relevant notion of a 
pure power. But, to repeat, this is to deny a very plausible understanding of what a pure 
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power is. Rejecting premise (2) is not an available option:  every powers view accept 
Independence. As Heil puts it, “it would be mad to require every actual disposition to be 
manifested” (2003, 82).  
An alternative option is to reject premise (3) and argue that the unmanifested 
existence of a power is a dispositional feature. The problem with this strategy is that the 
claim that an unmanifested existence of a power has a distinctive manifestation seems to be 
contradictory. Someone who denies (3) appears to be committed to the odd view, for 
instance, that not generating gravitational force is indeed a manifestation of an instance of 
gravitational charge when it is not manifest. Perhaps this view can be made less obscure. 
However, as it stands, this approach is conceptually unattractive. 
 Overall, it seems that the power theorist is better off by accepting that powers cannot 
be pure. Like the Actuality Argument, the Independence Argument does not threaten non-
pure powers versions of Dispositionalism. It is worth stressing that the Independence and 
Actuality Arguments are plausible reconstruction of remarks made by powerful qualities 
theorists. However, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are independent 
reasons for endorsing the powerful qualities view. It would be a mistake to treat the powerful 
qualities view as hanging on these arguments. 
 
3.1.3 Against Pure Qualities  
The powerful qualities theorist does not offer any original objection against 
Categoricalism, the view that all fundamental properties are qualities. I shall not discuss 
again the arguments against Categoricalism here (see Chapter 2, §2.3.3-§2.3.4). However, 
some considerations in the spirit of those raised against pure powers can be offered against 
a pure qualities version of Categoricalism (here I will not attempt to single out those 
categoricalists who are actually committed to this version). It is possible to construct an 
argument against pure qualities based on the idea that qualities affect our experiences. For 
instance, Heil claims that qualities “produce a certain kind of experience in us” (2003, 111). 
One way to spell out this claim is to say that qualities have certain manifestations or effects 
on conscious observers. To illustrate the idea, consider a scarlet marble. Being scarlet is a 
quality of the marble. Yet is uncontroversial to claim that this quality affects us in a certain 
way: it produces a sensation of scarlet in us. By considering this as dispositional feature of 
qualities, we can assemble what we can call the “Experience Argument” against pure 
qualities. In its simplest form, this argument can be reconstructed as follows. 
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(1) A quality is pure if and only if it has only qualitative features. 
(2) Every quality has the feature of producing a certain experience when it is perceived 
by a conscious observer. 
(3) A quality’s feature of producing a certain experience when it is perceived by a 
conscious observer is a dispositional feature of it. 
 
From (1)-(3), we reach the conclusion that: 
 
(4) Every quality is not pure. 
 
Premise (1) expresses a plausible interpretation of what a pure quality is. Premise (2) 
conveys the idea that qualities affect our experiences when they are perceived. Here we can 
set aside worries related to what a conscious observer is. We can think of it as a paradigmatic 
human being capable of conscious experiences. This is sufficient for the plausibility of (2). 
Premise (3) is the claim that producing a certain kind of experience is a dispositional feature 
of qualities. The idea is that the way a quality affects conscious observers is a manifestation 
of the quality’s dispositionality. From these premises, we reach the conclusion (4). Note that 
the Experience Argument does not rule out the existence of qualities. It only establishes that 
they cannot be really pure.  
 Unsurprisingly, there are several ways to resist the Experience Argument. The pure 
qualities theorist can argue against (1). For example, she might claim that the “purity” of a 
quality has to be understood in a different way. Premise (2) is more difficult to reject. Unless 
one takes them to be unperceivable, it seems that many qualities do produce in us a certain 
kind of experience such as colours, shapes, and smells. However, someone can argue that 
(2) is not true for every quality. The pure qualities theorist might claim that fundamental 
qualities do not affect us in any distinct way. For example, she might argue that we do not 
perceive charge and mass of electrons (provided that these are fundamental qualities). To 
resist this objection, one can argue that we perceive some qualities indirectly. While we do 
not directly perceive the charge and mass of an electron, we do perceive their effects on 
measuring devices. Alternatively, one can even argue that we perceive fundamental qualities 
directly. For example, it can be argued that a bodybuilder who lifts a barbell loaded with 
heavy plates directly perceives its mass. Similarly, when a distracted passer-by touches an 
electric wire, she experiences directly the property of charge.  
 Presumably, the main target against the Experience Argument is premise (3): the pure 
qualities theorist would claim that producing a certain experience is not a dispositional 
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feature of quality. The mere association between the perception of a quality and certain 
experiences does not guarantee that the quality is responsible for their production. The 
impression, one might say, is created by the regular succession of a perception of the quality 
in question and a certain kind of experience. The mistake is therefore to ascribe to a pure 
quality a feature of our experience. Such an objection is in the spirit of Humeanism that the 
pure qualities theorist presumably would endorse. The powerful qualities theorist would 
protest here. She would claim that it is a feature of a quality that is responsible for the way 
in which our experience of that quality is affected. Room for disagreement remains. It is not 
my aim to defend further the Experience Argument. I outlined this argument as a possible 
strategy against pure qualities from the viewpoint of the powerful qualities view. 
 In this section I discussed two possible arguments against pure powers and one 
against pure qualities. If sound, these arguments establish than any project of purely 
dispositional or purely qualitative properties is undermined. Such as a result would be a 
decisive choice-point in favour of the powerful qualities view. However, powerful qualities 
theorists only hint at these arguments. The main consideration in favour of the adoption of a 
conception of powerful qualities is, the powerful qualities theorist contends, that there is no 
real distinction between powers and qualities. 
 
3.1.4 In Medio Stat Virtus? 
 As I shall understand it, the powerful qualities view is committed to the thesis that 
all fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-qualitative, or powerful 
qualities. As Martin puts it:  
 
Properties of entities constitutive of any state of affairs must be qualitative as well as 
dispositional, dispositional as well as qualitative. Dispositionality and qualitativity are 
correlative, complementary, inseparable and covariant when they are displayed in their 
intrinsic irreducible form at the level of the finer interstices of nature. (Martin 2008, 
64) 
 
It is tempting to regard the powerful qualities view as a middle ground between 
Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. But this would be a mistake: powerful qualities are a 
different and unitary kind of properties on a par with dispositional properties and qualitative 
ones. The hyphen in “dispositional-and-qualitative” is meant to capture such a difference. 
 One way to understand the distinctness of powerful qualities as compared to powers 
and qualities is to consider the respective mutual exclusivity of these conceptions. Qualities 
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are not essentially dispositional; in contrast, powers are essentially dispositional (Chapter 2, 
§2.3.1). This characterisation warrants the incompatibility between Dispositionalism and 
Categoricalism. Significantly, it also ensures that a powerful quality is not a conjunction of 
a power and a quality. Fairly obviously, it would be contradictory to claim that a powerful 
quality is essentially dispositional and not essentially dispositional. Thus the nature of a 
powerful quality has to be understood as a distinctive kind in addition to the dispositional 
and the qualitative. The aim of this chapter is to formulate in precise terms what it is for a 
property to be essentially dispositional-and-qualitative, or a powerful quality. To accomplish 
this purpose, in the next section, I will introduce the notion of an aspect. I will then discuss 
the canonical version of powerful qualities view which is committed to a distinctive identity 
claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. This view is known as the 
Identity Theory of powers (Heil 2003). In the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge 
of contradiction (Armstrong 2005, 314; Bird 2007b, 514; Barker 2013, 649). In section §3.3 
I will discuss three plausible ways in which such an identity claim can be understood. This 
will free Identity Theory from some initial obscurities. However, in §3.4, I will offer some 
considerations against any of the suggested readings. As such, my conclusion will be that a 
more promising account of powerful qualities should renounce the identity claim. 
 
3.2 Powerful Qualities 
 
3.2.1 Aspects of Properties 
 A powerful quality is a property that has a dual nature: “in virtue of possessing a 
property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative 
character. The overall dispositionality and qualitative character of an object depend on the 
properties it possesses and relations these bear to one another” (Martin and Heil 1999, 45–
46). To formulate this characterisation in precise terms, I will introduce the notion of an 
aspect. I will then argue that the powerful qualities view is best understood as the view that 
all fundamental properties have essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects.  
 One might protest against the introduction of a new notion for it offends against the 
conceptual economy of the theory. But the theoretical benefits that aspects bring us are well 
worth the entities. The introduction of aspects complicates the framework, but the 
complication will be repaid; once aspects will be commanded, a promising ontology 
emerges. In this section, I will first discuss the metaphysics of aspects. Then I will offer a 
more precise formulation of the notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
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 Aspects are ways of being of properties, or ways properties are. The notion of a way 
of being that I have in mind traces back to Jerrold Levinson (1978). He claims that “an 
object’s ways of being are the varied fashion in which it goes the complicate business of 
existing” (Levinson 1978, 2), but also properties have “ways of being as components” 
(Levinson 1978, 1). The proposal is that aspects are the varied fashion in which properties 
go the business of existing. In more familiar terms, aspects can be understood as higher-
order properties. That is, aspects are borne by properties. Aspects have three important 
qualifications, which I will explain in due course: (i) aspects are ontologically lightweight; 
(ii) aspects ontologically depend on the properties of which they are aspects; (iii) what 
aspects a property has is metaphysically determined by that property’s nature. Of course, 
there are several ways of conceiving of aspects. My claim here is not that the proposed 
conception is the best one. Rather my claim is that the powerful qualities view is best 
understood according to the conception of aspects I wish to defend in this chapter. 
 Despite being vague, the term “way of being” conveys the ontological sense of the 
notion adequately: properties are in some ways or other; these ways are aspects. Thus to say 
that a property has aspects should not be interpreted literally. Rather it is a convenient 
shorthand for saying that a property has some ways of being. Unfortunately, the ambiguity 
is inevitable: it seems that a property has aspects in the same fashion in which a whole is 
constituted or made of parts. As it will become clear in due course, this is a different 
conception from the one under scrutiny. Yet if one bears in mind the previous remark––
namely that “a property has aspects” is a shorthand––the ambiguity becomes tolerable.  
 Aspects are available for almost everyone. If one rejects properties tout court, then 
aspects go away with them. Someone who thinks that properties do not figure in the 
inventory of what exists has no place for aspects either. But if one accepts the existence of 
properties, then she can benefit from the introduction aspects independently from whether 
properties are thought of as Platonic universals or immanent universals or tropes. The choice 
between these views rests on independent factors which I shall not explore here. 
 It is a different story if someone claims that at least some properties must be simple. 
Canonically, a property is simple if it is not constituted by further properties. In contrast, a 
property is complex if it has other properties has its constituents (Armstrong 1997, 31–33). 
For example, the property of having a certain charge is simple. In contrast, the property of 
being a black marble is a complex one, namely it is constituted by the property of being 
black and the property of being a marble. On a liberal interpretation, one could argue that 
properties with aspects are complex. Accordingly, if all properties have aspects and 
properties with aspects are complex, then there are no simple properties. Someone who 
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thinks of this consequence as problematic will spurn the introduction of aspects. However, 
there is no reason for supposing that there must be simple properties. For all we know, the 
world might be fundamentally complex.  
 Aspects, like properties, are available also for those who think that these entities do 
not really exist. Even someone who holds that talk of properties is simply a profitable 
framework to describe the world can benefit from the introduction of aspects.  
 The notion of an aspect appears to be conceptually primitive. That is, it cannot be 
explicated in more basic terms. Nor can it be reduced to other familiar ones. One could 
provide an analysis of aspects in terms of ways of being or higher-order properties. For 
instance, one might say that α is an aspect of a property P just in case α is a way of being of 
P.  But this is not particularly illuminating.  
 Another clarification is needed. The claim that all fundamental properties have 
dispositional and qualitative aspects is not a claim about how many aspects a fundamental 
property has. While it entails that every fundamental property has at least two aspects, the 
claim concerns the kinds of aspect that fundamental properties have. The powerful qualities 
view should be understood as the view that all fundamental properties have two kinds of 
aspects: dispositional and qualitative. But fundamental properties can have countless 
aspects. They can have only a qualitative aspect and several dispositional ones, or the other 
way round. From the armchair, we cannot decide how many aspects a fundamental property 
has. Whatever number of aspects fundamental properties have, on the proposed view, they 
are qualitative and dispositional in kind.  
 One might wonder: what kinds of property have aspects? I will argue that all 
fundamental properties have some dispositional and qualitative aspects. One might think that 
it is fairly unproblematic to think of sparse yet non-fundamental properties as having aspects. 
Here I acknowledge a twofold distinction between sparse and fundamental properties (cf. 
Schaffer 2004). Sparse properties are those invoked by all scientific disciplines that 
investigate nature. Fundamental properties are those sparse properties that are posited by 
fundamental physics. However, it is possible that some sparse non-fundamental properties 
have only either dispositional aspects or qualitative ones. Once again, we cannot assess this 
possibility from the armchair. In this chapter and the ones to come, I will restrict my attention 
to fundamental properties. 
 It might be useful to illustrate a few examples to convey the general idea of aspects. 
Think of the property of having a certain gravitational mass, a putative fundamental property. 
According to the proposal, having a certain gravitational mass has some aspects. This is a 
shorthand for saying that the property of having a certain gravitational mass is in some ways 
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or other. By having a certain gravitational mass, a bearer has the disposition to generate a 
gravitational force. Disposing a bearer to a generate gravitational force is an aspect of, or 
way the property of having a certain gravitational mass is. In more familiar terminology, to 
dispose a bearer to generate a gravitational force is a higher-order property of having a 
certain gravitational mass. 
  Another example. Think of the property of having a certain charge, another putative 
fundamental property. By having a certain charge, a bearer has the disposition to exert a 
force in accordance to Coulomb’s Laws. This is an aspect of the property of having a certain 
charge; it is a way this property is. Alternatively, we can say that having a certain charge has 
the higher-order property of disposing a bearer to exert a force in accordance to Coulomb’s 
Law. 
  Other examples of aspects are the “basic features” of powers (Molnar 2003; Chapter 
2, §2.2.2). For instance, Molnar claims that powers “have an object towards which they are 
oriented or directed”. The object in question is a particular manifestation. This is the so-
called “directedness”, which is “an essential feature of power properties” (Molnar 2003, 60). 
It seems plausible to think of the directedness of powers as an aspect: every power is such 
that it is directed toward a certain manifestation; this is a way every power is. We can say 
that every power has the aspect, or higher-order property of being directed toward a certain 
manifestation. Similar considerations can be offered for the other features of powers. 
 The previous examples can be regarded as paradigmatic examples of aspects of 
properties. I have not discussed yet the notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
However, some of the previous examples regard aspects that are intuitively dispositional. 
But of course intuitions might diverge in other cases. A more precise formulation will give 
us a criterion for discriminating whether an aspect is dispositional or qualitative. But 
inevitably room for disagreement will remain. This is perhaps due to the difficulty of finding 
paradigmatic examples of qualitative aspects. In turn, such a difficulty depends on the 
generality of the notion of qualitativity. But disagreement over cases does not threaten the 
main claim that I want to defend in this dissertation, namely that all fundamental properties 
have dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
 We must acknowledge another possibility: it may be that not all aspects are either 
dispositional or qualitative. For example, someone can argue that every instantiated property 
has the aspect of being instantiated. This is to say that being instantiated is a way every 
instantiated property is. Granted that this could be a genuine aspect, it is unclear whether 
being instantiated is a dispositional or qualitative. Here it is not possible to explore the nature 
of aspects that are neither dispositional nor qualitative. For the purposes of this chapter, two 
74 
 
remarks will suffice: (i) I am not committed to the claim that every aspect is either 
dispositional or qualitative; (ii) the powerful qualities view is not the view that all 
fundamental properties have only dispositional and qualitative aspects. To put it differently, 
a powerful quality may have aspects that are neither dispositional nor qualitative. What 
matters for the truth of the powerful qualities view is that every fundamental properties has 
essentially some dispositional and qualitative aspects. If a powerful quality has extra aspects 
that are neither dispositional nor qualitative, then so be it. However, my focus is on the 
essential aspects of powerful qualities, which I contend are dispositional and qualitative. 
 I will turn now to explain the qualifications of aspects. As previously said, aspects 
are higher-order properties according to an ontologically lightweight sense. On the proposed 
conception, aspects supervene on properties. Since I embrace the standard view that what 
supervenes does not constitute a genuine addition to being, aspects are lightweight entities 
(cf. Armstrong 1982, 7; cf. Armstrong 1997, 11–13). Three analogies with more familiar 
cases may` demystify some initial obscurities.  
 First, consider E. J. Lowe’s idea of manners of existing (2006). Aspects are akin to 
Lowe’s manners of existing (2006, 44–49). In Lowe’s view, properties have a certain 
ontological form. The ontological form a property is the manner of existing of that property. 
It is how a property exists. Crucially, the manners of existing of properties (and other entities) 
do not appear in the inventory of what exists. For example, a manner of existing of a property 
is to be self-identical. According to Lowe, our ontological commitment has to be restricted 
to that property; being self-identical is simply one of its manners of existing. We can truly 
predicate of every property that it is self-identical without endorsing the view that every 
property has the property of being self-identical in a sense that would constitute a genuine 
addition to being.  
 Second, consider David Armstrong’s distinction between thin and thick particulars. 
A thin particular is a particular considered in abstraction from its properties, which are ways 
that particular is (Armstrong 1997, 123). A thick particular is a particular “taken along with 
all and only the particular’s relational properties” (Armstrong 1997, 124). Consider for 
example the particular a and the property F which a instantiates. The thin particular is a 
abstracted from F; the thick particular is, in Armstrong’s view, a’s being F (1997, 125). 
According to the proposed conception of aspects, properties are thick: they are in some ways 
or other. In contrast, aspects are thin: they are ways of being of properties considered in 
abstraction from the property and its other ways. The analogy with Armstrong’s view 
demands caution: first, there are different ways of understanding the distinction between 
thick and thin particulars (Dodd 1999); second, an aspects view does not force us to regard 
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properties as particulars. Universals have ways of being as well as particulars. The choice 
between these two conceptions is independent from the idea of aspects. 
 Lastly, think of the standard view of tropes (Williams 1953; Campbell 1990; Simons 
1994; Maurin 2002; Hakkarainen and Keinänen 2017). According to it, some tropes are 
mereologically simple entities that lack any constituents. Yet these simple tropes are 
individually distinct from each other and primitively resembling to some other ones. These 
features are not entities that simple tropes have. Rather they are, in Lowe’s fashion, “manners 
of existing”: ways in which simple tropes exist (Hakkarainen and Keinänen 2017: 652). 
According to the standard view, these features supervene on simple tropes. If we adopt the 
view that what supervenes is no addition to being (e.g. Campbell 1990, 37; Armstrong 1997), 
features of tropes are “pseudo-additions”. To use a metaphor, God’s creation of a simple 
trope T suffices for T being distinct from any other tropes and T being primitively resembling 
to some other tropes. Significantly, the manners of existing of simple tropes can be 
abstractedly considered (Campbell 1990, 56–57): in thought, we can select the primitive 
resemblance of simple tropes T and T* while neglecting T and T* individual distinctness. 
Of course, the standard view of tropes is not exempt from problems (cf. Daly 1994). 
However, it is not possible to discuss them here. Also in this case, the proposed conception 
of aspects does not require to decide between tropes or universals. 
 Like Lowe’s manners of existing and the feature of simple tropes, aspects do not 
constitute an addition to being with respect to their bearers, which are properties. For 
example, disposing a bearer to generate a gravitational force is an aspect of the property of 
having a certain gravitational mass. Once you have the property of having a certain 
gravitational mass, you get its aspect of disposing a bearer to generate a gravitational force. 
In slogan form, aspects supervene upon the properties of which they are aspects. To use the 
creation metaphor again, God needs only to create properties in order for them to have 
aspects. 
 One might wonder: why not get rid of properties? Why not conceiving of properties 
as bundles of aspects? At first glance, a “bundle view” of aspects seems an attractive option. 
If the role of properties can be exhaustively supplanted by aspects, we could simplify our 
theory by eliminating the latter. On closer inspection, however, a bundle view is problematic. 
The challenge is to explain how aspects are bundled together.  
 A possible strategy is to invoke a relation that plays the “bundling” role. To mirror 
the case of bundles of properties, someone might appeal to a relation of compresence (e.g. 
Williams 1953; Campbell 1990). Roughly, if two or more properties are compresent, then 
they occupy the same spatio-temporal location. Then one can stipulate that when some 
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properties are compresent, they form a bundle (cf. Daly 1994, 259). By adapting the 
compresence relation to the case of aspects, we can say that if two or more aspects are 
compresent, then they form a bundle. Despite its initial plausibility, this strategy is 
unpromising for at least two reasons. 
 First, we need to accept a primitive compresence relation in our ontology. Thus we 
get rid of properties by burdening us with relations. This strategy calls in question the 
parsimony that motivated getting rid of properties in the first place. 
Second, a bundle view of aspects faces the notorious Bradley’s regress (1893, 31–
33; 1935). Let us use Greek letters to denote aspects. The existence of α and β is not sufficient 
for forming a bundle. The appeal to a compresence relation C is meant to solve this problem 
by providing a condition for bundle formation. However, the existence of α, β, and C is not 
sufficient either for the formation of a bundle. In order to form a bundle, α and β must stand 
in the relation C; that is, α and β must be compresent. One can introduce another relation C’ 
to relate C with α and β. But the problem is reiterated: the mere existence of C’ does not 
warrant that C, α, and β stand in the relevant relation. A regress arises. If we invoke another 
relation C’’, the same problem occurs, and so on. There are various strategies to resist 
Bradley’s regress (MacBride 2016). Arguably, these can be tweaked for the case of aspects. 
Yet the fact that such a view does face a regress makes it, at first glance, conceptually 
unattractive. 
 The proposed conception of aspect is preferable for it eschews the regress. To justify 
this claim, we need to consider the second qualification of aspects. This will clarify the idea 
that aspects do not supplant properties.  
 According to the proposed conception, aspects ontologically depend on properties. 
That is, aspects cannot exist independently from the properties of which they are aspects. 
This is because aspects are ways of being of a property. If a property ceases to exist, so it is 
for its aspects. Properties play therefore the role of ontological ground for aspects. One could 
admit ungrounded aspects in order to get rid of properties, but this would require abandoning 
the proposed characterisation: if there are no properties, then aspects cannot be ways 
properties are. Perhaps one could claim that aspects are ways things are. But if so, aspects 
are properties in disguise.  
 Ontological dependence is not the only link between properties and aspects. There is 
a stronger connection that fastens a property and its ways of being. On this proposal, the 
aspects of a property P obtains in virtue of how P is, or P’s nature. To put it differently, how 
a property is like determines its ways of being. This is the third most important qualification 
of the proposed conception of aspects. For example, it is in virtue of the nature of charge 
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that it has the aspects of disposing a bearer to exert and experience a force in accordance to 
Coulomb’s Law is. A friend of essences would say that the aspects of a property are 
determined by or depend on that property’s essence. 
 To use the terminology of grounding, we can say that the aspects of a property are 
grounded in that property. The notion of grounding in question is less technical than the one 
discussed in contemporary metaphysical debates (for a general introduction, see Bliss and 
Trogdon 2014). However, it shares with it at least two relevant features. 
 First, it captures the pre-theoretical sense of the notion of ground. This is the sense 
in which one entity (or more) obtains (or obtain) in virtue of another (or others). Second, the 
grounding relation in question captures the ideas that there is a systematic connection 
between a property and its aspects. It is the nature of a property that metaphysically 
determines its aspects. For example, it is the nature of charge that determines its aspect of 
disposing a bearer to produce an electromagnetic force. It is tempting to regard grounding 
as a metaphysically necessary connection. But this might be mistaken. Thus I shall not be 
committed to the claim that a property has the aspect it has as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity (see Leuenberger 2014 for a discussion on grounding and entailment). However, 
on the proposed conception, a property’s nature determines its aspects. Standardly, this 
entails that such a property has its aspects in every possible world where it exists. 
 Why accepting that aspects hold in virtue of the properties of which they are aspects?  
A relation of metaphysical determination between properties and their aspects accounts for 
their systematic connection. Every instance of charge disposes a bearer to produce an 
electromagnetic force. In contrast, for example, there is no systematic connection between 
instances of charge and the shape of their bearers. One could say that the nature of charge 
includes the disposition to produce an electromagnetic force but not the bestowal of a 
distinctive shape.  
 Of course, there are other ways to account for the systematic connection between a 
property and its aspects. For example, one might claim that laws of nature dictate what 
aspects a property has. Thus the modal force of the determination between a property and its 
aspects reflects the modal force of the laws nature. This approach is a live possibility that 
we are not forced to rule out. At first impression, however, an aspects view that dispenses 
with laws of nature is more parsimonious. Properties have the aspects they have in virtue of 
what they are; there is no need to invoke laws to account for their aspects. One might protest 
that properties cannot do all this work. But a similar objection can be raised against laws. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether this is an expression of a philosophical prejudice or conceals 
a substantial argument against this view. 
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 What aspects a property has cannot be determined a priori. Allowing such a 
possibility would offend against empiricism. The aspects of sparse, or natural properties are 
to be decided by science. Relatedly, aspects reflect the naturalness of their properties. Thus 
some aspects are more natural than others. For example, the aspect of disposing a bearer to 
produce an electromagnetic force is more natural than the aspect of having a certain degree 
of hue of scarlet. One might wonder whether some aspects are fundamental. But given that 
aspects ontologically depends on properties, aspects cannot be absolutely fundamental. Talk 
of fundamental aspects is at best a shorthand for referring to the aspects of fundamental 
properties.  
 No harm is done in embracing the view that all sparse properties have aspects. One 
might think that it is reasonable to extend the previous claim to abundant properties. 
However, there is a looming worry: it is unclear whether for every abundant property A, it 
is meaningful to say that A has any way of being at all. For example, it is unclear whether 
negative properties (whose canonical expression involves negation) have any ways of being 
at all. Suppose to accept the existence of the property of not being self-identical. Is the claim 
that the property of not being self-identical has a way of being intelligible? Does it make it 
any sense to say that the property of not being self-identical is in some way or other? 
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to these questions. It is therefore wise to avoid the 
commitment to the claim that all abundant properties have aspects.  
 A related question arises: do aspects have aspects? One could maintain the view that 
properties have aspects, aspects have other aspects, and so on. A hierarchy of aspects looks 
implausible, but it is just unlovely. The proliferation of aspects does not overpopulate our 
ontology. Recall that aspects are not an ontological addition to being with respect to 
properties. Whether properties have only first-order aspects or countless many higher-order 
ones does not burden our ontology. Someone might raise epistemic concerns with respect to 
this hierarchy of aspects. A view that escapes the charge of implausibility is therefore 
preferable. 
 The aspects view I wish to defend here takes only sparse properties to have aspects. 
We can surely predicate or ascribe characteristics to aspects. But such ascriptions are made 
true by aspects; they are not made true by other higher-order aspects that aspects have. For 
example, an aspect of negative charge is disposing particles to produce an electromagnetic 
force. One could claim that being dispositional is a higher-order aspect of this aspect of 
negative charge. This is a true ascription, but there is no need to posit another aspect in 
addition to it. The aspect of disposing particles to produce electromagnetic force is sufficient 
to ground the truth of the ascription “is dispositional”.  
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 Some other restrictions need to be placed on the kinds of aspect that can be admitted. 
Conjunctions of positive aspects are unproblematic. These are themselves aspects under two 
conditions: first, they are conjunctions of aspects that a property has; second, conjunctions 
of aspects are nothing over and above their conjuncts. Let P be the property with aspects α, 
β and γ. The conjunction (α˄β˄γ) is an aspect of P, but it is not an ontological addition with 
respect to α, β and γ. 
 On the contrary, we need to deny that a property P has disjunctive aspects such as 
(α˅Ω), where Ω is not an aspect of P. While that P has “α or Ω” is true, there is no 
corresponding aspect (α˅Ω) that P has. Unrestricted disjunctions of aspects have worrisome 
implications (for an analogy with properties, see Armstrong 1978a, 20). This is a reason for 
rejecting them. Suppose that P has α but lacks Ω, while Q has Ω but lacks α. The predicate 
“has α or Ω” is true for both P and Q. Yet it does not seem quite right to say that P and Q 
have something in common.  
 In similar vein, we need to reject negative aspects whose canonical expression 
involve negation (e.g. “not disposing a bearer to shatter”). As for negative properties, the 
acceptance of negative aspects leads to implausible consequences (Armstrong 1978a, 23–
29). If properties have negative aspects, then they would always resemble for some aspects. 
For example, suppose that P has α and Q has Ω, but neither P nor Q has β. If negative aspects 
are accepted, then P has ¬β and Q has ¬β. Properties P and Q would resemble with respect 
to something that they do not have. This should not be considered as an objective 
resemblance. The introduction of aspects is extremely serviceable in the analysis of 
resemblance. The previous qualifications will become relevant in Chapter 5 where I will 
discuss this topic in detail. For the sake of completeness, however, I introduced them here. 
 One might ask: are aspects tropes or universals? The answer depends on one’s 
conception of properties. If properties are tropes, then so it is for their aspects; if properties 
are universals, then their aspects are universals. It seems to me that such a qualification is 
not essential: one might accept that properties have aspects without being committed to the 
claim that aspects are universals or tropes. It is not possible to adjudicate the most adequate 
view here. But it is sufficient to note that the decision between particulars and universals 
rests on independent considerations.  
 We are now in position to reformulate the powerful qualities view in light of the 
proposed notion of an aspect. But first let us consider another example to summarise the 
proposal. Think of the property of having a certain charge. According to the view discussed 
so far, having a certain charge has some aspects. This is to say that the property of having a 
certain charge is in some ways or other. An aspect of this property is disposing a bearer to 
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produce an electromagnetic force. This is a way having a certain charge is. On the proposed 
view, this aspect is metaphysically determined, or grounded in the nature of having a charge 
is. Yet the aspect of disposing a bearer to produce an electromagnetic force is not an 
ontological addition to being with respect to the property of having a certain charge. Once 
we have a property of having a certain charge, we get its aspects for free. 
 
3.2.2 Qualitative and Dispositional Aspects 
 The powerful qualities theorist is committed to the thesis that all fundamental 
properties are essentially dispositional-and-qualitative. By appealing to the notion of aspects, 
we can clarify this thesis. A powerful quality is a property that has a dual nature (Martin and 
Heil 1999, 45–56). As Martin puts it, “in virtue of possessing a property, an object possesses 
both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character” (2008, 44). In this 
section, I will argue that we can make sense of this claim by saying that a powerful quality 
is a property having dispositional and qualitative aspects. Thus the powerful qualities view 
can be regarded as the view that all fundamental properties have essentially dispositional 
and qualitative aspects.  
 As a preliminary remark, the claim that all fundamental properties have essentially 
dispositional and qualitative aspects regards the kinds of aspect they have rather than their 
number. Fundamental properties might have countless aspects; the proposed interpretation 
entails only that a fundamental property has at least a dispositional aspect and a qualitative 
one. It cannot be decided a priori how many dispositional and qualitative aspects a 
fundamental properties have. It is possible that some fundamental properties have a 
dominant majority of dispositional aspects and only a minority of qualitative or the other 
way round. It is also possible that some fundamental properties have the same number of 
dispositional and qualitative aspects. The powerful qualities view is compatible with either 
possibility. 
 Let us begin with the formulation of dispositional aspects. This notion is meant to 
capture the idea that by having a property, an object possesses a “particular dispositionality” 
(Martin 2008, 44). This is to say that by possessing a certain powerful quality, a bearer has 
some powers. I shall propose to formulate the relation between a property  and dispositional 
aspects as follows. 
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
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Dispositional Aspect is not a reductive analysis of dispositionality. More modestly, it 
clarifies the relation between dispositional aspects of a property and the possession of certain 
powers, or dispositions that a bearer of that property has. For example, charge has some 
dispositional aspects just in case every charged thing possesses some powers. This seems to 
be the case: every charged thing has, for example, the power to produce an electromagnetic 
force in various circumstances. 
 Another way to grasp the notion of a dispositional aspect is in terms of the bestowal 
upon a bearer of some powers by a property. This is a shorthand for saying that a bearer has 
some powers by having that property. The “bestowal” of some powers is that property’s 
dispositional aspect. However, such an understanding is potentially confusing. It erroneously 
implies that properties bestow upon particulars some powers in the same fashion in which 
monarchs bestow the title of knighthood to some remarkable individuals. But the bestowal 
of a monarch is an action that properties cannot perform. The formulation of Dispositional 
Aspect is less ambiguous, though it captures the same idea.  
 The notion of a qualitative aspect captures the idea that by having a property, an 
object has a “particular qualitative character” (Martin 2008, 44). This is to say that the 
possession of a powerful quality contributes, in some sense, to how a bearer is occurrently 
like. I propose to formulate the notion of a qualitative aspect as follows. 
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspects if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P.  
 
Qualities are a matter of how something is like. They contribute to how a thing is, or its 
“make-up. This term is to be understood in a loose sense: it is meant to capture the various 
ways the possession of a property affects the qualitativity of a bearer. For example, Heil says 
“qualities are ways things are” (2010, 70). In similar vein, Henry Taylor proposes that 
“categorical/qualitative properties essentially contribute to the makeup of how an object is 
now” (2013, 94). Consider once again the property of having a certain charge. According to 
this formulation, if charge has a qualitative aspect, then it qualitatively contributes to the 
make-up of every charged thing. A plausible candidate for being a qualitative aspect of 
charge is having a certain quantity of charge that can be measured in coulombs. This is a 
qualitative contribution of charge to the make-up of charged things. Here I acknowledge that 
the notion of “qualitative contribution” is ambiguous. For present purposes, an intuitive 
grasp of what a qualitative contribution might be is sufficient. We can think of the qualitative 
contribution as the idea that a bearer is in some way or other by virtue of having a property. 
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Like Dispositional Aspect, the formulation of Qualitative Aspect is not a reductive analysis 
of qualitativity. More modestly, it clarifies the relation between a property’s qualitative 
aspect and its possession by a bearer.  
 Equipped with dispositional and qualitative aspects, we can now define a powerful 
quality. The aim here is to regiment the claim that “every property has a dual nature: in virtue 
of possessing a property, an object possesses a particular dispositionality and a particular 
qualitative character” (Martin and Heil 1999: 45–46). I propose the following definition.  
 
Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects. 
 
The definition of Powerful Quality brings us some important benefits. First, it allows us to 
interpret the powerful qualities view as the view that all fundamental properties have 
essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. If this is true, then a putative fundamental 
property such as charge have some dispositional and qualitative aspects. According to the 
proposed formulations, this means that every charged particular has some powers by having 
this property and has some qualitative aspects that contribute to its make-up. Second, it 
represents an improvement in precision with respect to the standard characterisation of 
powerful qualities. However, that most significant merit that the introduction of aspects 
brings us concern the Identity Theory of powers, which is the canonical version of powerful 
qualities. As its name implies, the Identity Theory is committed to a controversial identity 
claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, the Identity 
Theory faces the charge of contradiction (e.g. Armstrong 2005, 315; Bird 2007b, 514; Barker 
2013, 649). This obfuscates the merits of a conception of powerful qualities. We should 
therefore explore an alternative account. The notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects 
serve the purpose well. In the next section, I will first present the Identity Theory. Then I 
will discuss three prima facie promising ways to disambiguate it by appealing to a distinction 
between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity.  
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3.3 The Identity Theory of Powers 
 
3.3.1 A Surprising Identity 
 In its canonical version, the powerful qualities view is committed to a distinctive 
identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. This version is 
known as the Identity Theory of powers (Heil 2003; 111).8 
 The central tenet of the Identity Theory is that “the qualitative and dispositional are 
identical with one another and with the unitary intrinsic property itself” (Martin 2008, 65). 
This claim has been regimented by Heil as follows: 
 
If P is an intrinsic property of a concrete object, P is simultaneously dispositional and 
qualitative; P’s dispositionality and qualitativity are not aspects or properties of P; P’s 
dispositionality, Pd, is P’s qualitativity, Pq, and each of these is P: Pd = Pq= P. (Heil 
2003, 111. Original emphasis.) 
 
For clarity’s sake, let us focus on the relevant part of this claim. We can reformulate it 
follows.  
  
Identity: a property P’s dispositionality is P’s qualitativity, and each of these is P. 
 
In the literature, Identity faces the charge of contradiction. For example, David Armstrong 
says: 
 
I confess that I find this [Identity] totally incredible. If anything is a category mistake, 
it is a category mistake to identify a quality – a categorical property – and a power, 
essentially something that points to a certain effect. (Armstrong 2005, 315) 
 
In same vein, Stephen Barker claims that the Identity Theory “looks incoherent” (2013, 649). 
Similarly, Alexander Bird argues that “a property cannot be both a potency and a categorical 
property” (2007b, 514).  Since the identity theorist does not think of her view as incoherent, 
Identity must be understood in a different sense. As it happens, identity theorists hint at 
different readings of Identity. This leaves unclear which one is the most adequate. In what 
follows, I will discuss three plausible interpretations of Identity in light of a distinction 
                                                          
8 Others that endorse that Identity Theory are Martin (2008), Strawson (2008a), Jacobs (2011), Taylor 
(2013), Carruth (2016), Jaworski (2016).  
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between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity. Of course, the proposed readings 
do not exhaust the interpretative options. As I will explain in due course, the proposed 
readings are rather well-suited to capturing the spirit of the Identity Theory. 
 The idea that there are various ways of making sense of Identity presupposes the 
coherence of this claim. So let us begin by defusing the charge of contradiction. This 
accusation hangs on a characterisation of the qualitative as non-dispositional: of course, if 
we define the qualitative as non-dispositional, Identity is contradictory. But the identity 
theorist simply does not conceive of the qualitative in opposing terms to the dispositional. 
Rather they take qualitativity to be a matter of how a thing is occurrently like. For example, 
Heil says that “qualities are categorical; qualities are here and now, actual, not merely 
potential, features of the objects of which they are qualities” (2012, 59). Elsewhere, he 
claims that “ways things are are qualities” (Heil 2010, 70). If we understand qualitativity as 
a matter of how something is occurrently like, then there is no contradiction in claiming that 
the qualities of a thing are identical with its powers. 
 While the previous understanding of qualitativity escapes the charge of contradiction, 
the question of whether it is possible to characterise the notion of qualitativity in more 
informative terms remains (see Taylor 2018 for various interpretations). But, as Ingthorsson 
(2013) notes, this task does not burden only the identity theorists. Friends of Categoricalism 
face it as well. As such, the lack of a precise notion of qualitativity does not represent a 
strong objection against the Identity Theory. 
 The previous clarification frees the Identity Theory from the charge of contradiction. 
However, it remains the question of how to understand the notions of dispositionality and 
qualitativity in Identity. Martin and Heil, who are leading proponents of this view, hint at 
different readings. For example, they say: 
 
We hold that every property has a dual nature: in virtue of possessing a property, an 
object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character. 
[…] A ball’s sphericity, for instance, gives it (in concert with the ball’s other 
properties) a distinctive appearance and disposes it in particular ways. (It will roll, for 
instance, and reflect light in a certain pattern.) (Martin and Heil 1999, 45–46) 
 
A property’s dispositionality and qualitativity must be thought of as unrealizable limits 
for different ways of being of that property. (Martin and Heil 1999, 46–47) 
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The previous passages strongly suggest that qualitativity and dispositionality are ontological 
notions: they concern the nature of certain properties, or how they are. However, other 
remarks imply a conceptual reading of the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity. For 
example, Martin and Heil also claim: 
 
The dispositional and the qualitative are […] simply different ways of representing the 
selfsame property […] what is dispositional and what is qualitative are one and the 
same property differently considered: considered as what the property exhibits of its 
nature, and considered as what the property is directive and selective for as its 
manifestations. (Martin and Heil 1999, 47) 
 
Crudely speaking, in this sense, dispositionality and qualitativity are ways of regarding a 
property. An immediate question arises: what is the most adequate reading of Identity? The 
ontological and conceptual readings of Identity are clearly distinct. The distinction reveals a 
number of interesting possibilities: some views can be committed to one sense but not the 
other, while others can endorse both of them (I believe this is Martin’s and Heil’s view). 
Relatedly, some objections might target only one reading but not the other. The distinction 
between these two senses of Identity also improves the precision of the view. These are good 
reasons to examine it further. I shall therefore propose to take seriously the idea that there 
are two senses in which dispositionality and qualitativity can be understood: according to an 
ontological sense, dispositionality and qualitativity are ways of being of a property; 
according to a conceptual sense, dispositionality and qualitativity are ways of considering a 
property. In light of such a distinction, I will discuss three plausible readings of Identity. 
Dispositional and qualitative aspects will prove extremely serviceable in this task. However, 
it is useful to begin by considering the motivations for adopting Identity in the first place. 
 
3.3.2 Inseparability 
 The identity theorist holds that the powerful qualities view is not a conjunctive view 
of properties. It is tempting to think of a powerful quality as a conjunction or “compound” 
of dispositional and qualitative parts: this is a natural way of interpreting the claim that 
properties are dispositional and qualitative (an example of this view has been offered by 
Taylor 2018). The identity of a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity is the most 
straightforward strategy to block this temptation: if the dispositionality and qualitativity of 
a property are identical to each other and the property itself, then a property cannot be a 
compound of them. This is not to say that a “compound” view is impossible (e.g. Taylor 
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2018); simply, it is a different view from the Identity Theory (I will discuss a compound 
view of powerful qualities in Chapter 4). 
 However, the identity theorist also claims that we can regard the same unitary 
property in different ways—as the conceptual reading of Identity suggests. In doing so, we 
engage in a process of abstraction: we selectively consider a property according to one of its 
features while neglecting other ones (Martin 2008, 134–136). This idea echoes the Lockean 
notion of partial consideration. We can partially consider the same property as a power or 
quality in the same fashion in which we can regard the duck-rabbit ambiguous figure as a 
duck or rabbit (Martin 2008, 65–68). Thus the distinction between dispositionality and 
qualitativity is possible only in thought. In contrast, there is no real distinction in reality 
between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. Here scholastic philosophers 
would say that there is a distinction of reason between dispositionality and qualitativity, but 
not a real distinction.  
 In contemporary terms, a distinction of reason is a conceptual distinction or a 
distinction in description. Thus distinctions of reasons exist only “in our thought” (Descartes 
1645–46, 3.280–1). For instance, we can describe a triangle in terms of its sides or angles. 
The distinction between triangularity and trilaterality is conceptual in the sense that 
triangularity and trilaterality involve different concepts: the former is a matter of angles; the 
latter is a matter of sides. In contrast, a real distinction exists “outside our thought” (ibid). 
Namely, it concerns things that can exist separately in reality (cf. Strawson 2008a, 271). For 
example, trilateral and triangular objects cannot exist apart in reality; in contrast, ravens and 
desks can. Therefore, there is a real distinction between ravens and desks. 
 A distinction of reason is compatible with inseparability in reality. Consider a 
pyramidal sculpture. We cannot separate the shape from the sculpture in reality. Any attempt 
would mean the destruction of the sculpture. However, in our thought, we can separate the 
shape from the sculpture.  
 In similar fashion, a powerful quality’s dispositionality and its qualitativity “cannot 
be prized apart” in reality (Martin and Heil 1999, 46–47; cf. Heil 2003, 247). The division 
between dispositionality and qualitativity occurs in conception only, namely it is the product 
of partially considering a property. So it appears that the identity theorist endorses two 
distinctive claims: first, a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity are inseparable in 
reality; second, we can consider the same property as a power or quality. We can reformulate 
these claims more precisely as follows: 
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Inseparability: the dispositionality and qualitativity of every sparse property cannot be 
separated in reality. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
This way of characterising Inseparability and Partial Consideration is not to be ascribed to 
any identity theorist in particular. Yet it captures accurately the commitments of an advocate 
of the Identity Theory. We have to recall that the Identity Theory is a thesis about the nature 
of fundamental properties. However, the considerations and examples invoked to motivate 
Inseparability and Partial Consideration strongly suggest that at least these claims concern 
sparse yet non-fundamental properties. The restriction on sparse properties is also necessary 
to avoid some obvious counterexamples. An abundant, complex property whose constituents 
are distinct powers and qualities would be a counterexample to Inseparability. If logical 
properties such as that of being self-identical were neither sparse nor dispositional or 
qualitative, then they would represent a counterexample to Partial Consideration. 
 According to what has been discussed so far, the identity theorist appears to be 
committed to three distinct claims: Identity, Inseparability and Partial Consideration. In 
addition to these claims, she also endorses the powerful qualities view: the thesis that all 
fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-qualitative. Having clarified the 
motivations for the adoption of Identity, I will now turn to discuss the two senses of 
dispositionality and qualitativity.  
 
3.3.3 Conceptual Identity 
 It is convenient to begin with the conceptual sense of dispositionality and 
qualitativity. In this sense, dispositionality and qualitativity are best understood as ways of 
considering a property. As Heil puts it, in this sense “a property’s dispositionality and its 
qualitativity are, as Locke might have put it, the selfsame property differently considered” 
(2003, 112). 
 There are at least two distinct interpretations of the idea of ways of considering a 
property. Accordingly, we can formulate two versions of Identity in the conceptual sense. 
On one interpretation, Identity is a claim about the ways in which we can conceptualize the 
same property. Let us call this interpretation Identityc. 
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Identityc: the dispositional way of conceptualizing a property P and the qualitative way 
of conceptualizing P are ways of conceptualizing one and the same property P. 
 
Here the details of the dispositional and qualitative ways of conceptualizing a property are 
unimportant. For present purposes, it is sufficient to bear in mind that they are mental acts 
of thinking of a property as a power or quality. For example, the dispositional way of 
conceptualizing charge is a way of conceiving of charge as the power to produce an 
electromagnetic force; the qualitative way of conceptualizing charge is a way of thinking of 
charge as the quality of having a certain quantity of coulombs. There can be many ways of 
dispositionally or qualitatively conceptualizing the same property. For example, we can 
think of a multi-track power in accordance with each of its manifestations in a specific 
circumstance. Each of these ways of thinking of a multi-track power is a dispositional way 
of conceptualizing it. Thus Identityc should not be interpreted as the claim there is only one 
way of dispositionally or qualitatively conceptualizing a certain property. In Identityc, the 
identity in question is analogous to the claim that we can perceive in different ways the same 
ambiguous figure. For example, the duck-perception and the rabbit-perception are distinct 
ways of perceiving the same duck-rabbit illustration. Identityc is therefore a claim about the 
sameness of reference of the dispositional and qualitative ways of conceptualizing.  
 According to another interpretation, dispositionality and qualitativity can be 
understood as descriptions of a property. Identity can be formulated as Identityd, which can 
be regarded as the linguistic counterpart of Identityc. In this case, the identity in question has 
to with the sameness of the reference of the dispositional and qualitative descriptions of a 
property. 
 
Identityd: the dispositional description of a property P and the qualitative description 
of P denote one and the same property P. 
 
Plausibly, a dispositional description of a property involves dispositional locutions or 
predicates such as “is disposed to … when …” or “has the disposition to … when …” (Bird 
2007a, p.20) However, a dispositional description of a property may also involve covert 
dispositional predicates or locutions, namely terms that do not explicitly refer to a disposition 
and its manifestation. An example of a covert dispositional term is “fragility”, which 
corresponds to the “disposition to shatter when struck” (ibid.). In contrast, we can think of a 
qualitative description as one that does not involve covert or overt dispositional locutions. 
For example, a dispositional description of a diamond’s hardness “is the diamond’s 
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disposition to scratch glass when raked across its surface”; a qualitative description is “the 
diamond’s tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms” (cf. Jaworski, p. 54). The identity 
between dispositional and qualitative descriptions is analogous with the property is 
analogous to the identity between “The Morning Star” and “The Evening Star” with the 
planet Venus. 
The interpretation of Identity as Identityd is suggested by William Jaworski, who 
writes: 
 
The identity theory of powers claims that one and the same property plays a variety of 
theoretical roles which we express using different vocabularies. Sometimes we use a 
dispositional vocabulary, other times we use a nondispositional one. […] According 
to the identity theory, though, these vocabularies describe the very same properties; 
they just bring out the different theoretical roles these properties play. (Jaworski 2016, 
54) 
 
As for the ways of conceptualizing a property, Identityd should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that there is only one dispositional or qualitative description of a property.  
 The identity in Identityd is analogous to the identity between “The Morning Star” and 
“The Evening Star” with the planet Venus. These ways of picking out Venus are identical in 
the sense of having the same referent. The same can be said for the notions of qualitativity 
and dispositionality in Identityd.  
 On closer inspection, the conceptual sense of Identity reveals two distinct claims: 
Identityc and Identityd. I shall postpone the discussion of their plausibility to §3.4. Here few 
remarks will suffice. My claim is not that identity theorist should fix on either Identityc or 
Identityd. Nor is that Identityc and Identityd are the best ways of interpreting the conceptual 
sense of Identity. My claim is weaker, namely that Identityc or Identityd are plausible readings 
which capture the conceptual sense of Identity. Crucially, there is no contradiction in 
claiming that we can conceptualize one and the same property in different ways. Similarly, 
there is no contradiction in claiming that we can describe one and the same property using 
different vocabularies. Identityc and Identityd clarify how the identity theorist escapes the 
charge of contradiction. Therefore, the distinction represents a beneficial improvement in 
precision of the Identity Theory.  
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3.3.4 Ontological Identity 
 In the ontological sense, I submit that dispositionality and qualitativity are best 
regarded ways of being of properties. As Martin and Heil suggest it, “a property’s 
dispositionality and qualitativity must be thought of as unrealizable limits for different ways 
of being of that property (1999, 46–47). 
 The notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects (§3.2) are extremely serviceable 
to clarify the ontological sense of Identity. For the sake of brevity, I shall not repeat the 
characterisation of aspects in its entirety. It is sufficient to recall that aspects are ways of 
being of properties. In more familiar terms, they can be understood as higher-order properties 
with a few important qualifications: (i) aspects are lightweight higher-order properties; (ii) 
aspects ontologically depend on the properties of which they are aspects; and (iii) it is the 
nature of a property that determines its aspects. 
 According to this proposal, Identity in the ontological sense can be regarded as a 
claim about the relation between a property’s dispositional and qualitative aspects and the 
property itself. Since aspects and properties are different kinds of entity, we cannot appeal 
to numerical identity to formulate the ontological sense of Identity. A more promising 
formulation which captures the ontological sense of dispositionality and qualitativity is the 
following one. 
 
Identityo: there is no real distinction between a property P’s dispositional aspect and 
P’s qualitative aspect, and each of these aspects belongs to one and the same 
property P.9 
 
It is worth noting that Identityo is somewhat different from the original Identity claim. This 
is because aspects are lightweight entities. So they cannot be the relata of the standard 
numerical identity relation. An opponent could argue that Identityo would be untenable if 
this were a claim about the numerical identity of aspects. One way to preserve the spirit of 
the Identity Theory is to say that there is no real, ontologically robust distinction between a 
property dispositional aspect and its qualitative one. This interpretation captures the identity 
theorist’s claim that a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity are not ontic, 
ontologically robust higher-order properties (Heil 2003, 118–119). An example will clarify. 
Consider the property of having a certain mass. According to Identityo, the dispositional 
aspect of disposing a bearer to produce a gravitational force is not really distinct from the 
                                                          
9 Recall that a powerful quality may have more than one dispositional and qualitative aspects. Of course, 
Identityo can be understood as a claim about all aspects that a powerful quality has.  
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aspect of conferring a bearer a certain quantity of matter. Presumably, the advocate of 
Identityo would argue that the distinction between these aspects of mass is in thought only 
and, as such, it does not demarcate a distinction in reality. 
 The second part of Identityo concerns the relation between a property’s aspects and 
the property itself. Also in this case, the plausibility of Identityo requires us to amend the 
numerical identity between the aspects and the property. Here we have various options. One 
way to preserve the spirit of the original Identity is to hold that the dispositional and 
qualitative ways of being of a property belong to a single and unitary property. Such an 
interpretation allows us to capture the identity theorist’s claim that a powerful quality is not 
a conjunctive property of some sort (cf. Heil 2003, 118–119). 
It seems to me that Identityo is well-suited to capturing the ontological reading of 
Identity. Recall that to say that a property has dispositional and qualitative aspects should 
not be taken literally. Rather it is a convenient shorthand for saying that “in virtue of 
possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular 
qualitative character” (Martin 2008, 44). 
 Inspection of Identity reveals three distinct readings: Identityc and Identityd are 
conceptual claims about the ways we can consider properties; Identityo is an ontological 
claim about the nature, or ways of being of properties. The identity theorist is now in a 
position to elucidate her view. 
   
3.4 Toward a Dual-Aspect Account of Powerful Qualities 
 
3.4.1 Is Qualitativity identical with Dispositionality? 
 An immediate question arises: are Identityc, Identityd, and Identityo plausible readings 
of Identity? In this section I will argue that even if they were not, we would not be forced to 
abandon the powerful qualities view tout court. However, my claim is not that if Identityc, 
Identityd, and Identityo are false or ill-suited to capturing the distinctive claim the identity 
theorist wishes to make, then Identity should be rejected. There may be other readings of 
Identity. My aim is not to show the falsity of the Identity Theory, but that we can articulate 
an account of powerful qualities that is not committed to any of the suggested readings of 
Identity. The claim is therefore conditional: if Identityc, Identityd, and Identityo were false, it 
would be still possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities. Aspects 
elucidate such a possibility.  
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3.3.5 No Asymmetry 
 To begin with, let us focus on the plausibility of Identityc and Identityd. Both readings 
involve the conceptual sense of dispositionality and qualitativity. This warrants a unified 
treatment. Against these interpretations, one could argue that they are compatible with 
ontological views that privilege either the dispositional over the categorical or the other way 
round. By contrast, the powerful qualities theorist is committed to the claim that there is “no 
asymmetry” (Martin and Heil 1999, 46) between a property’s dispositionality and its 
qualitativity; they are “equally basic and irreducible” (ibid.) and there is “no direction of 
priority or dependence” among them (ibid.). The identity theorist should preserve this idea. 
By contrast, the previous possibility threatens the commitment to the equal basicness of 
dispositionality and qualitativity.  
Suppose that “charge’s dispositionality” is a description of charge in terms of the 
disposition to produce an electromagnetic force, while “charge’s qualitativity” is a 
description of charge in terms of quantity of coulombs. A categoricalist, who holds that all 
fundamental properties are qualities, can accept that “charge’s dispositionality” and 
“charge’s qualitativity” denote the same property of charge and yet she can maintain that 
charge’s dispositionality depends on its qualitativity. Similarly, a dispositionalist, who 
maintains that all fundamental properties are powers, can accept the sameness of reference 
of “charge’s dispositionality” and “charge’s qualitativity” while denying that the 
dispositionality and qualitativity of charge are equally basic. Identityc and Identityd cannot 
block these views because they are conceptual claims. In contrast, the claim that a property’s 
dispositionality and qualitativity are equally basic is an ontological claim. Thus to preserve 
the equal basicness, or no asymmetry of dispositionality and qualitativity, the identity 
theorist ought to look for an ontological reading of Identity. 
 There is a related problem with Identityc and Identityd. If the Identity Theory were 
only a claim about the ways of conceptualizing or describing certain properties, then it would 
be explanatorily weaker than its main rivals: Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. Albeit 
contentious, these doctrines offer a positive account about the nature of fundamental 
properties. Thus Dispositionalism and Categoricalism provide us with an ontological ground 
for the fundamental properties of our world. In contrast, Identityc and Identityd are silent 
concerning the nature of fundamental properties. In order to vindicate the superiority of the 
Identity Theory as compared to Dispositionalism and Categoricalism, one must embrace an 
ontological reading of Identity. However, also Identityo faces criticism. 
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3.3.3 Is There a Real Distinction between Aspects?  
 Identityo is a more promising option for it captures the ontological sense of 
dispositionality and qualitativity. Recall that the notion of a dispositional aspect captures the 
core idea of dispositionality, which is a matter of the powers a thing has by virtue of having 
a certain property. The notion of a qualitative aspect conveys the core idea of qualitativity, 
which is a matter of how a thing is like. By embracing Identityo, we capture the idea that the 
Identity Theory is an ontological claim about the nature of properties. Relatedly, we preserve 
the distinctive commitment to the idea that there is no real distinction between a property’s 
dispositionality and its qualitativity. However, also Identityo faces an objection.  
 A possible argument goes as follows. By virtue of a property P’s dispositional aspect, 
there is a power or cluster of powers that every bearer of P possesses (note that this objection 
does not require the adoption of any substantial view about the “by virtue of relation” 
between a property and its aspects). In contrast, there is no power or cluster of powers that 
every bearer of P possesses by virtue of P’s qualitative aspects. Therefore, dispositional and 
qualitative aspects are distinct. To illustrate this argument, consider the following example. 
Suppose that the property of having a certain mass is a powerful quality. By virtue of a 
dispositional aspect of having a certain mass, a particle has the power to generate 
gravitational force. In contrast, there is no power that the particle has by virtue of a 
qualitative aspect of mass such that of having a certain quantity of matter. The opponent of 
Identityo would claim that this is just a qualitative contribution of the property of having a 
certain mass to the occurrent make-up of the particle. 
 The argument against Identityo seems to be compelling. However, the identity theorist 
could respond, for example, that the distinction between these aspects is in thought only. As 
such, having a certain quantity of matter is not really distinct from the aspect of disposing a 
bearer to generate a gravitational force. To my knowledge, no identity theorist has explicitly 
advocated Identityo. It is therefore unclear whether the identity theorist would adopt this 
strategy to resist the previous objection. Since it is not my aim to show the falsity of Identityo, 
I concede that there might be a way to salvage the claim that there is no real distinction 
between a property’s dispositional aspects and its qualitative ones. It is worth repeating that 
my aim in this section is different, namely to show that it is possible to articulate an account 
of powerful qualities that is not committed to any of the suggested readings of Identity. Thus 
if each of the proposed readings of Identity were to fail, it would be still possible to endorse 
an account of fundamental powerful qualities. This is good news for those who think that 
the previous argument establishes the falsity of Identityo. 
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Of course, the identity theorist could resist the previous objections against Identityc, 
Identityd, and Identityo by claiming that the opponent failed to understand Identity. This 
strategy is always available, but not particularly insightful. So let us suppose, for the sake of 
the argument, that the opponent is right, namely that Identityc, Identityd, and Identityo are 
plausible interpretations of Identity but ill-suited for its tenability. Shall we abandon the 
powerful qualities view? It does not seem so. The introduction of dispositional and 
qualitative aspects paves the way toward a novel account that renounces Identity. 
  
3.3.4 Towards an Alternative Account of Powerful Qualities  
 The view that the nature of every fundamental property is essentially qualitative-and-
dispositional is independent from any of the suggested readings of Identity. Thus it is 
possible to endorse the powerful qualities view while renouncing Identity. Such a possibility 
clears the way to a more promising account of powerful qualities. I shall explore this 
alternative view in detail in Chapter 4. But let us proceed with order.  
 Call Powerful Qualities View the thesis that all fundamental properties are essentially 
dispositional-and-qualitative. The independence of Powerful Qualities View and Identityc is 
evident: the nature of fundamental properties does not depend on the ways in which we 
conceptualize them. Similarly, the ways in which we conceptualize fundamental properties 
do not depend on their nature (though the former might be informed by the latter). There is 
no contradiction in accepting Powerful Qualities View while denying Identityc. Likewise, 
there is no contradiction is embracing Identityc while denying Powerful Qualities View.  Also 
Identityd and Powerful Qualities View are independent: someone can accept that we have 
different ways of describing one and the same property while denying that the all 
fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-qualitative. Alternatively, someone 
may endorse Powerful Qualities View while rejecting Identityd on the grounds, for example, 
that the referents of dispositional and qualitative descriptions are different. None of these 
combinations faces a contradiction.  
Lastly, Powerful Qualities View is independent from Identityo. The former can be 
regarded as the claim that all fundamental properties have essentially dispositional and 
qualitative aspects (§3.2.2). This claim neither entails nor depends on the identity of the 
aspects of fundamental properties. That is, it is possible to maintain that all fundamental 
properties have essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects without being committed to 
their identity. Of course, the opposite does not hold: Identityo implies that (sparse) properties 
have dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
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 Overall, Powerful Qualities View is independent from any of the proposed readings 
of Identity. This is good news for Identityc, Identityd and Identityo were false, it would be still 
possible to hold that all fundamental properties are powerful qualities. 
It is worth noting that Identity is also independent from the other two claims that 
powerful qualities theorists embrace: Inseparability (§3.3.2) and Partial Consideration 
(§3.1.1).  
 
Inseparability: the dispositionality and qualitativity of every sparse property cannot be 
separated in reality. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
In Inseparability, we can replace dispositionality and qualitativity with dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. The substitution is legitimate for Inseparability is a claim about the ways 
a property is. Now we can observe that the inseparability of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects does not depend on their identity. Namely, it is possible to adopt Inseparability 
without embracing Identityo. An identity relation is the strongest way to tie the aspects of a 
property together, but it is not the sole strategy. For example, one can argue that aspects of 
a property are inseparable in virtue of some laws of nature or as a matter of brute fact. It is 
not my aim to adjudicate between these options. For purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient 
to note that we can endorse Inseparability while denying Identityo without facing any 
contradiction (I will return to this topic in Chapter 4, §4.3.3). 
 Partial Consideration is a claim about the ways in which we can consider a property. 
It is therefore analogous to Identityc and Identityd. I have already argued that these claims are 
compatible with different views about the nature of fundamental properties. For example, 
both the categoricalist and the dispositionalist can hold Identityc and Identityd and yet they 
have opposing views about the nature of fundamental properties. This means that Partial 
Consideration is independent from Identityo. Thus we can embrace Partial Consideration 
and Powerful Qualities View while renouncing Identityo. 
 The way towards an alternative account of powerful qualities is now clear: we can 
abandon Identity and yet embrace Powerful Qualities View, Inseparability and Partial 
Consideration. A detailed examination of such an account will be the focus of the chapters 
to come. The notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects will play a central role in 
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articulating this view. For this reason, I will call it “Dual-Aspect Account” of powerful 
qualities. 
 Let me conclude with a summary of this chapter.  In §3.1 I introduced the powerful 
qualities view as a superior account with respect to Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. 
There I discussed three possible arguments against ontologies that take all fundamental 
properties to be pure powers and pure qualities. In §3.2 I illustrated in detail the novel notion 
of an aspect of a property. The introduction of aspects is extremely serviceable to formulate 
the powerful qualities view. It is in fact possible to regard it as the thesis that all fundamental 
properties have essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. Then in §3.3 I discussed the 
canonical version of powerful qualities view: the Identity Theory of powers. In the literature, 
the Identity Theory faces serious criticism due to a contentious identity claim between a 
property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. To disambiguate it, I proposed a distinction 
between two senses of the notions of dispositionality and qualitativity. I then discussed three 
possible ways of reformulating the identity claim in light of such a distinction. I argued that 
these readings free the Identity Theory from some initial obscurities. However, in §3.4, I 
offered some consideration against each of them. I concluded that even if the identity claim 
were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to maintain a conception 
of fundamental powerful qualities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A DUAL-ASPECT ACCOUNT OF PROPERTIES 
 
Metaphysics is not governed by science. But it must be informed by science, since it 
must not involve claims about the world that have been empirically refuted. But while 
metaphysics is constrained by science, it also extends past science to engage with the 
nature of parts of the world that science ignores or presupposes, because it involves 
speculative theses and assumptions that are either unnoticed, ignored or simply 
assumed as obviously true in scientific theorizing. (Paul 2012, 222) 
 
The most straightforward test of an ontological thesis is its overall power to its 
competitors: which thesis best accounts for features of the world we encounter in 
science and in everyday life? (Heil 2003, 128) 
 
 
4.1 A Two-Category Ontology 
 
4.1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
According to the Identity Theory, all fundamental properties of our world are essentially 
qualitative and dispositional, or powerful qualities. Two main motivations underlie this 
view:  first, its superiority over Dispositionalism and Categoricalism (Chapter 2); second, 
the belief that a satisfactory ontology of fundamental properties should not separate the 
dispositional and the qualitative.  
The identity theorist contends that we need to give an account of what things are 
disposed to do in certain circumstances and how things are like independently from what 
they do. For example, we have to account for the fact that negatively charged particles 
generate a repulsive force when they interact with other negatively charged particles and yet 
having a negative charge is a matter of how a particle is like—independently from whether 
or not it is manifesting any repulsive force. 
 In Chapter 3, I illustrate the Identity Theory as the view committed to the following 
claims: 
 
Powerful Qualities View: all fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-
qualitative, or powerful qualities. 
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Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
Inseparability: the dispositionality and qualitativity of every sparse property cannot be 
separated in reality. 
  
Identity: a property P’s dispositionality is P’s qualitativity, and each of these is P. 
 
In the same chapter, I discussed three plausible interpretations of Identity: Identityc, Identityd, 
and Identityo. These are formulated as follows.
10 
 
Identityc: the dispositional way of conceptualizing a property P and the qualitative way 
of conceptualizing P are ways of conceptualizing one and the same property P. 
 
Identityd: the dispositional description of a property P and the qualitative description 
of P denote one and the same property P. 
 
Identityo: there is no real distinction between a property P’s dispositional aspect and 
P’s qualitative aspect, and each of these aspects belongs to one and the same 
property P.  
 
However, I argued that each of these reading faces challenging objections. We should 
therefore explore an account of powerful qualities that renounces Identity. I concluded 
Chapter 3 by showing how the independence of Identity, in any of the above readings, from 
Powerful Qualities View, Inseparability and Partial Consideration clears the ways to a more 
promising view. The aim of this chapter is to elaborate this view. In the remaining ones, I 
will discuss some of its most important merits. I shall call this new account of powerful 
qualities “Dual-Aspect Account”. As I will explain, the idea that all fundamental properties 
have essentially some dispositional and qualitative aspects plays a central role in its 
articulation. These notions capture in a more precise way the idea that “in virtue of 
possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular 
qualitative character” (Martin and Heil 1999, 45–46). 
                                                          
10 Recall that the identity theorist leaves open the possibility that a property can have more dispositional 
and qualitative ways of conceptualizing, descriptions, and aspects (Chapter 3, §3.3). The proposed 
readings of Identity must be understood accordingly.   
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Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspect if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P. 
 
The plan is as follows. In the remainder of this section, I will lay out the metaphysical 
backbone of the Dual-Aspect Account. In §4.2, I will defend the idea of dispositional and 
qualitative aspects from an objection raised by John Heil (2003). In the same section, I will 
also discuss two other aspect views that can be found in the literature different conception 
of aspects that can be found in the literature: Kristina Engelhard’s (2010) and Henry Taylor’s 
(2018). Lastly, in §4.3, I will examine how the notions of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects elucidate the claims Powerful Qualities View, Inseparability, and Identity.  
 
4.1.2 Substance and Property 
 John Heil (2012) and C. B. Martin (2008), who are the leading proponents of the 
Identity Theory, maintain a two-category ontology: the fundamental constituents are 
substances (or property-bearers), namely concrete objects, and properties that are ways 
concrete objects are. This ontology fits well with the Dual-Aspect Account. The articulation 
of the Dual-Aspect Account is a distinctive metaphysical project. It is desirable that any 
metaphysical project is informed by scientific findings, but science does not govern 
metaphysics. In what follows I will maintain the spirit of the inquiry so far: it is the business 
of empirical science to discover what items occupy the placeholders of fundamental 
properties and property-bearers. 
Note that the Dual-Aspect Account does not force us to adopt a two-category 
ontology. It is a flexible view that can be incorporated in other ontologies. For example, it is 
available for someone who favours a one-category ontology of only properties. On the 
resulting view, the fundamental constituents are properties that have essentially dispositional 
and qualitative aspects. The Dual-Aspect Account is also available for someone who holds 
that the fundamental constituents are properties, property-bearers, and relations. Also on this 
view, one can maintain that properties have essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
Insofar one admits the category of property, she can benefit from the adoption of the Dual-
Aspect Account. 
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 Why, then, am I adopting a two-category ontology of substance and property? 
Because these categories are well-suited to capturing the world as we find it. In everyday 
life and scientific investigation, we encounter and interact with objects that appear to be 
propertied-entities; entities that seem to have properties. Tables and chairs have size and 
shape, electrons and other particles have mass, charge, and spin. And so on. Any ontology 
that aspires to accommodate the most general features of the world ought to capture this fact. 
 Someone could point out that there is no consensus on how to read off an ontology 
from what everyday experience and science. On the one hand, scientific theories do not wear 
ontology on their sleeves. Namely, it is hard to infer what the metaphysical categories of our 
world are from science. On the other hand, everyday experience is notoriously an unreliable 
guide for telling us what exists.  Yet there are some philosophical reasons for thinking that 
a two-category ontology of substance and property is preferable to ontologies that dispense 
with either of these categories. 
 An example of an ontology that denies substances is the standard bundle theory of 
tropes (e.g. Williams 1953; Campbell 1990). The Dual-Aspect Account is preferable to a 
bundle view of powerful qualities for it is more conservative: it is “closer to” to the picture 
of the world we find it in ordinary experience and scientific theorising. Here the assumption 
is that in deciding between competing theories, other things being equal, we ought to favour 
the less revisionary one with respect to how things manifestly appear. Albeit debatable, such 
an assumption is a reasonable one. The Dual-Aspect Account does not ask us to renounce 
property-bearers. We can maintain that there are things that have the property of being 
rectangular, such as some tables, and other things that have the property of being negatively 
charged, such as electrons. 
 The version of the Dual-Aspect Account I wish to defend here is also preferable to 
views that do away with properties. An example is the view that Peter Van Inwagen called 
“austere nominalism” (2011). According to this view, there are only particular things such 
as the table in front of me and Luna the black cat, coiled on top of it. We can ascribe many 
predicates to Luna and the table. For example, we can predicate that the table has a certain 
shape and colour, and that Luna is a black cat. However, on austere nominalism, there is no 
corresponding property for any of these predicates. When we say, for example, that Luna “is 
a black cat”, we are not picking a property (blackness) that Luna has. On austere nominalism, 
there is no such a property in virtue of which Luna is black. This is a parsimonious view, but 
it faces an explanatory challenge.  
 The main difficulty for the austere nominalist is to offer a satisfactory account of 
resemblances among particulars (cf. Armstrong 1978, 44–57). Consider Mimì, another black 
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cat. Both Luna and Mimì are black.  On austere nominalism, we can only say that the 
predicate “is black” can be ascribed to both to Luna and Mimì. But saying that both Luna 
and Mimì are black because the predicate “is black” can be ascribed to both cats appears to 
be an inadequate explanation for their resemblance. It seems to get things the wrong way: it 
is because Luna and Mimì are both black that the predicate “is black” applies to each of 
them. However, the austere nominalist cannot invoke the property of blackness to account 
for the resemblance of Luna and Mimì. In contrast, ontologies that admit properties are in a 
better position. On these views, the resemblance between Luna and Mimì holds in virtue of 
the property of blackness that both cats have. A two-category ontology evades the 
explanatory worry of austere nominalism. This represents a reason in favour of its adoption. 
 In what follows, I will articulate the Dual-Aspect Account by embracing Heil’s idea 
that substance and property are “complementary categories of being” (Heil 2012, 12). 
Accordingly, substances are property-bearers, and properties are ways substances are. 
 
Substances are property bearers; properties are ways substances are. If there are 
substances, there are properties; if there are properties, there are substances. Every 
substance is some way or other, every property is a way some substance is. (Heil 2012, 
12) 
 
Every substance is itself some way or other, indeed many ways. These ways are its 
properties. For a substance to possess a property is for it, the substance, to be a 
particular way. (Heil 2012, 15) 
 
The categories of substance and property are fundamental and complementary. To 
think of a substance is to think of something that is various ways; to think a property 
is to think of a way a substance is or could be. A substance cannot be no way at all, 
and a property cannot fail to be a property of a substance, a way a substance is or might 
be. (Heil 2012, 16) 
 
The previous passages suggest that Heil believes that it is a matter of metaphysical necessity 
whether substances are propertied. To put it differently, a substance is necessarily propertied 
in some ways or other. On this view, the necessity between substances and properties is not 
grounded in some further entities. Rather it depends on the characterisation of substances as 
being in some ways, and properties as ways substances are (Heil 2003, 172). Also in this 
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case, it is worth bearing in mind that the Dual-Aspect Account is available for those who 
dislike the idea that substance and property are complementary categories.  
At this point, the reader may wonder whether properties, on the Dual-Aspect Account 
are tropes or universals. Once again, the Dual-Aspect Account does not force us to choose 
sides. The decision between tropes and universals rests on independent factors (for an 
overview of the trope–universal distinction, see MacBride 2005, 2018). Heil and Martin opt 
for a tropes view of properties. But the powerful qualities view is available also for the friend 
of universals. The same holds for the Dual-Aspect Account. In the previous chapters (and 
examples), I have been treating properties as universals to avoid unnecessary complications 
in presenting the powerful qualities view. I will maintain the same attitude in this chapter 
and the following ones. Here it is important to bear in mind that a conception of powerful 
qualities does not force us to adopt a tropes view of properties. These commitments are 
independent. However, it is worth acknowledging that on some interpretations the 
distinction between universals and tropes is not mutually exclusive (cf. MacBride 2005).  It 
is therefore possible to embrace a view of powerful qualities and maintaining both universals 
and tropes (e.g. Lowe 2006).  
The version of the Dual-Aspect Account that I wish to defend here, like the Identity 
Theory, is a view of fundamental properties. However, both views are compatible with the 
thesis that all sparse non-fundamental properties are powerful qualities. However, I will not 
defend this version here. Some identity theorists like John Heil (2003, 2012) and C. B. 
Martin (2008) seem to be sympathetic to the view that sparse, non-fundamental properties 
are powerful qualities. For example, Heil often mentions examples of colours and shapes to 
illustrate the notion of a powerful quality. However, he does not explicitly advocate the view 
that all properties are powerful qualities. Here it is useful to acknowledge a distinction 
between fundamental and sparse non-fundamental properties. On certain conceptions, sparse 
and fundamental properties overlap (e.g. Lewis 1986a). Others are committed to a distinction 
between a fundamental conception of sparse properties and a scientific one (Schaffer 2004). 
On the former, the fundamental properties are those invoked by physical theory. On the 
latter, the sparse properties also comprise those invoked by other scientific disciplines such 
as chemistry and biology. The version of the Dual-Aspect Account I wish to defend in this 
chapter holds a fundamental conception of sparse properties. However, it is also compatible 
with a scientific conception of sparse properties. In what follows, examples that concern 
intuitively non-fundamental properties are to be understood as merely illustrative. The sense 
of familiarity with certain properties will be sometimes useful to unpack some relevant 
claims.  
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 Every satisfactory ontology of properties must be internally coherent. In Chapter 3, 
I argued that the commitment to Identity represents a threat to the Identity Theory in this 
respect. While the charge of contradiction can be resisted, each of the suggested readings of 
Identity faces some objections. The crucial advantage of the Dual-Aspect Account is that it 
evades this problem for it renounces Identity. However, the Dual-Aspect Account faces a 
preliminary objection that must be addressed before moving on. This objection, which has 
been raised by Heil (2003), targets the very idea that powerful qualities have dispositional 
and qualitative aspects. Fortunately, as I will explain in the next section, Heil’s objection 
can be successfully resisted. 
 
4.2 The Dual-Aspect Account Elaborated 
 
4.2.1 Aspects of properties defended 
In Chapter 3, I introduced the notion of an aspect. Here I shall not repeat its 
characterisation, but a summary will help the reader (See Chapter 3, §3.2f or a detailed 
discussion). An aspect is a way of being a property. The idea of ways of being of properties 
that I have in mind traces back to Jerrold Levinson who claims that that an object’s ways of 
being are the “varied fashions in which it goes the complicate business of existing” 
(Levinson 1978, 2). On the Dual-Aspect Account, properties as well as objects go the 
complicate business of existing in some ways or other. In slogan form: properties are ways 
objects are; aspects are ways properties are. 
The notion of an aspect appears to be irreducible to more basic ones. On the proposed 
conception, aspects supervene on properties, and it is the nature of a property that determines 
the aspects it has. These qualifications have two important consequences: (i) since I endorse 
the standard view that what supervenes is no addition to being, aspects are ontologically 
lightweight; (ii) since it is the nature of a property that determines its aspects, then the same 
property has the same aspects in every possible world where it exists.  
We can regard aspects as ontologically lightweight higher-order properties. An 
example will illustrate. Consider the property of having a certain charge. It has the higher-
order property of having a certain magnitude that can be measured in coulombs. On the 
proposed view, this is an aspect of the property of having a certain charge: given (i), it not 
something which is ontologically over and above having a certain charge, and given (ii) it is 
the nature of having a certain charge that determines its having the aspect of having a certain 
magnitude. 
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The Dual-Aspect Account holds the thesis that all fundamental properties have 
essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. To repeat, these notions capture in a more 
precise way the idea that “in virtue of possessing a property, an object possessess both a 
particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character” (Martin and Heil 1999, 45–
46): 
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspects if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P. 
 
By appealing to dispositional and qualitative aspects, we can offer a more precise definition 
of a powerful quality. This is the first important benefit that aspects bring us. 
 
Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects. 
 
To give an example, consider charge—a putative fundamental property. Suppose that charge 
is a powerful quality. On the Dual-Aspect Account, it would have dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. By having a certain charge, a particle is disposed to produce an 
electromagnetic force. This would be a dispositional aspect of charge. At the same time, by 
being charged, a particle has a certain quantity of charge which can be measured in 
Coulombs. Having a certain quantity of charge is a qualitative aspect of charge. Namely, it 
is a qualitative contribution of charge to the make-up of that particle; it is a matter of how 
the particle is occurrently like by having a certain charge.  
 As I argued at length in Chapter 3, the introduction of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects allows us to demystify the Identity Theory. However, the very idea that powerful 
qualities can be thought of as properties having aspects faces an objection put forward by 
Heil (2003, 118–120).  
The tenability of the Dual-Aspect Account demands to assess the force of Heil’s 
objection. Fortunately, as I will explain, the objection can be resisted. However, it is still 
worthy of attention for it allows us to clarify further the conception of aspects in question. 
Relatedly, the discussion highlights the difference between the Dual-Aspect Account and 
other aspects views in the vicinity. 
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 A word of caution: the Dual-Aspect Account suffers the same linguistic ambiguity 
of the Identity Theory. Talk of aspects strongly suggests that a property has aspects in the 
same fashion as a chair has four legs. It is tempting to regard the Dual-Aspect Account as 
the view that a property is a compound or conjunction of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects. But this is not the version of the Dual-Aspect Account I advocate here. Note that a 
compound view of aspects is a live option. For example, Henry Taylor (2018) endorses this 
view (I will discuss Taylor’s view in due course). Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory way 
of preventing the impression that powerful qualities are sort of compound properties. One 
has to bear with the ambiguity. But once the Dual-Aspect Account is clarified, its merits are 
worth tolerating the ambiguity.  
 Heil grants that the plausibility of thinking of aspects in terms of higher-order 
properties (2003, 119). On this interpretation, a dual aspect view of powerful qualities would 
hold that a powerful quality bears further dispositional and qualitative higher-order 
properties. The objection is that this amounts to a mischaracterisation of the powerful 
qualities view: this view does not hold that “every property has a dispositional aspect and a 
qualitative aspect” (2003: 118) in the sense of having further higher-order properties.  
If Heil’s objection were sound, the claim that the Dual-Aspect Account is a more 
promising version of powerful qualities would be undermined. More significantly, the Dual-
Aspect Account would face two important worries (Heil 2003, 118–120). First, it would 
reiterate the robustness of the distinction between powers and qualities. This would 
undermine the superiority of the Dual-Aspect Account over Dispositionalism and 
Categoricalism. Second, the Dual-Aspect Account would clash with the claim the 
dispositional and the qualitative are not “‘aspects’, or ‘sides’, or higher-order properties of 
properties” (Heil 2003, 112).  
These worries are legitimate. At first impression, Heil’s objection does target the 
Dual-Aspect Account: aspects can be regarded as higher-order properties. However, on 
closer inspection, Heil protests a specific conception of aspects which is not the Dual-Aspect 
Account’s one. The previous problems arise just in case we think of aspects as ontologically 
robust properties. By contrast, on the Dual-Aspect Account, aspects are lightweight higher-
order properties (Chapter 3, §3.2). This is because aspects are taken to be supervenient on 
properties. Since I embrace the canonical view that what supervenes is no addition of being 
(e.g. Armstrong 1997), aspects are to be understood as lightweight, non-ontic higher-order 
properties. Therefore, the Dual-Aspect Account escapes Heil’s objection. 
 Here it could be useful to recall the analogy between the proposed conception aspects 
and the manners of existing of tropes (Chapter 3, §3.2; Williams 1953; Campbell 1990; 
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Simons 1994; Maurin 2002; Hakkarainen and Keinänen 2017). According to the standard 
view of tropes, simple tropes lack any constituents (they are mereologically simple). Yet 
these simple tropes are individually distinct from each other and primitively resembling 
some other ones. The features of being individually distinct from each other and being 
primitively resembling some other tropes are not further entities that simple tropes have. 
Rather they are “manners of existence”: ways in which simple tropes exist (Hakkarainen and 
Keinänen 2017, 652). According to the standard view, these manners of existence supervene 
on simple tropes. By embracing the canonical view that what supervenes is no addition to 
being, the simple tropes’ features are best understood as lightweight properties (Campbell 
1990, 37). Of course, the standard view of tropes is not exempt from problems (e.g. Daly 
1994). Here the analogy is meant to illustrate that the claim that a property has aspects does 
not necessarily amount to the view that these are ontological additions to the property itself.  
 In a slightly more precise way, we can reconstruct Heil’s objection as the following 
argument. 
 
(1) Aspects are higher-order properties. 
(2) A dual aspect view holds that “every property has a dispositional aspect and a 
qualitative aspect” (Heil 2003, 119). 
 
Therefore, from (1) and (2): 
 
(3) A dual aspect view holds that every property has a higher-order dispositional 
property and a higher-order qualitative property. 
 
Heil claims that the conclusion (3) violates the powerful qualities view and raises the 
problem of reiterating a robust distinction between the dispositional and the qualitative. But 
these worries do not follow unless we assume that aspects are ontic, ontologically robust 
higher-order properties. To put it differently, if we were to replace (1) with:  
 
 (1*) Aspects are higher-order ontic properties. 
 
We would reach the conclusion that: 
 
 (3*) A dual aspect view holds that every property has a higher-order ontic 
dispositional property and a higher-order ontic qualitative property. 
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Heil would be right in this case: (3*) violates the powerful qualities view and reiterates a 
robust distinction between the qualitative and the dispositional.  
The motivating reason for embracing the powerful qualities view is to avoid the 
commitment to the power–quality distinction. By adopting such a distinction, it seems that 
we are forced to choose between two incompatible pictures about fundamental properties: 
one that they are essentially powerful, the other they are not (I illustrated these conceptions 
and theirs problems in detail in Chapter 2. Here I will not repeat the discussion). The 
powerful qualities theorist contends that both views are unable to accommodate the fact that 
fundamental properties appear to be at once powerful and qualitative. For example, the 
property of having a certain gravitational mass, which is a putative fundamental one, 
empowers a bearer with distinctive dispositions and, at the same time, it is a matter of how 
that bearer is like (namely, it is massive).  The powerful qualities theorist claims that a view 
that forces us to choose between fundamental powers and fundamental qualities is 
inadequate to capturing the world as we find it. The powerful qualities view is therefore a 
preferable approach. The Dual-Aspect Account may claim the same advantage for it is a 
version of the powerful qualities view. 
Crucially, the Dual-Aspect Account is not committed to (1*). Rather, on the 
conception of aspects I wish to defend here, (1) is to be understood as: 
 
(1**) Aspects are higher-order non-ontic properties. 
 
Therefore, instead of (3*), we reach the conclusion: 
 
(3**) A dual aspect view holds that every property has a higher-order non-ontic 
dispositional property and a higher-order non-ontic qualitative property. 
 
Here with “non-ontic” I simply mean “not ontologically robust”. On the Dual-Aspect 
Account, if God would have to create a property, she would get its aspects for free. God 
would not have to make another act of creation for giving dispositional and qualitative 
aspects to the property in question. Once we have a property, its aspects supervene on it. By 
embracing (1*), the Dual-Aspect Account does not reiterate an ontologically robust 
distinction between powers and qualities. Heil’s objection is therefore resisted. 
 The Dual-Aspect Account has another merit: a non-ontic conception of aspects does 
not mischaracterise the powerful qualities view. On the canonical version, powerful qualities 
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are unitary entities (Heil 2003, 114–115). The same holds on the Dual-Aspect Account. On 
both views, powerful qualities are unitary, essentially dispositional-and-qualitative 
properties. The difference is that the dispositionality and qualitativity of powerful qualities, 
on the Dual-Aspect Account, is not identical. This is because the dispositional and qualitative 
aspects are distinct. This allows us to escape the contradiction objects that the Identity 
Theory faces (Chapter 3). 
 Heil’s objection against aspect views does not afflict the Dual-Aspect Account. But 
it is nonetheless instructive. An ontic conception of aspects is in fact a viable option (I will 
discuss it in the next sub-section). It is therefore important to distinguish the Dual-Aspect 
Account from other aspect views. 
 
4.2.2 Other Dual Aspect Views 
 To my knowledge, in the literature there are two dual aspect views that share some 
similarities with the Dual-Aspect Account: one is Kristina Engelhard’s (2010), the other is 
Henry Taylor’s (2018). I will consider them in turn. Then I will offer some reasons for 
favouring the Dual-Aspect Account. As it will emerge, there are important differences 
between these views and the Dual-Aspect Account. It is therefore crucial to avoid confusion 
between these views and the conception of aspects I wish to defend in this work. 
 Let us begin with Engelhard’s dual aspect view. On her view, properties have 
dispositional and qualitative aspects in a lightweight sense. Thus Engelhard’s view does not 
amount to an ontologically robust distinction between the dispositional and the qualitative 
(Engelhard 2010, 52). This is a relevant similarity with the Dual-Aspect Account. In 
addition, Engelhard’s view resembles the version of the Dual-Aspect Account in three other 
respects: (i) properties are ways of being of substances; (ii) to consider aspects is a matter of 
abstraction; (iii) the basic ontological categories are property and substance (or property 
bearer) (Engelhard 2010, 53–54). Despite this superficial resemblance, I will argue that 
Engelhard’s dual aspect view and the Dual-Aspect Account differ significantly. 
 Engelhard’s dual aspect view is meant to be a version of Pandispositionalism—the 
view that all fundamental and non-fundamental properties are powers—able to escape some 
traditional objections against pure powers view (Engelhard 2010, 53–54; Chapter 2, §2.2.3). 
By contrast, the Dual-Aspect Account is a version of powerful qualities. Therefore, the two 
views are committed to two different pictures about the nature of fundamental properties: on 
Engelhard’s view, fundamental properties are essentially powerful; on the Dual-Aspect 
Account, they are essentially powerful-and-qualitative. It is important to note that both views 
are compatible with the claim that properties have dispositional and qualitative aspects. But 
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only on the Dual-Aspect Account, a fundamental property have both aspects essentially. On 
Engelhard’s view, it is possible that a fundamental property has the same dispositional aspect 
in every possible world, but it has different qualitative ones in some of them. The Dual-
Aspect Account does not permit such a possibility for a property has the same dispositional 
and qualitative aspects in every possible world.11 
 The second difference concerns how Engelhard conceives of aspects. On both the 
Dual-Aspect Account and Engelhard’s view, aspects are not ontologically robust entities. 
However, she thinks of the dispositional aspect of a property as capturing its “nomic 
relations” with other properties (2010, 54). A nomic relation has two features: (i) it has a 
certain modal force, and (ii) it can be understood in terms of a property’s directedness toward 
certain manifestations (cf. Molnar 2003, 60). For example, the dispositional aspect of the 
property of being charged would be the nomic relation with the property of producing an 
electromagnetic force (cf. Engelhard 2010, 53).12 The nomic relation between these two 
properties has a certain modal strength. However, Engelhard does not specify it. 
 There is a sense in which Engelhard’s dispositional aspect is similar to the Dual-
Aspect Account’s one. On both views, the dispositional aspect captures the idea that by 
possessing a property a bearer has some powers. Recall that on the Dual-Aspect Account if 
a property has some dispositional aspects, then every bearer of that property has some 
powers. 
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
The difference with Engelhard’s view concerns the relation between the property and its 
dispositional aspect. On the Dual-Aspect Account, the dispositional aspect is a way of being 
of a property. It is a matter of how that property exists. Differently, Engelhard thinks of a 
dispositional aspect as a way of considering a property’s dispositionality as abstracted from 
its particularity. In her words: 
 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that an aspects view of properties would be also compatible with a form of dual 
aspect Categoricalism. On this view, the fundamental properties have essentially qualitative aspects, but 
non-essentially dispositional ones. In order to distinguish the Dual-Aspect Account from other aspects 
views, we need to consider the nature of fundamental properties. 
12 Engelhard articulates her dual aspect view by adopting E. J. Lowe four-category ontology (2006). 
Two of these categories are properties (as thought of as universals) and modes (particular ways 
individuals are). By adopting Lowe’s view, Engelhard is able to specify the nomic relations between 
modes and properties. For the purposes of this chapter, this is an unnecessary complication that we can 
safely ignore. 
110 
 
We consider the very same property as a power if we abstract from its making this 
particular being that way, but consider the nomic relations it makes a particular be 
involved with. We can say that we consider the property’s power feature [i.e. 
dispositional aspect] if we consider it as a universal. (Engelhard 2010, 55) 
 
It seems that a property’s dispositional aspect is a matter of regarding it as a universal. An 
example will illustrate this claim. A particular electron has the property of being negatively 
charged. If we were to follow Engelhard, the dispositional aspect of the electron’s negative 
charge is a way of considering it in abstraction from its particularity. In particular, we should 
consider charge in abstraction from its particularity and in terms of its nomic relations with 
other properties such as that of producing electromagnetic force. 
 It appears that Engelhard’s notion of a dispositional aspect is in some sense a 
conceptual matter. In contrast, on the Dual-Aspect Account, it is an ontological matter: it is 
a way of being of a property. The dispositional aspect of an electron’s charge is not a matter 
of how we think of it. Rather it is a way the property of having a certain charge is. Of course, 
it is possible to hold that we can consider aspects in abstraction from the particularity of their 
properties. For example, there may be aspects that are possessed only by particular properties 
and not others. But an aspect, on the Dual-Aspect Account, is not dispositional because we 
think of it in abstraction from its particularity. Note that the claim here is not that Engelhard’s 
notion of a dispositional aspect is inadequate. Simply, it is not the same conception of the 
Dual-Aspect Account. 
 Someone, however, might wonder if there is any reason for favouring the Dual-
Aspect Account’s over to Engelhard’s one. As it happens, it seems that Engelhard’s view 
faces a potential worry that the Dual-Aspect Account evades. The worry concerns 
Engelhard’s conception of dispositional aspects: it leaves unclear whether properties are 
really powerful. If the dispositional aspect of the charge of an electron is a way of 
considering it as abstracted from its particularity, is the electron’s charge really powerful? 
 Since Engelhard aims to offer a version of Pandispositionalism, an affirmitive answer 
is required. Unfortunately, her notion of a dispositional aspect leaves open a troublesome 
possibility for her project. Someone might adopt Engelhard’s dispositional aspect and yet 
argue that properties are not essentially powerful. For example, a categoricalist who likes 
Engelhard’s idea of aspects may argue that fundamental properties are essentially qualitative 
and yet agree that we can consider properties in abstraction from their particularity (and in 
terms of their nomic relations). If we were to embrace Engelhard’s view, these qualities 
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would be essentially qualitative and yet would have dispositional aspects. Such a possibility 
threatens the spirit of Pandispositionalism.  
The worry becomes even more significant if we consider that Engelhard hints at a 
view of properties as qualities. Consider, for example, the following passages: 
 
We consider the property’s qualitativity insofar we do not abstract from the fact or 
state of affairs that it qualifies but take it as part of the fact in question involving one 
and the same property; as a trope the property makes a particular being this or that 
way. (Engelhard 2010, 55) 
 
We consider the qualitativity of “being negatively charged” if we consider it as that 
which makes this particular be this way. The qualitative feature fixes the identity of 
the property. The qualitative feature of a property is considered in an instantiated 
property, as part of a state of affairs or fact. (ibid.) 
 
On Engelhard’s view, it appears that a qualitative aspect is property considered in terms of 
its particularity, which fixes its identity. We could say that the qualitative aspect of the 
charge of an electron is what makes it different from the charge of other electrons. On this 
view, the distinction between dispositional and qualitative aspects lies in the way in which 
we regard the particularity of properties. 
 The previous characterisation of aspects suggests that properties, on Engelhard’s 
view, are in fact qualities. While properties possess a dispositional aspect by virtue of 
standing in nomic relations with other properties, they do not seem to be essentially 
powerful. Arguably, the pandispositionalist thinks of properties as essentially powerful 
independently from the way we regard their particularity. Engelhard’s conception of 
dispositional aspect does not warrant that. While Engelhard rightly claims that her view is a 
dual aspect one, her commitment to Pandispositionalism is under threat. 
 The Dual-Aspect Account preserves the commitment to the powerful qualities view. 
Thus it maintains the view that fundamental properties are essentially powerful. 
Dispositional and qualitative aspects are not a matter of how we regard the particularity of 
properties. Rather they are a matter of how properties are. This allows us to capture the 
ontological import of the powerful qualities view. First and foremost, this view holds a thesis 
about the nature of fundamental properties. By embracing the proposed conception of 
aspects, the charge of an electron is a fundamental powerful quality just in case it has some 
dispositional and qualitative aspects essentially. This requirement allows us to distinguish 
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the Dual-Aspect Account from other aspect views of properties. If we aim to preserve the 
commitment to the idea that all fundamental properties are essentially powerful, then the 
Dual-Aspect Account’s conception of aspects is preferable to Engelhard’s one. The latter 
remains an available option, but it apparently fails to secure the claim that properties are 
essentially powerful. 
 Now let us consider the other dual aspect view: Henry Taylor’s compound view of 
powerful qualities, which is supposed to be a middle ground between Categoricalism and 
Dispositionalism (2018).13 On the compound view, properties are “essentially compounds 
of distinct dispositional and qualitative parts” (Taylor 2018, 1438). These parts can be 
regarded as the counterpart of aspects with a crucial difference: they are ontologically robust 
entities. The dispositional parts of a property are those that contribute to a bearer’s 
dispositions. In contrast, the qualitative parts are those that do not contribute to the 
dispositions of a bearer. 
 Taylor claims that the compound view has two related merits: first, it is clearly 
different from the pure powers view (according to which properties are essentially 
powerful); second, it is also different from traditional Categoricalism (Taylor 2018, 1438–
1439). As I will explain, the Dual-Aspect Account can claim the same advantages. Yet I will 
also argue that there are another two reasons for preferring it over to the compound view. 
But let us consider the compound view’s first. 
 The first merit has to do with Taylor’s claim that the pure powers view and the 
Identity Theory of powerful qualities fail to be distinct. According to Taylor’s assessment, 
“neither position can claim an advantage over the other” for both views have access to the 
same theoretical resources (2018, 1438). The second one concerns the idea that properties, 
on the compound view, have their dispositional and qualitative parts (or aspects) essentially. 
The categoricalist maintains that the dispositional contribution the possession of properties 
makes to bearers is not essential. Thus the compound view is different from Categoricalism. 
Here I shall not discuss whether Taylor is right in claiming that the Identity Theory and 
Dispositionalism amount to the same conception of properties. Instead I will focus on the 
question of whether there is any reasons for favouring an ontologically lightweight 
conception of aspects such as that of the Dual Aspect Account (§4.2.1). 
 According to Taylor (2018), both powerful qualities and pure powers have qualitative 
aspects. On both conceptions, properties are actual features of their bearers (Taylor 2018, 
1425–1426). Powerful qualities are “here and now, actual, not merely potential” properties 
                                                          
13 The discussion of Taylor’s compound view can be also found in my paper “The Identity Theory of 
Powers Revised”, which has been conditionally accepted on Erkenntnis. 
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of their bearers (Heil 2012, 59). Similarly, powers are “not merely the potentiality of some 
behaviour” (Molnar 2003, 99). Rather to have a power is to “have an actual property” (ibid.). 
Since qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is occurrently like, both powerful qualities and 
pure powers have the qualitative aspect of being actual. This represents a potential problem 
for dispositionalists and identity theorists who aim to preserve a distinction between their 
views. The question is whether there is a robust distinction between pure powers and 
powerful qualities, since both have dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
 Taylor argues that the compound view has the merit of avoiding the collapse into 
Dispositionalism. On the compound view, the qualitative aspect of a property does not 
contribute to the dispositions of a bearer and yet it is essential to it (Taylor 2018, 1438). Such 
a conception is distinct from the dispositionalist’s one. In her view, the nature of property is 
only essentially dispositional.  
 Like the compound view, the Dual-Aspect Account can be distinguished from 
Dispositionalism. According to Dual-Aspect Account, all fundamental properties have 
essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. This interpretation captures the claim 
fundamental properties have essentially a dual dispositional and qualitative nature (Martin 
and Heil 1999, pp. 44–45; Martin 2008, p. 44). Like the compound view, the Dual-Aspect 
Account holds that fundamental properties have essentially qualitative aspects. It is therefore 
possible to distinguish it from Dispositionalism, on which fundamental properties have only 
an essentially dispositional, or powerful nature (e.g. Bird 2007a), and powerful qualities. 
However, in contrast with the compound view, the Dual-Aspect Account does not embrace 
a negative characterisation of qualitative aspects. 
 A similar reasoning extends to the case of Categoricalism. The compound view is 
different from traditional Categoricalism because properties have an essentially dispositional 
aspect (or part). By contrast, the categoricalist holds that the nature of a property is only 
essentially qualitative in the sense of being non-dispositional (e.g. Armstrong 1997). Taylor 
claims that compound view is different from the traditional version of Categoricalism 
because properties are thought of having both dispositional and qualitative aspects 
essentially. The same can be said from the viewpoint of the Dual-Aspect Account. This 
permits to distinguish the Dual-Aspect Account from Categoricalism for the latter is not 
committed to the view that the dispositional aspects are essential to qualities. 
 Overall, the adoption of either the compound view or the Dual-Aspect Account does 
not offer any significant advantage with respect to the task of distinguishing powerful 
qualities from pure powers and pure qualities. In this respect, the compound view and the 
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Dual-Aspect Account are on a par. Yet it seems to me that there are at least two important 
reasons for favouring the former. 
 First, the Dual-Aspect Account does not force us to embrace a characterisation of 
qualitative aspects in opposition to the dispositional ones (cf. Taylor 2018, 1438). Therefore, 
we evade an unlovely and uninformative characterisation of the qualitative. An advantage 
of this strategy is preserving the spirit of the powerful qualities view. Recall that the powerful 
qualities theorist claims that the mutual exclusivity of the dispositional and the qualitative is 
“deeply flawed” (Heil 2003, 118). 
 Second, the Dual-Aspect Account, in the version I wish to defend here, is more 
parsimonious than the compound view. From the viewpoint of the Dual-Aspect Account, 
aspects are no addition to being with respect to the properties of which they are aspects. They 
supervene on properties. By adopting the doctrine that what supervenes does not constitute 
e genuine ontological addition, aspects are therefore ontologically lightweight. Parsimony 
represents yet another merit of the proposed conception of aspects. 
 As for Engelhard’s view, the claim here is not that Taylor’s conception is inadequate. 
Rather the claim is that the Dual-Aspect Account holds a different conception of aspects. 
Therefore, it has to be distinguished from Engelhard’s dual aspect view and Taylor’s 
compound view.  
Someone might wonder whether which aspects view, among the discussed ones, is 
the most satisfactory. I argued that there are a few reasons for favouring the Dual-Aspect 
Account: (i) contra Engelhard’s view, the Dual-Aspect Account captures the idea that 
properties are essentially powerful qua properties; (ii) contra Taylor’s compound view, it 
does not embrace a negative characterisation of the qualitative aspects; and (iii) it is more 
parsimonious. 
 Having illustrated that the Dual-Aspect Account is different from other aspect views 
in the literature, I will now turn to discuss a comparison with the Identity Theory. This will 
help the reader in identifying the commonalities and differences between these views. More 
significantly, it will highlight how the Dual-Aspect Account can improve a conception of 
properties as powerful qualities. 
  
4.3 Identity Theory and Dual-Aspect Account: Differences and Commonalities 
 
4.3.1 Fundamental Powerful-and-Qualitative 
In Chapter 3, I argued that the Identity Theory of powerful qualities is committed to the 
following claims. 
115 
 
 
Powerful Qualities View: all fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-
qualitative, or powerful qualities. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
Inseparability: the dispositionality and qualitativity of every sparse property cannot be 
separated in reality. 
  
Identity: a property P’s dispositionality is P’s qualitativity, and each of these is P.  
 
The Dual-Aspect Account embraces Powerful Qualities View, Partial Consideration, and 
Inseparability. I already discussed how the introduction of the notions of dispositional aspect 
and qualitative aspect allows us to formulate more precisely the ontological reading of 
Identity, namely Identityo: 
 
Identityo: there is no real distinction between a property P’s dispositional aspect and 
P’s qualitative aspect, and each of these aspects belongs to one and the same 
property P.14 
 
In what follows, I will show how it is possible to reformulate Powerful Qualities, Partial 
Consideration, and Inseparability in terms of aspects. By doing so, the precision of these 
claims will improve. 
 Let us begin with Powerful Qualities View. By having aspects in our framework, we 
can reformulate it as the thesis that all fundamental properties have essentially dispositional 
and qualitative aspects. This allows us to distinguish the powerful qualities view from other 
views that hold that properties have dispositional and qualitative aspects but not both of them 
are possessed essentially. For example, on Taylor’s interpretation (2018), Dispositionalism 
holds that powers have qualitative aspects in addition to dispositional ones. However, only 
the latter are essential. In order to preserve a difference between these views, it is important 
to bear in mind that on the powerful qualities view both aspects are essential. 
                                                          
14 Recall that powerful qualities can have more than one dispositional aspect and one qualitative aspects. 
The identity claim concerns every aspect a powerful quality has. 
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 On the Dual-Aspect Account, we can define the notion of a powerful quality as 
follows: 
 
Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects. 
 
From the viewpoint of the Dual-Aspect Account, Powerful Qualities View is the thesis that 
all fundamental properties are essentially powerful qualities. I shall postpone the discussion 
of this thesis to Chapter 6, where I will clarify what a fundamental property is and discuss 
some arguments in favour of the truth of Powerful Qualities View.  
For present purposes, it is sufficient to recall that the notions of dispositional and 
qualitative aspects are supposed to capture the claim that “in virtue of possessing a property, 
an object possesseses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character” 
(Martin and Heil 1999, 45–46).  
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspect if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P.  
 
What distinguishes these aspects is how properties that have them contribute to their bearers. 
If Powerful Qualities View is true, then every fundamental property confers upon a bearer 
some powers and, at the same time, its possession qualitatively contributes to how that bearer 
is like. For example, the property of having a certain gravitational mass is a putative 
fundamental powerful quality: it confers upon a bearer some distinctive dispositions such as 
that of producing a gravitational force and, simultaneously, it is a matter of how that bearer 
is occurrently like. 
A merit of the Dual-Aspect Account is providing a serviceable criterion for evaluating 
candidate fundamental powerful qualities. By appealing to Powerful Quality, we can assess 
whether or not a certain fundamental property has dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
Inevitably, some room for disagreement remains. Yet this is an improvement with respect to 
the Identity Theory. 
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4.3.2 Partial Consideration 
 Now let us consider Partial Consideration. This is a conceptual claim about the ways 
in which we can think of a property. While Powerful Qualities View is a thesis about the 
nature of fundamental properties, Partial Consideration extends to sparse, non-fundamental 
properties as well. Here it is useful to acknowledge that on some views, there is no distinction 
between sparse and fundamental properties (e.g. Lewis 1986a; cf. Schaffer 2004). However, 
the examples invoked by powerful qualities theorists refer to properties that are intuitively 
non-fundamental such as sphericality (Heil 2003) and hardness (Jaworski 2016). It is 
therefore plausible to suppose that the powerful qualities theorist thinks that we can partially 
consider sparse non-fundamental properties in addition to fundamental ones. 
For the purposes of this chapter, we do not need to provide the details of what is 
involved in the mental act of partially considering a property. It is sufficient to bear in mind 
that it is a process of selectively attending a property in accordance with one of its features 
while neglecting other ones. For example, we can partially consider the property of having 
a certain inertial mass in terms of its dispositionality by focusing on the way it disposes a 
bearer to resist acceleration while neglecting its qualitativity, which may consist in 
conferring upon a bearer a certain quantity of matter.  
 The Dual-Aspect Account is able to improve the idea of Partial Consideration. We 
can say that to dispositionally consider a property is to consider it in terms of its dispositional 
aspect. In same fashion, we can say that to qualitatively consider a property is to consider it 
in accordance with its qualitative aspect.15 
This way of understanding Partial Consideration elucidates the claim that powerful 
qualities have a dual nature. On the Dual-Aspect Account, aspects are ways of being of 
properties. This means that if we are dispositionally or qualitatively considering a property 
in accordance with one of its aspects, then this presupposes that the property has 
dispositional and qualitative ways of being.  
 Let us consider an example to clarify this idea. On the Dual-Aspect Account, a 
putative fundamental property such as charge has dispositional and qualitative aspects. I 
suggested that we can think of Partial Consideration as a way of regarding a property in 
accordance to its dispositional or qualitative aspect. We can dispositionally consider charge 
by focusing our attention on the way it empowers a bearer with the disposition to produce 
an electromagnetic force. Alternatively, we can qualitatively consider charge by attending 
                                                          
15 Properties may have more than one dispositional or qualitative aspects. More precisely, we can say 
that to dispositionally/qualitatively consider a property is to consider it in accordance to one of its 
dispositional/qualitative aspects. 
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its aspect of conferring upon a bearer a certain quantity of charge that can be measured in 
coulombs. The latter appears to be a qualitative aspect. Namely, it is a way of how a bearer 
is occurrently like by virtue of being charged. Crucially, the dispositional and qualitative 
consideration of charge presupposes that it has dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
Otherwise, we could not partially consider charge in accordance with these aspects. In this 
sense, we are able to clarify the ontological import of the powerful qualities view. 
 Of course, the mental process of partially considering the aspects of a property suffers 
the limitation of our cognitive abilities. For example, we cannot abstract undetectable 
aspects. Here the limit concerns our knowledge; it does not represent a threat for the claim 
that all fundamental properties have dispositional and qualitative aspects. Once again, the 
interpretation of Partial Consideration in terms of aspect clarifies this point. If to consider 
dispositionally/qualitatively a property is to consider it in accordance to its 
dispositional/qualitative aspects, then this presumes that such a property has 
dispositional/qualitative aspects. Surely, we cannot partially consider a property that has 
undetectable aspects. However, a powerful quality would have dispositional and qualitative 
aspects independently from whether or not someone were able to partially consider them. 
 
4.3.3 Inseparability 
Both the Identity Theory and the Dual-Aspect Account hold Inseparability. The notions 
of dispositional and qualitative aspects allow us to specify what it means that a property’s 
dispositionality and its qualitativity cannot be separated in reality. As for Partial 
Consideration, the identity theorist appears to extend Inseparability to sparse and yet non-
fundamental properties. This is suggested by examples that involve intuitively sparse and 
yet non-fundamental properties such as sphericality (Martin and Heil 1999) and hardness 
(Jaworski 2016). 
The identity theorist believes that Inseparability is a consequence of Identity: if a 
property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity are identical, then they cannot be separated 
in reality because they are the same. The Dual-Aspect Account does not hold Identity. 
Therefore, we face the question of explaining what else may tie together a property’s 
dispositionality with its qualitativity. 
To begin with, the dual-aspect account theorist can reformulate Inseparability in 
terms of aspects: the dispositional aspects and the qualitative ones of every sparse property 
cannot be separated in reality. This reformulation highlights the ontological import of 
Inseparability, which is a claim about the nature of sparse properties. 
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 A straightforward strategy to glue together the dispositional and qualitative aspects 
would be to invoke a relation that plays such a role. However, this strategy is problematic.  
 If the relation that ties aspects together is external, then the Dual-Aspect Account 
faces the notorious Bradley’s regress (1893, 32–33). Namely, if the holding of the gluing 
relation between the aspects of a property is not fixed by the aspects or the property, then we 
need to explain what ties together these entities. But this gives rise to a vicious regress. To 
illustrate it, suppose to invoke an external relation R to glue together the dispositional and 
qualitative aspects, α and β, of a given property. The mere existence of R, α, and β does not 
warrant that they stand in the appropriate relation. It seems that we need to invoke another 
relation R** to relate R with α and β. But the mere existence of R**, R, α, and β does not 
guarantee that they stand in the appropriate relation. The previous problem is reiterated, and 
so on ad infinitum. Presumably, the strategies to resist Bradley’s regress can be invoked for 
saving this approach (see MacBride 2016 for an overview). However, another worry is 
looming: if in order to fasten the aspects of a property, we need an external relation, then the 
Dual-Aspect Account appears to be less parsimonious than the Identity Theory. More 
significantly, the admission of external relations threatens the claim that the proposed 
version of the Dual-Aspect Account is a two-category ontology of substance and property. 
Arguably, the gluing relation is irreducible to either category. We have to pay its admission 
in our framework by the coin of ontology. Overall, this is not an attractive strategy. 
 Another option would be to argue that the inseparability of a property’s dispositional 
and qualitative aspects is warranted by an internal relation. If the gluing relation is internal, 
then its holding is fixed by the property or its aspects. By way of example, consider the 
kinship relation between Mary and her daughter Miriam. The kinship relation is internal for 
it is determined by Mary’s being the mother of Miriam. Once we have that Mary is the 
mother of Miriam, we get a kinship relation holding between them.  
In similar vein, we can argue the inseparability relation between dispositional and 
qualitative aspects of a property is determined by how the property is like. Once we have a 
property, we get an inseparability relation between its aspects. This strategy is more 
promising than the appeal to an external gluing relation, but it raises another worry. On some 
views, internal relations are in some sense reducible to their relata and therefore they do not 
really exist (Simons 2010, 204–205; Heil 2012, 144–146). If so, we could think that the 
inseparability relation is reducible to the dispositional and qualitative aspects of a property. 
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However, someone might protest that this strategy looks ad hoc: aspects would determine 
their own inseparability. It is therefore preferable to explore a different approach.16 
 Fortunately, the Dual-Aspect Account has the resources for warranting the 
inseparability of aspects without the need for invoking relations, whether these are internal 
or external. Therefore, we can avoid the previous worries. On the Dual-Aspect Account, it 
is possible to argue that what grounds Inseparability is the very conception of aspects as 
ways of being a properties (Chapter 3, § 3.2). A property’s ways of being are ontologically 
inseparable, or inseparable in reality from the property. We cannot separate in reality the 
ways of being of a property from the property itself. Conceptually, the attempt is ill-
conceived. A separation in reality demands a real distinction between entities. As medieval 
philosophers put it, a real distinction requires the possibilities that the entities in question 
can exist independently. However, aspects do not enjoy such independence. On the proposed 
conception, aspects cannot exist independently from the properties of which they are aspects. 
This is because they are ontologically dependent on properties (Chapter 3, §3.2). To use an 
analogy, separating a property’s aspects from the property would be akin to separating a 
statue’s shape from the statue. We cannot do that in reality. Surely, we can alter the statue’s 
shape by breaking it down. But this does not count as a separation in reality. The aspects of 
a property P are ways of being of P; were P cease to exist, so that would be for P’s aspects. 
Of course, we can separate the aspects in thought in the sense of selectively attending an 
aspect while neglecting others. In same fashion, we can abstract the statue’s shape from its 
other properties such as size and material. Since the Dual-Aspect Account holds that every 
fundamental property has dispositional and qualitative aspects, every fundamental 
property’s dispositional and qualitative aspects are inseparable. 
  Against the previous strategy to ensure Inseparability, someone might argue that it 
only warrants the inseparability of aspects of fundamental properties. However, 
Inseparability is a claim about sparse properties. So we need some arguments for thinking 
that the aspects of sparse, non-fundamental properties are inseparable. Here it is useful to 
recall a distinction between sparse properties, which are those invoked by all scientific 
disciplines, and fundamental ones, which are invoked solely by physics (cf. Schaffer 2004). 
 The objection is legitimate. The version of the Dual-Aspect Account I wish to defend 
is a view of fundamental properties. However, the proposed conception of aspects is suitable 
for sparse non-fundamental properties as well. While I do not wish to defend the view that 
                                                          
16 An advocate of this strategy could attempt to resist the ad hoc objection by arguing for the 
irreducibility of internal relations (cf. MacBride 2016, §3). However, the parsimony objection would 
be reiterated. 
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all sparse non-fundamental properties have essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that sparse non-fundamental properties have indeed aspects. 
Think of some of examples invoked by identity theorist to illustrate Inseparability such as 
that of sphericality. Plausibly, this property can be regarded as having dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. Sphericality has the dispositional aspect of disposing a bearer to roll on 
inclined planes. It also has the qualitative aspect of conferring upon a bearer a distinctive 
geometrical shape. This is a qualitative contribution to the make-up of a bearer of 
sphericality. Intuitively, the property of being spherical is not fundamental. Yet it does not 
appear utterly unreasonable to think of it has having dispositional and qualitative aspect. The 
same could apply to every other sparse property.  
There is another motivation for admitting that sparse properties have dispositional 
and qualitative aspects. It is likely the case that putative fundamental properties such as 
charge, mass, and spin will turn out to be non-fundamental in light of future discoveries. 
Such a possibility does not strip off these properties from their sparseness. Nor does it make 
them lose their aspects. It simply makes them non-fundamental. On the proposed view, 
aspects are ways of being of properties. Whether a property is fundamental does not affect 
the possession of aspects. Nor does it affect the inseparability of its aspects. To repeat, this 
is because the inseparability of aspects is grounded on a conception of aspects as ways 
properties are. Since there cannot be a real distinction between a property and its aspect, they 
are inseparable. However, we should leave open the possibility that there may be sparse 
properties that have neither dispositional aspects nor qualitative ones. The aspects of these 
properties would be inseparable, but Inseparability would be false for they have no 
dispositional or qualitative properties. An easy fix would be to amend Inseparability to 
accommodate such a possibility. We can reformulate it as the claim that the aspects of every 
sparse property cannot be separate in reality. Also in this case, a conception of aspects as 
ways of being of properties would ground their inseparability. Overall, it appears that the 
Dual-Aspect Account can accommodate Inseparability without being committed to Identity. 
As I explained, this approach evades the worries relate to the appeal to a gluing relation 
between aspects. 
 To conclude the overview of the Dual-Aspect Account, here is a summary of its 
claims reformulated in terms of aspects. 
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Powerful Qualities View: all fundamental properties have essentially dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered in accordance with its 
dispositional or qualitative aspects. 
 
Inseparability: the dispositional and qualitative aspects of every sparse property 
cannot be separated in reality. 
 
The obvious difference with the Identity Theory is that the Dual-Aspect Account is not 
committed to Identity. But the take-home lessons are different ones: (i) it is possible to 
renounce Identity and yet maintain Powerful Qualities View, Partial Consideration, and 
Inseparability; (ii) by appealing to dispositional and qualitative aspects is possible to 
improve the precision of these claims. However, both views share an important 
commonality: they offer a metaphysics of fundamental properties that does not bifurcate the 
dispositional and the qualitative.  
 
4.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
 My aim in this chapter was to elaborate the Dual-Aspect Account of properties that 
has been introduced in Chapter 3. I began by laying out its metaphysical backbone (§4.1). 
Then I defended the Dual-Aspect Account from an objection raised by John Heil (2003), 
which targets the very notion of an aspect (§4.2). I also discussed how the Dual-Aspect 
Account differs from other dual aspect views of properties that can be found in the literature, 
such as that of Kristina Engelhard’s (2010) and Henry Taylor’s (2018). These views remain 
available options. However, I argued that they face some worries that the Dual-Aspect 
Account evades. After that, I illustrated how the notions of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects allow us to improve the precision of the claims of Powerful Qualities View, Partial 
Consideration, and Inseparability (§4.3).  
 According to Heil, “a measure of success” of an ontological account is its efficacy to 
resolve “pressing philosophical puzzles” (2012, 288). In the remaining chapters, I will 
discuss how the Dual-Aspect Account garners its success by discussing two significant 
“puzzles”. The first one, in Chapter 5, concerns the topic of resemblances. I will argue that 
the notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects render the Dual-Aspect Account 
preferable to other competing theories of properties. In particular, the introduction of aspects 
allows us to accommodate a greater variety of relation of resemblances. The second puzzle, 
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in Chapter 6, regards the problem of phenomenal consciousness and its place in nature. I 
will examine how the Dual-Aspect Account is a promising framework for improving certain 
views about the relation between mental and physical properties. In Chapter 6, I will also 
discuss some arguments in favour of the thesis that all fundamental properties are powerful 
qualities, which is the overall aim of this work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IDENTITY AND RESEMBLANCE  
 
The world is not chaos, with every aspect, at every minute, unique, in character. Nor 
is it undifferentiated blancmange. It is a diverse and orderly cosmos displaying patters 
of recurrence. No responsible ontology can evade this very general fact, and no 
responsible ontology can avoid offering its assay of this situation. (Campbell 1990, 
28) 
 
[…] And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities 
of detail. (Wittgenstein, PI 66) 
 
We speak of different things having the “same” property. The word “same” does not 
always mean what logicians and philosophers mean with the identity sign “=”. 
(Armstrong 1997, 14) 
 
5.1 Two Senses of Identity 
 
5.1.1 Preliminary Remarks  
The world that we inhabit displays patterns of similarities. The leaves of a sycamore tree 
resemble each other with respect to their shape, but differ in colour or size. Every cat and 
every jaguar have something in common: they are both mammal, felid, and carnivore. Yet 
cats and jaguars belong to different species. Scarlet is more similar to crimson than cerulean. 
Every electron has the same rest mass, charge, and spin. And so on. 
 Among other things, properties are invoked to account for resemblances. The more 
properties objects share, the more they resemble. The leaves of a sycamore tree might be 
resembling in shape, but not in size or colour. A jaguar and a cat have in common the 
properties of being a felid and being a mammal. Unlike the cat, the jaguar also has the 
property of being a pantherine. Electrons exactly resemble each other with respect to the 
property of having elementary charge. And so forth.  
 Like objects, properties can resemble other properties more or less closely. The 
property of being a pantherine resembles more closely the property of being a felid than the 
property being a canine. The property of being scarlet resembles more closely the property 
of being crimson than the property of being cerulean. 
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 Every satisfactory theory of properties has to provide the conditions for resemblance 
among objects and properties. In this chapter I will illustrate what the Dual-Aspect Account 
fulfils the task. In particular, I will show how the introduction of aspects in our ontology is 
extremely serviceable for analysing resemblances among properties. In slogan form: the 
more aspects two properties share, the more they resemble. It is worth bearing in mind that 
the version of the Dual-Aspect Account I wish to defend in this dissertation is a view of 
fundamental properties. However, the theoretical benefits of its analysis of resemblance 
represent a point in favour of the view that sparse non-fundamental properties have aspects 
as well.17   
 The Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis of resemblance has two main advantages. First, 
it gives us more precise conditions for resemblances among properties. Second, it allows us 
to accommodate a greater a variety of resemblances. It is therefore preferable to non-aspect 
views of properties. I will elaborate the previous claims by focusing on two cases: one 
concerns partially resembling properties such as that of being scarlet and being crimson, the 
other regards resemblances among simple properties. 
 The first case highlights the merits of the Dual-Aspect Account with respect to trope 
views of properties (it is worth noting that Heil 2003 and Martin 2008 defend a tropes version 
of the Identity Theory). Typically, the tropes theorist holds that resemblances among 
properties are primitive and no further explainable in more basic terms. As John Heil puts it, 
“objects are similar by virtue of possessing similar properties; properties, in contrast, are not 
similar in virtue of anything” (2003, 152). On a tropes view, the resemblance between scarlet 
and crimson is brute. This view fails to capture the intuition that scarlet and crimson resemble 
each other by virtue of being both shades of red. This is an intuition that we should preserve. 
As I will explain, the Dual-Aspect Account is up to the task: it accounts for the resemblance 
of scarlet and crimson in terms of their aspects.  
 A word of caution: being scarlet and being crimson are determinates of the 
determinable property of being red. It is widely held that determinables and determinates 
stand in some metaphysically distinctive relation. However, it is not my claim that the Dual-
Aspect Account elucidates the determinable-determinate relation. In what follows, I will not 
discuss this issue (for a more detailed discussion, see Johnson 1921; Fine 2011; Funkhouser 
2006, 2014; Wilson 2012). 
                                                          
17 Here I acknowledge a distinction between a fundamental conception and a scientific conception of 
sparse properties (Schaffer 2004). On the former, the sparse properties are those posited by physical 
theory. On the latter, the sparse properties are those invoked by all scientific disciplines. In this 
dissertation, I treated the fundamental properties as sparse properties in accordance to fundamental 
conception. 
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 The second case, which concerns resemblances among simple properties, highlights 
the advantages of the Dual-Aspect Account with respect to non-aspect views. Canonically, 
a property is simple if it is not constituted by other properties. In contrast, a property is 
complex if it is not simple. Suppose, for example, that the property of being a certain particle 
is a conjunctive property M∧Q∧S, where M is the property of having a certain mass, Q is 
the property of having a certain charge, and S is the property of having a certain spin. The 
conjunctive property M∧Q∧S is complex; its conjuncts M, Q, and S are simple properties 
that constitute it. Yet it is perfectly legitimate to ask whether M and Q resemble in some 
respects. For instance, one might argue that any partial resemblance between M and Q offers 
a ground for a unified account of these properties. Thus it is desirable to possess an account 
that permits partial resemblances among simple properties. Non-aspect views lack the 
theoretical resources for accomplishing this aim. On non-aspect views, simple properties are 
either identical or “wholly different” (Armstrong 1997, 52). In contrast, the Dual-Aspect 
Account provides us with conditions for assessing partial resemblances among simple 
properties. As it will become clear in due course, on the Dual-Aspect Account, simple 
properties can be partially resembling by virtue of having some resembling aspects. The 
Dual-Aspect Account is therefore able to accommodate a greater variety of resemblances 
among properties than non-aspect views. This is a decisive choice-point in its favour.  
 I will illustrate the previous claims by comparing the Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis 
of resemblance with two other views: one is the Identity Theory of powerful qualities 
(Chapter 3; Heil 2003; Martin 2008); the other is David Armstrong’s theory of resemblance. 
In particular, I will focus on Armstrong’s notion of partial identity, which captures a natural 
way of thinking of partial resemblances among properties (1989a, 102-107; 1997, 51-57). 
The discussion of Armstrong’s view allows us to highlight the merits of the Dual-Aspect 
Account with respect to a non-powerful qualities view of properties. 
 Here is the plan. In §5.1.2 and §5.1.3, I will identify two kinds of resemblance that 
any satisfactory view has to accommodate: exact resemblance and partial resemblance. In 
§5.2.1, I will reformulate these kinds of resemblance from the viewpoint of the Identity 
Theory and the Dual-Aspect Account. In §5.2.2 and §5.2.3, I will discuss the theoretical 
advantages of the Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis of resemblance. In these sections, I will 
examine the cases of partially resembling properties and resemblances among simple 
properties. In §5.2.4, I will explore a comparison with Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. 
The last section of this chapter, §5.3, is devoted to a short summary of the Dual-Aspect 
Account. 
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 Before proceeding any further, a distinction must be clarified. In ordinary language, 
the word “same” conveys different senses of sameness. We speak of Mary and Miriam 
wearing the same sweater, electrons having the same charge, Earth being the same as Twin 
Earth, the Morning Star being the same as the Evening Star, water being the same as H2O. 
And so on and so forth. In the previous cases, the word “same” has different meanings. 
 In the case of Mary and Miriam wearing the same sweater, electrons having the same 
charge, and Earth being the same as Twin Earth, the word “same” expresses the idea of 
sameness among numerically distinct entities. The identity in question is qualitative rather 
than numerical. Mary’s and Miriam’s sweaters are identical while being numerically distinct. 
Earth and Twin Earth are identical, but they are two distinct planets. And so on. Call exact 
resemblance this sense of sameness. Exact resemblance captures a loose sense of identity. 
In this sense, the resemblance relation involves at least two numerically distinct entities. 
 Yet resemblance comes in degrees; it is not all or nothing. Two objects or properties 
might be more or less closely resembling. The highest degree of resemblance between them 
is exact resemblance. Every degree of resemblance between them below exact resemblance 
is partial resemblance.  
 In addition to the loose sense, there is a strict sense of sameness. In the strict sense, 
the adjective “same” conveys the idea of numerical identity, or self-sameness. Examples of 
strict identities abound: everything is numerically identical with itself (cf. Lewis 1986a, 
192). The Morning Star is one and the same with the Evening Star, water is one and the same 
with H2O, and Diana Prince is one and the same with Wonder Woman. And so forth. In this 
chapter, I will restrict my attention to exact and partial resemblance. The Dual-Aspect 
Account does not offer any illuminating insights into the notion of self-sameness. 
 Before moving on, other remarks need to be stated. Resemblances among objects 
depend on their shared properties. On the Dual-Aspect Account and the Identity Theory, 
properties are powerful qualities. On these views, resemblances among objects are 
determined by their resembling powerful qualities. 
 For illustrative purposes, I will assume that the properties mentioned in the following 
examples are powerful qualities or can be exhaustively reduced to powerful qualities. This 
assumption allows us to discuss familiar cases of resemblance while leaving aside the 
question of whether the properties in question are really powerful qualities. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that neither the Identity Theory nor the Dual-Aspect Account holds 
that all properties are powerful qualities. Both views hold a thesis about the nature of 
fundamental properties. 
128 
 
 Another assumption: for the sake of simplicity, I will treat properties as universals. 
This allows us to illustrate the Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis of resemblance by setting 
aside complications which concern the role of location. On tropes view, the location of 
properties is a determining factor in assessing similarities among them. However, the 
conditions of resemblance that I will discuss in what follows can be easily incorporated in a 
tropes framework. I will flag some suggested amendments when needed. Relatedly, it is 
important to bear in mind that neither the Identity Theory nor the Dual-Aspect Account 
forces us to embrace a conception of tropes. The version of Identity Theory advocated by 
Martin and Heil is presented as a tropes view, but this hangs on independent commitments 
that they endorse (Heil 2003, 137–147; 2003, 152–159; 2012, 93–97; Martin 2008, 44). Very 
roughly, the trope—universal distinction can be understood as follows: two tropes can be 
exactly resembling, but never strictly identical; in contrast, two universals can be strictly 
identical. The decision between tropes and universals rests on independent factors which I 
shall not examine here (for a more detailed overview of the trope—universal distinction, see 
MacBride 2005).  
Lastly, a terminological note. In the literature, “similarity” and “resemblance” are 
used interchangeably. For the sake of clarity, I will stick to “resemblance”. 
 
5.1.2 Exact Resemblance 
 Exact resemblance conveys the idea that two properties or objects are qualitatively 
identical, but numerically distinct. Consider the example of Mary and Miriam, who wear the 
same sweater. Wearing the same sweater is something that Mary and Miriam have in 
common. Namely, they share the property of wearing a sweater of a certain model. Yet Mary 
and Miriam are numerically distinct individuals who have numerically distinct properties. 
To say that Mary and Miriam are similar with respect to wearing a certain sweater means 
that they have two exactly resembling properties. More precisely, we can say that Mary has 
the property P of wearing a certain sweater, Miriam has the property Q of wearing a certain 
sweater, and P and Q are exactly resembling. Of course, Mary and Miriam might differ with 
respect to other properties. For example, they might have different height, weight, and eye 
colour. If Mary and Miriam were exactly resembling with respect to all their properties, they 
would exactly resemble each other. We can generalise by saying that two objects a and b are 
exactly resembling just in case all properties of a exactly resemble all properties of b, and 
vice versa. We can formulate this idea more precisely as follows.  
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Exact Resemblance of Objects: for two objects a and b, a exactly resembles b if and 
only if for each property P of a, there is a property Q such that b has Q and P 
exactly resembles Q, and vice versa.  
 
We can impose some restrictions on the relevant properties to be considered. For example, 
one could decide to focus only on the fundamental properties that Mary and Miriam have. 
Suppose that Mary is a neuroscientist and Miriam is a business manager. Having different 
professions does not block the possibility that Mary and Miriam might be exactly resembling 
with respect to their fundamental properties. However, the condition of exact resemblance 
for objects is hardly useful if we do not specify one for properties.  
 Exactly resembling properties are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. It 
is difficult to spell out the idea of qualitative identity in more basic terms. To illustrate it, we 
can appeal to the notion of a duplicate. A duplicate P* of a property P is such that P* and P 
are identical with respect to all its intrinsic features; yet P* and P are numerically distinct 
properties (Langton an Lewis 1998). Suppose to print several copies of a picture. The image 
printed in each copy is qualitatively identical to the original picture: it has the same colours 
arranged in the same way. Yet the copies numerically differ from the original. Exactly 
resembling properties are like the copies of the picture. We can formulate a criterion of exact 
resemblance for properties by appealing to the notion of a duplicate.  
 
Exact Resemblance of Properties: for any two properties P and Q, P exactly resembles 
Q if and only if P is a duplicate of Q. 
 
The claim here is not that exact resemblance among properties can be reduced to duplication. 
Instead the claim is that the duplication captures the core idea of qualitative identity without 
numerical identity.  
 Typically, the relation of exact resemblance is taken to be reflexive, symmetrical and 
transitive (see Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, 69–80) for a more detailed discussion of the formal 
properties of resemblance). The reflexivity of exact resemblance is uncontroversial. For 
every property or object x, a duplicate y of x would be such that x and y are exactly 
resembling with respect to their intrinsic features. 
 Exact resemblance is symmetric; duplicates exactly resemble each other. Suppose 
that Mary is a duplicate of Miriam. If so, for every intrinsic property of Miriam, P, there is 
a duplicate property P* of P that Mary has, and vice versa.  
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 Lastly, exact resemblance is transitive. If properties or objects x and y are exactly 
resembling, and y and z are exactly resembling, then x exactly resembles z. Suppose two 
print two copies of your favourite philosopher. Each copy is a duplicate of the original 
picture. Consequently, if one copy exactly resembles the original picture, so it does the other. 
Otherwise, they would not be copies of the same original picture. 
 
5.1.3 Partial Resemblance 
 Resemblance comes in degrees: the more properties two entities share, the more they 
are similar. For example, Simone de Beauvoir and Simone Weil had common the properties 
of being a human, being French, and being a philosopher. However, we can plausibly 
suppose that Simone de Beauvoir and Simone Weil were different with respect to their height 
and weight. In turn, properties might resemble other properties more or less closely. At least 
intuitively, the property of being scarlet more closely resembles the property of being 
crimson than the property of being cerulean. For example, both scarlet and crimson are 
shades of red while cerulean is not. A satisfactory analysis has to specify the conditions for 
partial resemblance among objects as well as properties. 
 A view that captures a natural way of thinking of partial resemblances is David 
Armstrong’s theory of partial identity (1978b, 116–131; 1989a, 102–107; 1997, 51–57). 
According to Armstrong, objects and properties that are partially resembling share at least a 
common constituent, which is itself a property. The partial resemblance, or partial identity 
in Armstrong’s terminology, depends on the number of common constituents. The more 
constituents two properties or objects have in common, the more they are similar (Armstrong 
1978b, 121; 1989a, 102–103).  
 
As resemblance of properties gets closer and closer, we arrive in the limit at identity. 
Two become one. This suggests that as resemblance gets closer, more and more 
constituents of the resembling properties are identical, until all the constituents are 
identical and we have identity rather than resemblance. (Armstrong 1989a, 106) 
 
To illustrate Armstrong’s view, consider two marbles: one is scarlet, the other is crimson. 
The scarlet marble has the conjunctive property M∧S, where its conjuncts are the property 
of being a marble, M, and the property of being scarlet, S. The crimson marble has the 
conjunctive property M∧C, where C is the property of being crimson. On Armstrong’s view, 
the two marbles are partially identical, or partially resembling with respect to the property 
M. This is because M is a common constituent of M∧S and M∧C. 
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 The selling point of Armstrong’s partial identity is capturing an intuitive sense of 
partial resemblance. Unfortunately, his theory has a restriction: only complex properties can 
be partially identical, or partially resembling. As Armstrong puts it, “two simple things 
cannot be partially identical [partially resembling], they must be wholly different or not at 
all” (1997, 52). 
 I shall discuss the severity of this restriction in §5.3.2. At the moment, let us consider 
Armstrong’s partial identity as is. Two complex properties partially resemble each other if 
they share at least a constituent property. The more constituent properties they share, the 
more they are resembling. Suppose that P is a complex property constituted by A, B, and F, 
and Q is constituted by X, Y, and F. On Armstrong’s view, P and Q share F. More precisely, 
we could say that P partially resembles Q at a certain degree n, where n is determined by the 
common constituents of P and Q (it is worth noting that Armstrong claims that resemblance 
comes in degrees, but he does not specify how to measure it). Now let us suppose to compare 
P with a complex property G, which is constituted by T, B, and F. In this case, P partially 
resembles G at a degree m such that m>n. This is because P and G share B and F. If we 
compare P with another complex property P* constituted by A, B, and F, then, in 
Armstrong’s view, P is strictly identical with P*.  
 The idea of degrees of resemblance demands caution for we cannot consider only the 
shared constituents. Otherwise we face some implausible consequences. Suppose that the 
degree of resemblance is given solely by the number of shared constituents. Now consider 
the properties P, P∧Q, and P∧Q∧S. Properties P and P∧Q would have the same degree n of 
resemblance of P and P∧R∧S, namely n=1. However, this fails to capture the intuitive idea 
that P and P∧Q are more resembling than P and P∧Q∧S. 
 To avoid the previous problem, we need to consider the constituents that are shared 
as well as those that are not. In order to determine the degree of resemblance n of two 
complex properties P and Q, we can use the formula n=s/p, where s is the number of P’s and 
Q’s shared constituents and p is the number of P’s and Q’s possessed constituents. As a 
result, the degree of resemblance n of P and P∧Q is 1/2, while the degree n of P and P∧Q∧S 
is 1/3. The proposed formula allows us to capture the intuitive sense in which P more closely 
resembles P∧Q than P∧Q∧S. 
 Partial resemblance understood as Armstrong’s partial identity is reflexive, 
symmetric, but not transitive. We get reflexivity because every object or complex property 
share with itself at least a constituent. Partial identity is symmetric: the degree n is 
determined by the number of properties shared and possessed by two properties or objects x 
and y. So if x partially resembles y to a degree n then y partially resembles x to a degree n.  
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For example, if P partially resembles P∧Q at degree n=1/2, then P∧Q partially resembles P 
at degree n=1/2. 
 Partial resemblance is not transitive, however. If x partially resembles y to a certain 
degree n, and y partially resembles z to a degree n, it is not always the case that x and z are 
partially resembling to the same degree n. It is possible that x and z partially resemble each 
other to a degree m such that n≠m. For instance, if P partially resembles P∧Q at degree n=1/2 
and P∧Q partially resembles P∧Q∧R∧S at n=1/2, then it is not the case that P does not 
partially resemble P∧Q∧R∧S at degree n=1/2. As it happens, the degree of resemblance of 
P and P∧Q∧R∧S is n=1/4.  
 Armstrong’s partial identity captures an intuitive and plausible sense of partial 
resemblance. However, it has a limit: it does not allow partial resemblances among simple 
properties.18 As I will argue in due course, it is desirable to allow partial resemblances among 
simple properties. I will show in §5.2.3 that the Dual-Aspect Account is preferable to 
Armstrong’ partial identity theory in this respect. Having clarified the notions of exact and 
partial resemblance, I will now turn to discuss them from the viewpoint of the Identity 
Theory and Dual-Aspect Account respectively. 
 
5.2 The Dual-Aspect Account and the Identity Theory on Resemblance 
 
5.2.1 Differences and Commonalities 
 Every satisfactory theory of properties has to specify the conditions of exact and 
partial resemblance for objects and properties (§5.1.2–§5.1.3).  In what follows, I will 
examine how the Identity Theory (Chapter 3) and the Dual-Aspect Account (Chapters 3 and 
4) accomplish this aim. The two views do not drastically differ for both of them hold that 
properties are powerful qualities. However, I will show that the Dual-Aspect Account can 
claim two important advantages: (i) the notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects 
improve the precision of the resemblance conditions among objects and properties; (ii) it 
accommodates a greater variety of resemblances for it allows the possibility of partial 
resemblances among simple properties. 
 We can draw an initial comparison between the Dual-Aspect Account and the 
Identity Theory by considering how they differ with respect to these questions: 
 
(1) In what sense objects can have the same properties? 
                                                          
18Armstrong’s partial identity faces significant difficulties in accommodating quantitative properties 
(e.g. having a five grams mass). See Eddon (2007; 2013) for a critical examination of this issue. 
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(2) What are the conditions for two objects to resemble each other?  
(3) Why do two resembling objects behave in similar ways?  
 
The Identity Theory, in its standard version, is a tropes view (Heil 2003, 137–147; 2003, 
152–159; 2012, 93–97; Martin 2008, 44). Resemblances among two simple powerful 
qualities is a “brute phenomenon” (Heil 2003, 157–158). Resemblance among complex 
tropes can be accounted in terms of Armstrong’s partial identity (Heil 2003, 156). According 
to this view, if crimson and scarlet are simple powerful qualities, their similarity cannot be 
further explained in terms of common constituents. Simple powerful qualities have their 
exact resemblance “built-in”, which cannot be explained in more basic terms (Heil 2003, 
157). However, we have to bear in mind that the Identity Theory is also available for the 
friend of universals. On this version, two simple powerful qualities are resembling by virtue 
of being instances of the same universals.  
 To answer (1), objects can have the same properties in the sense of having exactly 
resembling powerful qualities. That is, qualitatively identical but numerically distinct 
powerful qualities. 
 To answer (2), two objects a and b resemble each other more or less closely 
depending on a’s and b’s exactly resembling powerful qualities. As Heil puts it: 
 
Objects are similar when they possess one or more properties in common. Exactly 
similar objects, if there are any, share all of their properties, less-than-exactly similar 
objects share some, but not all of their properties. (Heil 2003, 154) 
 
To answer (3), we need to consider the features of powerful qualities. A powerful quality is 
an essentially dispositional-and-qualitative property. This is to say that “in virtue of 
possessing a property, an object possesses both a particular dispositionality and a particular 
qualitative character” (Martin and Heil 1999, 45–46). By having resembling powerful 
qualities, two objects a and b have similar dispositionality. That is, a and b are disposed to 
manifest similar effects in similar circumstances. The resembling dispositionality accounts 
for the similarity of a and b. For example, consider two electrons. Each of them has the 
property of having a certain charge. Suppose that this property is a powerful quality. By 
having a certain charge, each electron has the power to produce an electromagnetic force. 
Note that on the Identity Theory the dispositionality of a powerful quality is identical with 
is qualitativity. As such, two exactly resembling powerful qualities qualitatively contributes 
to bearers in the same way. 
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 Now let us consider how the Dual-Aspect Account. Since the Dual-Aspect Account 
is a version of the powerful qualities view, the answers to (1)-(3) are similar to those of the 
Identity Theory.  
 The answer to (1) is the same as the Identity Theory: on the Dual-Aspect Account, 
objects can have the same properties in the sense of having exactly resembling powerful 
qualities. 
 The answer to (2) highlights an important difference between the Dual-Aspect 
Account and the Identity Theory. The Dual-Aspect Account can specify more accurately the 
conditions of resemblance for objects by invoking the notions of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects. As I will illustrate in due course, a beneficial consequence is the possibility of 
accommodating a greater variety of resemblances than the Identity Theory. I will elaborate 
these claims in §5.2.2 and §5.2.3. At the moment, it suffices to note that both the Identity 
Theory and the Dual-Aspect Account accommodate resemblances in terms of exactly 
resembling powerful qualities. 
 The answer to (3) is somewhat different. The Dual-Aspect Account invokes the idea 
of dispositional aspects to account for the dispositionality of objects. Two objects behave 
similarly when they possess powerful qualities having similar dispositional aspects. The 
dispositional aspect of a property captures the idea that a bearer has some powers by virtue 
of possessing that property. In more precise terms: 
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P. 
 
For example, on the Dual-Aspect Account, we can say that two electrons behave similarly 
by virtue of possessing powerful qualities with resembling dispositional aspects. However, 
the Dual-Aspect Account is not committed to the identity between the dispositional and the 
qualitative. Therefore, it is possible that two powerful qualities have resembling 
dispositional aspects but different qualitative ones.  
An interesting and advantageous consequence is that there can be objects with similar 
dispositionality but different qualitativity. Suppose that every shade of red has the 
dispositional aspect of disposing a bearer to reflect light at a certain wavelength. Scarlet and 
crimson would be exactly resembling with respect to this dispositional aspect. Every scarlet 
object and every crimson one is disposed to reflect light at the same wavelength. However, 
the ways in which scarlet and crimson contribute to the qualitativity of their bearers are 
different. The qualitative aspects of scarlet, namely how a scarlet contributes to how a bearer 
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is like, is different from the qualitative aspect of crimson. A scarlet marble and a crimson 
one are similarly disposed to reflect light at a certain wavelength. Yet they are qualitatively 
different: one looks scarlet, the other crimson.  
 To facilitate the discussion, a brief repetition of what aspects are might be useful (for 
a detailed discussion, see Chapter 3, §3.2). On the conception I wish to defend in this work, 
aspects are ways of being of properties. They can be regarded as ontologically lightweight 
(or non-ontic) higher-order properties with a few qualifications:  
 
(1) Aspects supervene on properties. Therefore, on the standard view that what 
supervenes does not constitute a genuine addition to being, aspects are lightweight 
entities (cf. Armstrong 1982, 7; cf. Armstrong 1997, 11–13). 
(2) Aspects are ontologically dependent on the properties of which they are aspects. 
They cannot exist without properties.  
(3) It is the nature of a property that determines the aspects it has. Consequently, a 
property has the same aspects in every possible world where it exists. 
 
I defended and motivated (1)-(3) in Chapter 3 (§3.2), and discussed other conceptions of 
aspects in Chapter 4 (§4.2). Here I shall not repeat the discussion. The notions of 
dispositional and qualitative aspects allow us to make more precise the claim that that “in 
virtue of possessing a property, an object possesseses both a particular dispositionality and 
a particular qualitative character” (Martin and Heil 1999, 45–46). Since I have already stated 
Dispositional Aspect, here I will just repeat the formulation of a Qualitative Aspect. 
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspects if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P. 
 
Here is an example to illustrate the proposed view. Suppose that having a certain 
gravitational mass is a powerful quality. On the Dual-Aspect Account, it has dispositional 
and qualitative aspects. For example, it has the dispositional aspect of dispositional of 
disposing a bearer to exert and experience a gravitational force, and it has the qualitative 
aspect, for example, of conferring upon a bearer a certain a gravitational potential energy 
which can be measured in joules.19 These aspects are ways the property of having a certain 
gravitational mass is. They supervene on it. Therefore, they are ontologically lightweight. 
                                                          
19 The example is merely illustrative. The reader is free to think of a more suitable candidate of a 
qualitative aspect of gravitational mass. 
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Crucially, these aspects are ontologically dependent on and determined by the nature of 
having a certain gravitational mass. 
 So far, I presented an overview of how the Identity Theory and the Dual-Aspect 
Account deal with resemblances among properties and objects. In what follows, I will 
examine how these views regiment the conditions of exact and partial resemblance among 
properties. To highlight differences and commonalities between them, I will consider the 
two cases mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: the first is the case of partially 
resembling properties such as scarlet and crimson, the second is the case of partial 
resemblances among simple properties. 
 
5.2.2 Exact Resemblance 
 Exact resemblance captures the loose sense of identity, namely the sense in which 
two entities are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. This is the sense in which 
Mary and Miriam may wear qualitatively identical but numerically distinct sweaters. In 
§5.1.2, I proposed the following formulations for exact resemblance.  
 
Exact Resemblance of Objects: for two objects a and b, a exactly resembles b if and 
only if for any property P of a, there is a property Q such that b has Q and P 
exactly resembles Q, and vice versa.  
 
Exact Resemblance of Properties: for two properties P and Q, P exactly resembles Q 
if and only if P is a duplicate of Q. 
 
On the powerful qualities view, we can just replace “property” with “powerful quality” in 
the above conditions. Accordingly, Exact Resemblance of Objects states that two objects a 
and b exactly resemble each other just in case a and b have exactly resembling powerful 
qualities; Exact Resemblance of Properties states that powerful qualities P and Q are exactly 
resembling just in case P and Q are duplicates. We can analyse resemblances among complex 
powerful qualities in terms of their common constituents, which are simple powerful 
qualities (Heil 2003, 156–157). 
Now let us focus on the Identity Theory. In its standard version, the Identity Theory 
takes resemblances among simple powerful qualities as primitive. This is because powerful 
qualities are held to be tropes (Heil 2003, 137–147; 2003, 152–159; 2012, 93–97; Martin 
2008, 44). Therefore, there is nothing else that accounts for the fact that two simple powerful 
qualities have exactly resembling dispositionality and qualitativity. A friend of universals 
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could say that two simple powerful qualities are exactly resembling by virtue of being 
instances of the same universal powerful quality. This would ensure that the two simple 
powerful qualities have exactly resembling dispositionality and qualitativity. Arguably, the 
identity theorist embraces the following principle or something akin. 
 
Exact Resemblance of Powerful Qualities: for two powerful qualities P and Q, P 
exactly resembles Q if and only if (i) P’s dispositionality exactly resembles Q’s 
dispositionality, and (ii) P’s qualitativity exactly resembles Q’s qualitativity.  
 
Given Exact Resemblance of Powerful Qualities, the charge of a particle a exactly resembles 
the charge of a particle b just in case a’s dispositionality and qualitativity and b’s 
dispositionality and qualitativity are exactly resembling. 
 Now let us consider the Dual-Aspect Account. Its most significant advantage is the 
possibility of invoking aspects to improve the conditions of the exact resemblance among 
powerful qualities. Recall that a powerful quality may have more than one dispositional or 
qualitative aspect. This is to say that a powerful quality may empower a bearer and 
qualitatively contributes to it in different ways. Plausibly, we can regard a powerful quality’s 
dispositionality as the conjunction of all its dispositional aspects. In same vein, we can think 
of its qualitativity as the conjunction of all its qualitative aspects. Accordingly, we can 
reformulate Exact Resemblance of Powerful Qualities can be reformulated as follows (where 
“DA” stands for Dual-Aspect Account).  
 
DA-Exact Resemblance: For two powerful qualities P and Q, P exactly resembles Q if 
and only if (1) for each dispositional aspect α of P, there is a dispositional 
aspect α* of Q such that α exactly resembles α*, and vice versa, and (2) for 
each qualitative aspect β of P, there is a qualitative aspect β* of Q such that β 
exactly resembles β*, and vice versa. 
 
The proposed formulation may look intricate, but it merely states that two powerful qualities 
are exactly resembling just in case they have exactly resembling dispositional and qualitative 
aspects. For example, the charges of two particles exactly resemble just in case both 
properties empower the particles in the same way and qualitatively contribute to their make-
up in the same way. 
 The Dual-Aspect Account offers a condition for resemblance among simple powerful 
qualities in terms of their aspects. To emphasise the advantage of this view over the Identity 
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Theory, let us consider the case of two intuitively resembling properties such as scarlet and 
crimson. 
 One can plausibly argue that scarlet and crimson have something in common. For 
example, they are both shades of red. A satisfactory account of resemblance should preserve 
this intuition. Both the Identity Theory and the Dual-Aspect Account have the theoretical 
resources for satisfying this requirement. However, as I will explain, the Dual-Aspect offers 
a preferable framework (I will discuss this case in more detail in §5.2.3).   
 On the Identity Theory, there are two ways in which scarlet and crimson can be 
partially resembling. First, it could be that scarlet and crimson are complex powerful 
qualities sharing at least a common constituent (Heil 2003, 154–157). The common 
constituent would be a simple powerful quality. Thus scarlet and crimson would be 
resembling by virtue of having at least an exactly resembling simple powerful quality. 
Second, it could be that scarlet and crimson are simple powerful qualities. The standard 
version of the Identity Theory would hold that their intuitive resemblance is a “brute 
phenomenon” (Heil 2003, 158). This is because powerful qualities, on the standard version, 
are tropes. Simple tropes primitively resemble other simple tropes. A version of the Identity 
Theory that adopts a conception of universals would hold the same: if scarlet and crimson 
are simple universals, their intuitive resemblance cannot be explicated further. 
 The Dual-Aspect Account accommodates the partial resemblance between scarlet 
and crimson is a similar way to the Identity Theory, if these are complex properties. Namely, 
the dual-aspect theorist can appeal to exactly resembling powerful qualities of scarlet and 
crimson to account for the intuitive resemblance. However, the dual-aspect theorist could 
claim that having exactly resembling powerful qualities means having powerful qualities 
with exactly resembling dispositional and qualitative aspects. Here the advantage is an 
improvement in precision. 
A more significant advantage concerns the possibility that scarlet and crimson are 
simple properties. The dual-aspect theorist can do better than the identity theorist, who 
claims that the intuitive resemblance is brute. This is because the dual-aspect theorist can 
invoke dispositional and qualitative aspects to account for the intuitive resemblance of 
scarlet and crimson.  
 On the Dual-Aspect Account, every powerful quality has some dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. This holds for complex powerful qualities as well as simple ones. Thus 
crimson and scarlet can be simple powerful qualities and yet possess dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. Here it is crucial to recall that the claim that powerful qualities have 
aspects should not be understood in the same fashion as the claim that tables have legs: 
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aspects are ontologically lightweight as they supervene on properties (Chapter 3, §3.2). 
Therefore, the claim that a property has aspects does not amount to the view that it is “made 
of” some constituents. To put it differently, a property can be simple and yet having aspects 
without being a complex one. 
 To return to the previous case, this conception of aspects permits that scarlet and 
crimson are simple and yet partially resembling. This is possible because scarlet and crimson 
may have some exactly resembling aspects. To illustrate this claim, let us consider an 
example from colour science. Shades of red have the same degree of hue, but differ in 
brightness and saturation. We can regard having a certain hue, brightness and saturation in 
terms of aspects of every shade of red. Here we are not forced to decide which of these 
aspects is dispositional and which one is qualitative. The point is that the dual-aspect theorist 
can claim that crimson and scarlet are partially resembling with respect to the exactly 
resembling aspect of having a certain degree of hue. This seems to capture the intuition that 
scarlet and crimson are partially resembling in spite of being simple. The Dual-Aspect 
Account appears to offer a more informative analysis of the partial resemblance of scarlet 
and crimson, if these are simple properties.  
 The Dual-Aspect Account may claim an advantage also with respect to the analysis 
of exactly resembling powerful qualities. On the Identity Theory, it is a “basic, irreducible 
fact” whether two simple powerful qualities are exactly resembling (Heil 2003, 157). 
Namely, nothing else constitutes the exact resemblance of two simple powerful qualities. In 
contrast, on the Dual-Aspect Account, it is possible to account for the exact resemblance of 
simple powerful qualities in terms of their aspects: two simple powerful qualities are exactly 
resembling just in case they have exactly resembling aspects (see the formulation of DA-
Exact Resemblance). 
 In spite of its merits, an analysis of resemblance in terms of aspects has some 
inescapable limitations. We are neither infallible nor all-knowing. Therefore, our 
discriminating abilities constrain the evaluation of resemblances. Properties might have 
aspects that are unknowable to us or we might erroneously identify aspects where there are 
none or we may confuse dispositional aspects for qualitative ones. Moreover, the notions of 
Dispositional Aspect and Qualitative Aspect (§5.2.1) do not help us adjudicating some 
controversial disputes. Consider the case of colours again. Someone might think that having 
a certain hue is a qualitative aspect: it can be argued that it is a matter of how a shade of 
colour looks like. However, someone else may argue that having a certain hue is a 
dispositional aspect: we can characterise it in terms of dominant wavelength, which depends 
on how light is reflected. There is no straightforward strategy to deal with difficult cases 
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such as that of colours. We can expect similar difficulties when we analyse resemblances 
among the aspects of fundamental properties. Think of charge. In the previous chapters, I 
have often indicated having a certain quantity of charge, which can be measured in 
coulombs, as an example of a qualitative aspect. But someone could defend a dispositional 
conception of having a certain quantity of charge. Note, however, that the tenability of the 
Dual-Aspect Account requires only that all fundamental properties essentially have some 
dispositional and qualitative aspects. What these aspects are cannot be decided from the 
armchair. (I will discuss some arguments in favour of the thesis that all fundamental 
properties are essentially dispositional and qualitative in Chapter 6). 
 A more significant objection is that the Dual-Aspect Account fails to give us a 
genuine explanatory advantage with respect to the Identity Theory. An opponent could argue 
the Dual-Aspect Account merely reformulates the resemblance conditions in terms of 
aspects. The two views are therefore on the same footing: they cannot explain exact 
resemblances among simple properties in more basic terms. The objection is fair. But it 
downscales unfairly the merit of the Dual-Aspect Account. The improvement in precision 
of the condition of resemblance remains a decisive choice-point: even if the Dual-Aspect 
Account and the Identity Theory were explanatorily on a par (i.e. both views cannot explain 
resemblances among properties in more basic terms), the Dual-Aspect Account would offer 
a more precise apparatus to assess when two powerful qualities are exactly resembling. 
Precision is a virtue that we should privilege. As such, the previous worry does not give us 
strong reasons for rejecting the Dual-Aspect Account.  
There is a related issue that it is worth addressing. In order to appreciate the force of 
the previous explanatory worry, we need to recall a peculiar feature of the proposed 
conception of aspects. On the Dual-Aspect Account, it is the nature of a property that 
determines its aspects (Chapter 3, §3.2.1). We can reformulate this claim by saying that 
aspects metaphysically depend on properties. The kind of metaphysical dependence that I 
have in mind shares an important feature with the notion of metaphysical grounding: it 
captures the idea that a property has certain aspects in virtue of its nature. However, the Dual-
Aspect Account is not committed to the view that the relation that obtains between a property 
and its aspects is grounding (for an overview on metaphysical grounding, see Bliss and 
Trogdon 2014). 
 A reason for avoiding the commitment to a grounding relation between a property 
and its aspects is that grounding is widely held to be an explanatory relation (the precise 
connection remains opaque. For a more detailed discussion, see Fine 2001, 2012, deRossett 
2013; Litland 2013; Dasgupta 2014; Thompson 2016). On such a conception, there is an 
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explanatory connection between a ground and what is grounded: the ground explains or 
backs an explanation of what is grounded. For example, if the fact that Mary is mortal is 
grounded in the fact that Mary is a human, then the fact that Mary is human explains, in 
some sense, the fact that she is mortal. To put it differently, we can say that Mary is mortal 
because she is a human. 
Someone might think that grounding is tailored to the view that aspects are 
metaphysically determined by properties. For instance, we could claim that the fact that 
charge has a certain nature explains why its possession disposes a bearer to produce an 
electromagnetic force. While this view may be attractive at first glance, it raises a problem 
with respect to the proposed analysis of resemblances: if aspects are grounded in properties, 
then they cannot explain resemblances among properties. It seems that we get the 
explanation the wrong way. If properties ground their aspects, and grounding is an 
explanatory relation, then it is the resemblance of properties that explains the resemblances 
among aspects.  
 The explanatory objection is fair and instructive. Fortunately, there are two 
straightforward strategies to escape it. First, we could abandon the idea that the metaphysical 
dependence that ties together aspects and properties is explanatory. Second, we could give 
up the idea that the Dual-Aspect Account explains resemblances among properties in terms 
of aspects. 
 Both strategies fit nicely with the version of the Dual-Aspect Account that I have 
outlined so far. The metaphysical dependence between properties and aspects is not meant 
to be explanatory. It merely shares the systematic connection and determination with 
grounding. On the Dual-Aspect Account, the dependence between aspects and a property 
holds in virtue of a property’s nature. But it does not follow that this dependence is 
explanatory in the same fashion as grounding is taken to be (I shall not repeat here the 
motivations for embracing the proposed conception of aspects. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Chapter 3 §3.2). It is not my claim that we can reduce, in an explanatory 
sense, resemblances among properties to resemblances among aspects. Rather my claim is 
more modest, namely that we can formulate more precise resemblance conditions by 
appealing to the Dual-Aspect Account’s notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects. The 
advantage is an improvement in precision rather than in explanation. Yet this is a choice-
point in favour of the Dual-Aspect Account as compared to the Identity Theory.  
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5.2.3 Partial Resemblance  
 Objects and properties resemble each other more or less closely. For example, 
Simone de Beauvoir more closely resembles Simone Weil than Hannah Arendt. Simone de 
Beauvoir and Simone Weil are both French, mortal, and philosophers. Hannah Arendt is 
mortal and a philosopher, but she is not French. Scarlet more closely resembles crimson than 
cerulean. Scarlet and crimson are both shades of red while cerulean is not. And so on and so 
forth. 
 The Dual-Aspect Account gives us a serviceable machinery for analysing partial 
resemblances among properties. In what follows, I will argue that it has two merits that make 
it preferable to non-aspect views: (1) it accommodates a greater variety of resemblances; (2) 
it allows the possibility of partially resembling simple properties. To illustrate these 
advantages, I will discuss a comparison between the Dual-Aspect Account and the Identity 
Theory. 
 In its canonical form, the Identity Theory holds that properties are tropes (Heil 2003, 
137–147; 2003, 152–159; 2012, 93–97; Martin 2008, 44). Accordingly, resemblances 
among simple powerful qualities are not explainable in more basic terms. Simple properties 
“are not similar in virtue of anything” (Heil 2003, 152). If scarlet and crimson were simple 
powerful qualities, there would be nothing in virtue of which they would be partially 
resembling. Such a partial resemblance would be a “brute phenomenon” (Heil 2003, 158). 
However, even on a universals version of the Identity Theory, the intuitive partial 
resemblance would be a brute fact if scarlet and crimson were simple. As I will explain, the 
Dual-Aspect Account admits the possibility of simple and yet partially resembling 
properties, and accounts for it in terms of aspects. Thus if scarlet and crimson were simple, 
it would be still possible for them to be partially resembling by virtue of having some 
resembling aspects.  
 Note that the Identity Theory can accommodate partial resemblances among complex 
properties in terms of common constituents. The same strategy is viable to the Dual-Aspect 
Account (§5.1.3; Heil 2003, 156–159). The difference between these views concerns the 
kind of properties that can be partially resembling: on the Identity Theory only complex 
properties can be partially resembling; in contrast, on the Dual-Aspect Account, both 
complex and simple properties can be partially resembling. To illustrate this claim, let us 
consider again the resemblance of scarlet and crimson. 
 Intuitively, scarlet and crimson are partially resembling. After all, they are both 
shades of red. We ought to preserve this intuition. Thus it is reasonable to hold that a 
satisfactory analysis of resemblance should give us the result that scarlet and crimson are 
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partially resembling. The problem is that the Identity Theory can deliver this result only if 
scarlet and crimson are complex properties. By contrast, the Dual-Aspect Account does not 
suffer from such a restriction.20  
 Let us suppose that shades of colour can be identified with respect to their degree of 
hue, brightness and saturation. This is a plausible view: in computer graphics, for example, 
the most common models for representing colours are based on these three features. By 
assigning a value to hue, brightness and saturation, it is possible to represent a broad array 
of colours (broad enough to comprise the shades of colour of the visible spectrum). Shades 
of red have the same degree of hue. They differ with respect to the degree of brightness and 
saturation.  
Call H, B, and S the property of having a certain hue, a certain brightness, and a 
certain for saturation respectively. If scarlet were the complex property H∧B∧S and crimson 
were H∧B*∧S*, the identity theorist could argue that they are partially resembling with 
respect to H, which is a common constituent. So far, so good. However, if scarlet and 
crimson were simple properties (i.e. properties that lack any constituents), the identity 
theorist could not tell us anything particularly illuminating. Scarlet and crimson could be 
partially resembling by virtue of having a common constituent. The partial resemblance 
between scarlet and crimson would be brute. 
The Dual-Aspect Account can do better. If scarlet and crimson were H∧B∧S and 
H∧B*∧S* respectively, the dual-aspect theorist can appeal to the strategy of considering H 
as a common constituent. But if scarlet and crimson are simple powerful qualities, they 
would still have dispositional and qualitative aspects. On the proposed conception, aspects 
supervene on properties; once we have a property, we get its aspects—irrespective of 
whether the property is simple or complex (Chapter 3, §3.2). It is therefore possible to regard 
having a certain hue, brightness, and saturation as aspects of scarlet and crimson. Call α the 
aspect of having a certain degree of hue, β having a certain brightness, and γ having certain 
saturation. Here we do not need to decide whether these aspects are dispositional or 
qualitative. Since scarlet and crimson have the same degree of hue, they are resembling with 
respect to α. However, they would differ with respect to β and γ. Where scarlet has β and γ, 
crimson has β* and γ* instead. The Dual-Aspect Account is able to account for the partial 
resemblance of scarlet and crimson even if even they were simple properties. Of course, the 
point generalises: on the Dual-Aspect Account simple properties can be partially resembling 
                                                          
20 I acknowledge that someone might protest the example. However, the familiarity of scarlet and 
crimson is beneficial for illustrative purposes. The reader is encouraged to run the discussion by using 
a more suitable example of partially resembling properties. 
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with respect to their aspects. In light of this discussion, we can formulate a condition for 
partially resembling powerful qualities. 
 
Partial Resemblance of Powerful Qualities: for two powerful qualities P and Q, P 
partially resembles Q if and only if there is at least one dispositional or 
qualitative aspect α of P and there is at least one dispositional or qualitative 
aspect of β of Q such that α exactly resembles β. 
 
The proposed formulation allows some interesting possibilities: two powerful qualities can 
have exactly resembling dispositional aspects but different qualitative ones, or the other way 
round. Imagine two possible worlds w and w*. Suppose that every shade of red has the same 
dispositional aspects in w and w*. Suppose also that every shade of red in w* has the 
qualitative aspects of every shade of green in our world. Accordingly, red objects reflect 
light at the same wavelength in both w and w*. But they look like as they were green in w*. 
Every shade of red in w is dispositionally resembling every shade of red in w*, but shades 
of red in w and w* are not qualitatively resembling (this is an adaptation from inverted qualia 
scenarios that are often discussed in philosophy of mind. For an overview, see Jackson 1982; 
Shoemaker 1982; Block 1990). 
 The crucial advantage of the Dual-Aspect Account over the Identity Theory is the 
possibility of accommodating a greater variety of partial resemblances. On the Identity 
Theory, dispositional and qualitative aspects are identical. As such, this view does not allow 
that some properties may be partially resembling with respect to their dispositionality, but 
qualitatively different. In contrast, the Dual-Aspect Account permits this possibility. On this 
view, some properties can be partially resembling with respect to some dispositional aspects 
and exactly resembling with respect to their qualitative ones, or the other way round. Of 
course, a view that accommodates a greater variety of resemblances is preferable. 
Overall, it seems that the Dual-Aspect Account accommodates more adequately the 
partial resemblance between properties such as scarlet and crimson. However, someone 
might protest against the example: scarlet and crimson are intuitively complex properties. In 
this case, the Identity Theory faces no problem in accommodating their partial resemblance 
in terms of common constituents. 
 The objection is fair: scarlet and crimson are not paradigmatic cases of simple 
properties. Here it is worth recalling that the choice of these properties has been motivated 
by practical reasons. The familiarity of scarlet and crimson is helpful to illustrate the merits 
of the Dual-Aspect Account. The reader is free to run the discussion by using more suitable 
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examples of properties. However, even if scarlet and crimson were indeed complex, the 
Dual-Aspect Account would have the advantage of specifying more precisely the conditions 
of their partial resemblance. The dual-aspect theorist can argue that partial resemblance 
among complex properties can be accounted in terms of resembling aspects. The condition 
of Partial Resemblance of Powerful Qualities fits simple properties as well as complex ones. 
This is an improvement in precision with respect to the Identity Theory. 
 The related advantage of the Dual-Aspect Account is that it allows the possibility of 
partially resembling simple properties. This is a merit with respect to every non-aspect view 
of properties. However, one might wonder whether it is significant. There are at least two 
reasons for believing so: (1) it is metaphysically possible that there are simple and yet 
partially resembling properties. An account that specifies the condition for partial 
resemblance among simple properties is therefore preferable to one that does not; (2) partial 
resemblances among simple properties may have some beneficial implications with respect 
to our theorizing about the world. As such, we should privilege an account that is able to 
accommodate them. 
 To illustrate the previous claims, imagine the following case. Consider gravitational 
mass and charge, which are paradigmatic examples of simple properties (that is, properties 
that have no other properties as constituents). Let us also stipulate that gravitational mass 
and charge are powerful qualities. Now suppose that a group of physicists is working on a 
unified theory Ω of gravitational mass and charge. Ω-theorists believe that mass and charge 
can be unified in accordance with their degree of resemblance. In particular, the Ω-theorist 
holds that the degree of resemblance determines the formalism that describes the unified 
interaction of these properties. The Identity Theory is not particularly helpful for the 
purposes of Ω-theorists. If gravitational mass and charge were partially resembling, the 
Identity Theory could not specify to what degree for their partial resemblance would be 
brute. Fortunately, the Dual-Aspect Account represents a better option for Ω-theorists. 
 From the viewpoint of the Dual-Aspect Account, gravitational mass and charge have 
some dispositional and qualitative aspects even if they were simple properties. The more 
aspects they share, the more they are similar. Here is a putative shared aspect: both 
gravitational mass and charge dispose a bearer to exert and experience a force in accordance 
to inverse-square laws (e.g. Newton’s Law of gravitation and Coulomb’s Law). A massive 
particle is disposed to exert and experience a force which is inversely proportional to the 
square of its distance from another massive particle. The same is true for a charged particle. 
The dual-aspect theorist can argue that this is an exactly resembling aspect that gravitational 
mass and charge share. By having such a common aspect, gravitational mass and charge are 
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partially resembling. We can determine the overall degree of resemblance between charge 
and gravitational mass by considering the number of shared and possessed aspects. This is 
good news for the Ω-theorist. 
 There are at least two objections to the case of theory Ω. First, one might argue that 
gravitational mass and charge are not powerful qualities. The response is two-fold: (i) it does 
seem that gravitational mass and charge have dispositional as well as qualitative aspects. 
Both properties empower their bearers in distinctive ways and at the same time being 
massive and being charge contribute to the qualitative make-up of their bearers; (ii) it is 
possible to concoct a similar scenario by considering other plausible candidates of powerful 
qualities. Of course, if one denies powerful qualities tout court the previous case does not 
get off the ground. But the arguer would face again the question of accommodating partial 
resemblances among simple properties. The Dual-Aspect Account has the theoretical 
resources for dealing with this case. This objection highlights at most the inadequacy of the 
example.  
 The second objection concerns the supposition that gravitational mass and charge are 
simple properties. Someone could argue that these properties are conjunctive. A common 
conjunct of gravitational mass and charge may be the property of disposing a bearer to exert 
and experience a force in accordance to an inverse square law. If so, the Identity Theory is 
as serviceable as the Dual-Aspect Account for the purposes of Ω-theorists. One might press 
the objection further and claim that every simple property will turn out to be complex in light 
of future discoveries. For all we know, it might well be that future physics will tell us that 
mass and charge are in fact complex properties. If that is the case, then the advantage of the 
Dual-Aspect Account is illusory. This objection is more compelling than the previous one: 
we cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that every simple property will turn out to be 
complex. Fortunately, there are two strategies for worrying less about it.  
 The first strategy is to defend the existence of simple properties. For example, current 
physics is treating putative fundamental properties such as charge, mass, and spin as lacking 
any constituent properties. Future physics is unlikely to reverse this trend. In light of this 
consideration, we can stipulate that mass and charge in the example of theory Ω can be 
regarded as placeholders for simple properties.  
 The second strategy is to make a conditional claim: if there were simple properties, 
then the Dual-Aspect Account would be able to specify the condition for their partial 
resemblances. The Identity Theory would lack the theoretical resources for doing so. As 
such, the Dual-Aspect Account is preferable. This strategy does not force us to rule out the 
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metaphysical possibility that properties are infinitely complex. But in same vein, it preserves 
the metaphysical possibility that there are simple properties.  
 Overall, it is possible to defend the merits of the Dual-Aspect Account. To repeat, its 
analysis of resemblance has two decisive advantages: (1) it specifies in more precise terms 
the partial resemblance conditions as compared to the Identity Theory; (2) it allows the 
possibility of partially resembling properties. This represents an advantage with respect to 
the Identity Theory and every other non-aspects views of properties. 
So far the discussion focused on the Dual-Aspect Account and the Identity Theory. 
However, the Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis of resemblance is preferable to views that do 
not endorse a conception of powerful qualities. To illustrate this claim, I will now turn to 
consider Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. As it will become clear, the Dual-Aspect 
Account has some important merits that make it superior. 
  
5.2.4 Armstrong’s Partial Identity 
David Armstrong’s theory of universals offers a systematic framework for analysing 
resemblances (1978; 1989a; 1997). Here it is not possible to offer an exhaustive overview 
of Armstrong’s metaphysics. For the purpose of this chapter, the focus will be on 
Armstrong’s notion of partial identity, which captures a natural way of thinking of partial 
resemblances among properties (Armstrong 1989a, 102–107; 1997, 51–57; see also §5.1.3). 
This is the view that partial resemblances among properties can be accounted in terms of 
shared common constituents, which are themselves properties. Other differences between 
Armstrong’s theory of universals and the Dual-Aspect Account can be omitted here (for a 
comparison between Armstrong’s theory of universals and trope views, see Armstrong 
1978b, Chs. 7-11-20-21-22). 
 To begin with, let us consider a general overview of Armstrong’s view on 
resemblance by answering (1)-(3): 
 
(1) In what sense objects can have the same properties? 
(2) What are the conditions for two objects to resemble each other?  
(3) Why two resembling objects behave in similar ways?  
 
Armstrong conceives of properties as universals. Therefore, distinct objects can have one 
and the same property. Thus the answer to (1) is something along the following lines: objects 
can have the same properties in the sense of having numerically identically universals 
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(§5.1.1). For example, the negative charge of an electron is one and the same with the 
negative charge of every other electron.  
 Armstrong’s conception of properties of universals also bears on (2). The degree of 
resemblance between two objects is determined by the number of shared universals. The 
more universals Mary and Miriam share, they more they are similar. Since properties are 
held to be universal, the sharing in question is to be understood literally. For example, Mary 
and Miriam share the property of being a human in the sense of having the same universal.  
 To answer (3), we need to consider Armstrong’s account of dispositionality (cf. 
Armstrong 1997, 69–85). The dispositions associated with properties depend on contingent 
laws of nature. For example, the fact that charge disposes to generate an electromagnetic 
force holds in virtue of a contingent law of nature that relates charge and the property of 
generating an electromagnetic force. Two resembling objects behave similarly because they 
instantiate strictly identical properties which are governed by similar laws of nature. For 
example, charge abides by Coulomb’s Law. In Armstrong’s view, every charged object share 
one and the same universal charge. Thus the behaviour of every charged object is similar 
because every instance charge obeys the Coulomb’s Law. 
 The differences between Armstrong’s view and the Dual-Aspect Account are 
evident. However, different answers to (1)-(3) do not give us compelling reasons for 
favouring either view. A decisive choice-point in favour of the Dual-Aspect Account 
concerns partial resemblances among properties: in Armstrong’s view, only complex 
properties can be partially resembling; in contrast, on the Dual-Aspect Account, both 
complex and simple properties can be partially resembling. The Dual-Aspect Account is 
therefore able to accommodate a greater variety of resemblances that Armstrong’s theory. 
 According to Armstrong, complex properties can be partially resembling or “partially 
identical” to other complex or simple properties in virtue of sharing some common 
constituent, which is a simple property (Armstrong 1898, 102–107; 1997, 51–57). 
Conjunctive properties are examples of complex properties. For instance, properties P∧Q 
and P∧T are partially resembling with respect to P: P is a simple property which is a common 
constituent of P∧Q and P∧T. But also P∧Q and P are partially resembling; this is because P 
is strictly identical with P in P∧Q. We can formulate Armstrong’s condition for partial 
identity as follows. 
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Partial Identity: For every complex property P and for every complex or simple 
property Q, P is partially identical to Q if and only if there is at least a 
constituent F of Q and there is at least a constituent F* of Q such that (i) F is 
strictly identical with F* or (ii) F is strictly identical with Q. 
 
To illustrate Partial Identity, let us consider the example of scarlet and crimson. Suppose 
that being scarlet is the complex property H∧B∧S and being crimson is H∧P∧Q. In 
accordance to Partial Identity, scarlet and crimson are partially identical with respect to H. 
Namely, the property H is a common constituent of scarlet and crimson. Armstrong’s view 
is therefore able to accommodate the intuitive partial resemblance between scarlet and 
crimson (according to Partial Identity, the complex property H∧B∧S is also partially 
identical to H).21 
 The degree of resemblance of complex properties is determined by the shared 
constituents. If scarlet and crimson are respectively H∧B∧S and H∧P∧Q, then they have the 
same degree of resemblance. We need to consider the constituents that are both shared and 
possessed; otherwise, we face some implausible consequences. If we consider only the 
shared constituents, then properties H, H∧P and H∧P∧Q would have the same degree of 
resemblance for they have the same number of common constituents. This does not seem 
quite right. Intuitively, H∧P resembles more closely H∧P∧Q than H. This is an intuition that 
we should preserve. In order to do so, we need to consider also the constituents that H, H∧P, 
and H∧P∧Q do not share. H∧P resembles more closely H∧P∧Q than H because there is just 
one constituent, Q, that H∧P does not have. Property H lacks two constituents as compared 
to H∧P∧Q: P and Q. Therefore, H less closely resembles H∧P∧Q.   
 Armstrong gives an account of partial resemblance by restricting Partial Identity to 
complex properties. Resemblance among simple properties is all or nothing: either simple 
properties are strictly identical or they are not. As Armstrong puts it, “two simple things 
cannot be partially identical [partially resembling], they must be wholly different or not at 
all” (Armstrong 1997, 52). Thus a simple property is identical either with another simple 
property or it is not. A consequence of this view is that it is not possible that two simple 
properties are partially resembling, or partially identical.  
                                                          
21 Armstrong claims that his notion of partial identity offers a serviceable machinery to account for the 
relation between determinables and determinates (i.e. properties such as red and scarlet; cf. Armstrong 
1997, 51–55). I shall not explore this claim here for it is not my aim to elucidate the determinable–
determinate relation. But it is worth flagging that Armstrong’s account of determinables faces a number 
of significant challenges (see Eddon 2007 and 2013 for a more detailed discussion of this topic). 
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The restriction of partial resemblance to complex properties is unwelcome for two 
reasons. First, it imposes an arbitrary constraint on the principle that resemblance comes in 
degree (cf. Armstrong 1997, 47). What grounds do we have for ruling out the possibility that 
simple properties may be partially resembling? It is a genuine metaphysical possibility that 
simple properties are partially resembling. As such, we should favour an analysis of 
resemblance that is able to accommodate it (§5.2.3). 
 Second, partial resemblances among simple properties may have beneficial 
implications. This is a reason for admitting them. Think again of the case of theory Ω 
discussed in §5.2.3. An account that offers conditions for simple and yet partially resembling 
properties is therefore preferable to one that it does not. The Dual-Aspect Account is up to 
the task. In contrast, Armstrong’s partial identity theory lacks the theoretical resources for 
doing so (Here I shall not repeat the case of theory Ω. See §5.2.3). 
 A possible objection from Armstrong’s viewpoint is that properties as thought of in 
accordance to the Dual-Aspect Account are not simple: by having aspects, powerful qualities 
are rather complex. As such, the advantage of the Dual-Aspect Account would be illusory: 
the alleged partial resemblances among simple properties are rather resemblances among 
complex properties. These can be accounted in terms of Partial identity.  
 This objection is ineffective, however. A powerful quality does not have aspects in 
the same fashion as a complex property has constituents. Armstrong suggests that the 
relation between the constituents of a complex property is a mereological one or similar to 
it (1997, 51–52). It is therefore plausible to regard the constituents of a complex property as 
analogous to the parts that compose a whole. But aspects do not stand to properties in the 
same fashion as parts stand to wholes. 
 On the proposed conception, aspects supervene on properties and ontologically 
depend on them (Chapter 3, §3.2). By contrast, if aspects were the constituents of powerful 
qualities, then powerful qualities would be dependent on them. On the Dual-Aspect Account, 
this is to get things the wrong way: aspects depend on properties, but the opposite does not 
hold. Therefore, aspects should not be regarded as the constituents of powerful qualities. The 
upshot is that powerful qualities are not complex in the sense of having aspects as 
constituents. Of course, this does block the possibility that some powerful qualities may be 
complex in the sense of having simple powerful qualities as constituents. But a simple 
powerful quality has aspects and yet it is not complex. 
   By admitting partial resemblances among simple properties, the Dual-Aspect 
Account is preferable to Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. Here the moral is not 
Armstrong’s Partial Identity should be rejected. The comparison between the Dual-Aspect 
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Account and Armstrong’s account of partial resemblance had a different purpose: it stressed 
the merits of the Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis of resemblance with respect to a non-aspect 
view that differs more significantly from the Identity Theory.  
By having aspects in its framework, the Dual-Aspect Account can claim two 
advantages with respect to the Identity Theory, Armstrong’s theory of partial identity, and 
other non-aspect views of properties: (1) it is able to accommodate a greater variety of 
resemblances among properties, and (2) it allows the possibility of partially resembling 
simple properties. These merits show the theoretical utility of the conception of aspects I 
wish to defend in this dissertation. 
 
5.3 A Short Summary of the Dual-Aspect Account 
 
 The discussion of the analysis of resemblance concludes the overview of the Dual-
Aspect Account. In this chapter, I formulated the conditions of exact resemblance and partial 
resemblance (§5.1). Then I discussed a comparison between the Dual-Aspect Account and 
the Identity Theory, and argued for the superiority of the former over the latter (§5.2). The 
introduction of dispositional and qualitative aspects allows us to improve the precision the 
resemblance conditions among properties. This has a beneficial consequence: the Dual-
Aspect Account is able to accommodate a greater variety of resemblances than the Identity 
Theory (§5.2.1-§5.2.2). To further stress the merits of the Dual-Aspect Account’s analysis 
of resemblance, I examined a comparison with Armstrong’s theory of partial identity 
(§5.2.4). I showed that the Dual-Aspect Account has two overall advantages: (1) it provides 
more precise conditions for resemblance among properties; (2) it allows the possibility of 
partially resembling simple properties. These merits, I claimed, are evidence of the 
theoretical utility that aspects bring us. 
 Heil claims that there are three ways to measure the “success” of an ontological view 
(2012, 288).22 First, the extent to which a view is internally coherent. Second, the plausibility 
of the resulting “big picture” world-view from the perspective of the view in question. Third, 
the applicability of the view to other pressing philosophical issues. The Dual-Aspect 
Account fares well with all of them. 
 In the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction because of the 
commitment to a controversial identity claim between the dispositional and the qualitative. 
In Chapter 3, I showed that the introduction of aspects clears the way to the Dual-Aspect 
                                                          
22 The notion of “success” is informal. It seems to capture some canonical theoretical virtues such as 
plausibility, explanatory power, and applicability.  
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Account of powerful qualities that is not committed to the Identityo—which is the ontological 
reading of the identity claim held by the powerful qualities theorist. 
 
Identityo: there is no real distinction between a property P’s dispositional aspect and 
P’s qualitative aspect, and each of these aspects belongs to one and the same 
property P.23  
 
On the proposed conception, aspects are ways of being of properties. They can be regarded 
as higher-order ontologically lightweight properties. This is because aspects supervene on 
the properties of which they are aspects. In addition, aspects have two other important 
qualifications: (i) they ontologically depend on properties; and (ii) it is the nature of a 
property that determines the aspects it has. The notions of dispositional and qualitative 
aspects capture the idea that “in virtue of possessing a property, an object possesseses both 
a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character” (Martin and Heil 1999, 
45–46). I proposed to regiment the possession of a property and its dispositional and 
qualitative aspects as follows. 
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspects if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P.  
 
Then I proposed to define a powerful quality of aspects:  
 
Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects. 
 
In the same chapter, I argued that it is possible to renounce Identityo  while holding the other 
claims of the Identity Theory, namely Powerful Qualities View, Partial Consideration, and 
Inseparability. This is because these claims and super are independent. By abandoning 
                                                          
23 Recall that powerful qualities can have more than one dispositional aspect and one qualitative aspects. 
The identity claim concerns every dispositional and qualitative aspects of a property. 
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Identityo, the Dual-Aspect Account escapes the contradiction objection. Therefore, it 
satisfies the requirement of internal coherence.  
 
Powerful Qualities View: all fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-
qualitative, or powerful qualities. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
Inseparability: the dispositionality and qualitativity of every sparse property cannot be 
separated in reality. 
 
In Chapter 4, I elaborated further the Dual-Aspect Account. There I defended it from an 
objection raised by Heil against the very notion of aspects (Heil 2003, 118–120). Then I 
distinguished it from other aspect views in the literature, such as that of Kristina Engelhard’s 
(2010) and Henry Taylor’s (2018).  
In this Chapter I showed the Dual-Aspect Account fares well with the applicability 
requirement by offering us a serviceable machinery for analysing resemblances among 
properties. In particular, I explained how the proposed analysis of resemblance is preferable 
to one offered by the Identity Theory and Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. 
Now it remains to discuss the Dual-Aspect Account’s “big picture” world-view that 
emerges by adopting it. This will be the topic of the next chapter. There I will finally discuss 
some arguments in favour of the thesis that all fundamental properties are essentially 
powerful qualities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
“BIG PICTURES” 
 
The physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features of its space-time 
structure—features which, because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show 
whether the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world 
of the mind. (Russell 1948, 240) 
 
Metaphysics is an ambitious subject; it aspires, among other things, to given an 
account of the fundamental constituents of any reality and exposition of how these 
constituents mesh together to give the reality in question. (Campbell 1990, 1) 
 
6.1 Preliminary Remarks 
 
The ontology of powerful qualities offers a superior account of the fundamental properties 
of our world as compared to its main rivals: Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. I devoted 
the previous chapters to describe the conception of powerful qualities. Now I will discuss 
some arguments in favour of the thesis that all fundamental properties are powerful qualities. 
 As John Heil noted, we can informally measure the success of an ontology by 
considering three respects: (i) its internal coherence; (ii) the plausibility of its resulting “big 
picture” world-view; and (iii) its applicability to some philosophical puzzles (2012, 288). In 
Chapters 3 and 4 I showed how the Dual-Aspect Account meets (i). By avoiding the identity 
claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity, the Dual-Aspect Account 
escapes the charge of contradiction that jeopardises the Identity Theory. In this chapter, I 
will show how the Dual-Aspect Account may fare well with respect to (ii) and (iii). In order 
to do so, I will focus on a case which allows us to consider (ii) and (iii) together: 
consciousness and its place in nature.  
The identity theorist contends that consciousness is one of the philosophical puzzles 
that the powerful qualities view may illuminate (for some examples, see Heil 2003; Taylor 
2013; Carruth 2016). The Dual-Aspect Account offered in Chapter 3 can claim the same 
benefits since it is a version of the powerful qualities view. The reason for examining the 
case of consciousness is merely practical. The claim here is not that the Dual-Aspect Account 
ought to be endorsed just in case it fares well with (ii) and (iii) with respect to this case.  
 It is a manifest fact of our world that some things are conscious while others are not. 
Mary the neuroscientist, Luna the cat, and Fido the dog are examples of conscious beings. 
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The chair where I am sitting and the desk in front of me are examples of non-conscious 
beings. No exhaustive ontology of fundamental properties can ignore this fact: fundamental 
properties are those that “characterize things completely and without redundancy” (Lewis 
1986, 60), so we need to account for the existence of conscious beings and their properties. 
There are two main strategies to accomplish this aim: one is to hold that consciousness is, in 
some sense, fundamental; the other is to argue that consciousness depends on, in a sense yet 
to be specified, fundamental non-conscious entities. The first strategy escapes the difficulties 
of bridging the gap between the non-conscious and the conscious. The second avoids raising 
the sort of incredulous stares that tends to meet the first. 
 Powerful qualities theorists part ways with respect to these strategies. It is important 
to note that the Dual-Aspect Account entails neither of them. Those who adopt the first 
strategy embrace some form of Physicalism. As I shall understand it, this is the view that all 
fundamental properties are physical, or non-mental. For example, such a strategy is adopted 
by Heil (2012, 222–248). By contrast, those who favour the second strategy typically 
endorse a form of Panpsychism. As I understand it, this is the view that all fundamental 
properties have some mental features. This is the strategy that Galen Strawson adopts 
(2008b, 19–74).  
The choice between Physicalism and Panpsychism rests on independent factors, 
which I will flag in due course. My claim is not that the Dual-Aspect Account gives us 
reasons for adjudicating between these views. Rather my claim is that the Dual-Aspect 
Account offers a promising ontology for articulating both a powerful qualities-based 
Physicalism and a powerful qualities-based Panpsychism. The reader who thinks that 
Panpsychism is false or implausible should not be alarmed: the Dual-Aspect Account does 
not force us to go down the panpsychist route. Nevertheless, I will offer some considerations 
in favour of what I will call respectively Powerful Qualities Panpsychism over to Powerful 
Qualities Physicalism in §6.3.3. 
 Here is the plan. In the remainder of this section I will lay out a few preliminary 
remarks about the purpose of this chapter. In §6.2 I will elucidate the notion of 
fundamentality in question (§6.2.1). Then I will discuss three arguments for the thesis that 
all fundamental properties are powerful qualities (§6.2.2). In §6.3 I will show how it is 
possible to give an account of phenomenal properties from the viewpoint of the powerful 
qualities view. Phenomenal properties are those whose possession has a distinctive “what it 
is like”-ness. A paradigmatic example is the property of being conscious: there is a 
distinctive qualitative character for someone to be conscious. Then I will outline a version 
of Powerful Qualities Physicalism (§6.3.2) and compare it with a form of Powerful Qualities 
156 
 
Panpsychism (§6.3.3). Here I will offer some considerations in favour of the latter. In the 
last section of this chapter, §6.4, I will review the main claims of this dissertation and point 
out further work that needs to be done in future investigations. 
 My aim in this chapter is to argue in favour of the plausibility of the Dual-Aspect 
Account’s “big picture” world-view. Talk of big pictures is inevitably speculative. But this 
should not be regarded as a downside. To ascertain the plausibility of an ontological view, 
we need to zoom out, so to speak, and look at the bigger picture. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that standard criteria for deciding between competing theories apply: one theory 
is preferable to another one with respect to its internal coherence, explanatory power, and 
the trade-off between respective costs and benefits.  
 
6.2 Powerful Qualities All The Way Down 
 
6.2.1 Conceptions of Fundamentality 
 The powerful qualities theorist holds the thesis that all fundamental properties are 
essentially dispositional and qualitative, or powerful qualities. Before discussing a few 
arguments for the truth of this thesis, it is useful to clarify the notion of fundamentality in 
question. Note that my aim here is not to argue in favour of a particular conception. This 
task goes beyond the scope of this work and would require a separate investigation. 
 The powerful qualities theorist does not offer an explicit definition of the notion of 
fundamentality that they have in mind. Some remarks, however, suggest that they could 
endorse two different, although related views. For example, Heil says that “fundamental 
physics is in the business of telling us what substances and properties are” (Heil 2012, 25; 
cf. Heil 2003, 200). The influential work of David Lewis (1983, 1986a) has made popular 
the view that physics investigates, among other things, the so-called natural properties. For 
example, Lewis says: 
 
Physics has its short list of ‘fundamental physical properties’: the charge and masses 
of particles, also their so-called ‘spins’ and ‘colours’ and ‘flavours’, and maybe few 
more that have yet to be discovered. […] What physics has undertaken, whether or not 
ours is a world where the undertaking will succeed, is an inventory of the sparse 
properties of this-worldly things. (Lewis 1986a, 60) 
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It seems that the powerful qualities theorist may have two conceptions of fundamentality in 
mind. The first is a conception that links fundamental properties to the practice of physics. 
The second is a conception that links them with the notion of naturalness. 
 Lewis characterises natural properties in opposition to abundant ones. The latter, he 
says, “do nothing to capture the casual powers of things” and “do nothing to capture facts of 
resemblance” (Lewis 1983, 346). In contrast, natural properties are a privileged minority of 
abundant properties (for this reason, they are also called sparse), “whose sharing makes for 
resemblance, and the ones relevant to causal powers” (Lewis 1983, 347). Lewis offers 
similar remarks in a famous passage of On the Plurality of Worlds:  
 
Sharing of them [natural properties] makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the 
joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso 
facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterise 
things completely and without redundancy. (Lewis 1986a, 60) 
 
The interpretation of Heil’s conception of fundamentality in terms of naturalness demands 
caution. For example, he does not explicitly mention Lewis’s notion of naturalness. Nor does 
he seem to embrace Lewis’s view that naturalness comes in degree. 
 
Probably it would be best to say that the distinction between natural properties and 
others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even 
though they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural 
in a derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated 
chains of definability from perfectly natural properties. (Lewis 1986a, 61). 
 
A conception of fundamentality in terms of naturalness is not exempt from problems. 
Lewis’s idea of naturalness comprises a number of disparate notions: intrinsicality, 
specificity, qualitative similarity, and “joint carving”-ness. A satisfactory account of 
fundamentality in terms of naturalness demands a clarification of these notions. For the 
purposes of this chapter, we can avoid embarking in such a task. It suffices to sketch two 
possible interpretations that clarify the idea of naturalness. 
According to one interpretation, some of the associated notions pick out the core idea 
of naturalness (e.g. Bennett 2017, 126). On a different interpretation, “natural” is a 
theoretical term; properties that play or realise the naturalness role has some of the previous 
features (cf. Dorr and Hawthorne 2013). If Heil’s notion of fundamentality is akin to Lewis’s 
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naturalness, to say that a powerful quality is fundamental is to say that it is a perfectly natural 
property. 
 Heil, however, also hints at a conception of fundamental entities as the “building 
blocks” of reality (Heil 2003, 174). It is difficult to spell out this metaphor in more precise 
terms. To use another metaphor, we can think of the building blocks of a possible world w 
as those entities that God would have to create in order to make w as is. 
 A possible way to elucidate a “building block” conception of fundamentality is to 
consider other remarks offered by Lewis. In his view, the fundamental entities are those that 
“suffice to characterise things completely and without redundancy” and “figure in a minimal 
basis on which all else supervenes” (Lewis 1986a, 60; 2009, 205). If we embrace such a 
characterisation, a powerful quality is fundamental if it belongs to a minimal basis. Also in 
this case, it is worth noting that such a conception of fundamentality is not exempt from 
objections (see, for example, Bennett 2017, 107–124). In spite of its popularity, the question 
of whether this conception gives us a satisfactory account of fundamentality remains (for an 
overview on fundamentality, see Tahko 2018).  
 If the previous interpretations are plausible, then there are two readings of the thesis 
that all fundamental properties are powerful qualities: one is that all perfectly natural 
properties are powerful qualities; the other is that all properties that belong to one of our 
world’s complete minimal bases are powerful qualities. These readings are clearly different. 
But it is not my aim to establish which one we should favour. The choice rests on what 
account of fundamentality is the most appropriate. In turn, this is a separate issue that cannot 
be explored here. To repeat, my aim is merely to clarify how “fundamental” can be 
understood in what follows, without being committed to offering the best explication for this 
notion.   
 
6.2.2 Fundamental Powerful Qualities 
 Having clarified how it is possible to understand the notion of fundamentality, we 
can now focus on the thesis that all fundamental properties are essentially powerful qualities. 
We can construct two arguments for this thesis by adapting the Actuality Argument and 
Independence Argument against pure powers presented in Chapter 3 (§3.1.2) The adaptation 
of the former is more persuasive than the adaptation of the latter, but both are worthy of 
attention. Each of these arguments begins by supposing that all fundamental properties are 
powers and then shows that they are powerful qualities instead. As I will explain, however, 
it is possible to construct a similar argument by supposing that all properties are qualities. 
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The proposed conception of aspects (Chapter 3, §3.2) plays a decisive role in the soundness 
of these arguments. It is therefore useful to repeat its relevant qualifications. 
 On the conception I wish to defend, aspects are ways of being of properties. I take 
that the notion of an aspect is a basic one and cannot be explicated in more basic terms. One 
way to think of aspects is to regard them as ontologically lightweight higher-order properties. 
They are lightweight because aspects supervene on properties. By endorsing the standard 
view that what supervenes does not constitute a genuine addition to being, aspects are not 
ontological additions. Once we have a property, we get its aspects. 
 Here is the crucial qualification: on the proposed view, it is the nature of a property 
that determines the aspect it has. For example, it is the nature, or essence of charge that 
determines its having the aspects of disposing a bearer to produce an electromagnetic force 
and contributing to its make-up by conferring upon it a certain quantity of charge that can 
be measured in coulombs. To put it differently, charge has the aspect of disposing a bearer 
to produce an electromagnetic force and conferring upon it a certain quantity of charge in 
virtue of its nature. In Chapter 3 (§3.2) I argued that this qualification allows us to capture 
the systematic connection between a property and its aspects. As a consequence, a property 
has the same aspects in every possible world in which it has the same nature. Presumably, a 
property could not exist with a different nature. It is therefore reasonable to think that a 
property has the same aspects in all worlds where it exists.  
 Now let us consider the Actuality Argument for fundamental powerful qualities. In 
its simplest form, it can be reconstructed as follows: 
  
(1) Every fundamental property is a power. 
(2) Every power has the aspect of actuality. 
(3) The actuality of a power is a qualitative aspect. 
 
Now recall that a power has essentially some dispositional aspects (Chapter 2, §2.2). By 
virtue of having a power, every bearer that possesses it has a particular dispositionality 
(Chapter 3, §3.2.2). To put it differently, every power has the dispositional aspect of 
conferring upon a bearer some dispositions. With this assumption, together with (1)-(3), we 
reach the intermediate conclusion:  
 
(4) Every fundamental property has dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
 
Now we have to consider the definition of a powerful quality introduced in Chapter 3, §3.2: 
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Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects.  
 
Consequently, if a fundamental property has dispositional and qualitative aspects, then it is 
a powerful quality. From (1)–(4), we reach the conclusion that:  
 
(5) Every fundamental property is a powerful quality. 
 
Since on the proposed view aspects are determined by the nature of properties, the 
conclusion (5) can be regarded as stating that all fundamental properties have essentially 
dispositional and qualitative aspects. This is the version of the powerful qualities view under 
scrutiny. 
Now let us consider premise (1). The immediate question is whether it is plausible to 
suppose that all fundamental properties are powers. Recall that Dispositionalism is meant to 
offer an ontological ground to the properties posited by physical theory (Ellis 2001, 2002; 
Molnar 2003; Mumford 2006; Marmodoro 2017). Here I shall not repeat the considerations 
in favour of this view (see Chapter 2, §2.2.1). It suffices to note that Dispositionalism fits 
nicely with a conception of fundamental properties as perfectly natural properties. As 
previously suggested, this conception may be endorsed by the powerful qualities theorist 
(§6.2.1). Therefore, the supposition that all fundamental properties are powers is in the spirit 
of the powerful qualities view. 
 Premise (2) captures the feature of Actuality of powers (Chapter 2, §2.2). The power 
theorist believes that powers are actual or occurrent features of their bearers. As George 
Molnar puts it: “having a power is prima facie having an actual property in the same sense 
in which objects have actual properties that are not powers” (2003, 99). This holds for 
fundamental properties as well. For example, if charge, mass and spin, are fundamental 
powers, then they are actual properties of their bearers. To say that a power has the aspect 
of being actual means that being actual is a way of being of that power. To put it differently, 
every power possessed by a bearer has the ontologically lightweight higher-order property 
of being actual (for the sake of brevity, I shall not repeat the characterisation of aspects. See 
Chapter 3, §3.2 for a detailed discussion). It is important to distinguish the claim that the 
actuality of powers is one of their aspects from the claim that every power is actual. Neither 
the dispositionalist nor the powerful qualities theorist is committed to the latter. The claim 
that every power is actual seems to imply the view that every power is actualised in the sense 
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of being instantiated. But this is an independent view: the claim that powers are actual 
properties of their bearers does not entail that every power is actual. The latter is a 
substantive view that hangs on separate commitments that are not in question here. 
 To clarify premise (3), we must consider dispositional and qualitative aspects. These 
notions are meant to capture the idea that “in virtue of possessing a property, an object 
possesseses both a particular dispositionality and a particular qualitative character” (Martin 
and Heil 1999, 45–46). I proposed to regiment the possession of properties and their 
dispositional and qualitative aspects as follows. 
 
Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspects if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer of P.  
  
There are some good reasons for thinking of a power’s actuality as a qualitative aspect. The 
mark of dispositionality is the directedness toward a characteristic manifestation. But a 
power’s actuality lacks any characteristic manifestations. In general, there is no distinctive 
circumstance in which the actuality of a thing is manifested in a characteristic fashion. Rather 
being actual is best thought of as a way something is occurrently. Therefore, we should 
consider being actual as neither a dispositional property nor a dispositional aspect of a 
property. Relatedly, it is odd to say that the actuality of a property empowers a bearer. Rather 
it is a property’s dispositional aspect that empowers, so to speak, a bearer. For example, 
consider an electron. Being negatively charged is an actual property of the electron. But it is 
odd to say that the actuality of negative charge empowers the electron with the disposition 
to produce an electromagnetic force. It seems more appropriate to say that it is the 
dispositional aspect of negative charge that empowers the electron in such a distinctive way. 
Yet the possession of negative charge as an actual property does contribute to the make-up 
of the electron. For example, by having the actual property of being negatively charged, the 
electron has a certain quantity of charge that can be measured in coulombs. 
 From (1)–(3), we reach the intermediate conclusion (4), namely that every 
fundamental property has dispositional and qualitative aspects. For example, negative charge 
qualitatively and dispositionally contributes to the make-up of an electron. The next step is 
to consider the notion of a powerful quality. In Chapter 3 (§3.2) I proposed that a property 
is a powerful quality if and only if it has some qualitative and dispositional aspects. Thus we 
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reach the conclusion (5): every fundamental property is a powerful quality. In a nutshell, the 
strategy is to suppose that all fundamental properties are powers and show that they turn out 
to be powerful qualities because of their actuality. 
 I will now defend the Actuality Argument for fundamental powerful qualities from 
some objections. A first objection targets premise (1): one might protest that this version of 
the Actuality Argument relies on the implausible supposition that all fundamental properties 
are powers. Presumably, the opponent would raise some of the standard objections against 
this view (Chapter 2, §2.2.3).  
 To defend the plausibility of (1), we can point out that the standard objections against 
power views can be successfully resisted (Chapter 2, §2.2.3). Consider, for example, the 
family of regress objections. As David Armstrong puts it: “given purely dispositionalists 
account of properties, particulars would seem to be always re-packing their bags as they 
change properties, yet never taking a journey from potency to act” (1997, 80).  The complaint 
is that if powers are nothing but mere potentialities, they are never actualised; powers are 
just passed around, from a potentiality to another, but never “take a journey” from 
potentiality and actuality. But the “always packing, never travelling” objection (Molnar 
2003, 173) fails because it neglects that powers are indeed actual properties of their bearers. 
 There is another way to challenge premise (1): one might argue that only some 
fundamental properties are powers. Accordingly, only some fundamental properties will turn 
out to be powerful qualities. In the literature, such an objection relies on considerations about 
properties that do not appear to be dispositional in nature and yet play a crucial role in 
scientific theorising. Consider, for example, the following passages from Brian Ellis:  
 
A property can have a causal role without either being a causal power, or being 
ultimately reducible to causal powers. For even the most fundamental causal powers 
in nature have dimensions. They may be located or distributed in space and time, be 
one or many in number, be scalar, vector or tensor, alternate, propagate with the speed 
of light, radiate with their effects uniformly, and so on. But these dimensions of the 
powers are not themselves causal powers. A location in space and time is not itself 
located in space and time. Nor does having a magnitude have a magnitude. Nor being 
one or many in number itself or many in number. Yet these dimensions of the powers 
clearly do have causal roles. They not only signify the respect in which causal powers 
may be similar or different with one another, their detailed specification is required to 
define the laws of distribution, action and effect of the powers. These dimensions of 
the powers are the properties that I call categorical. […] They [the categorical 
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dimensions] are indeed amongst the essential properties of the causal powers. (Ellis 
2012, 17–18) 
 
Ellis’s dimensions of powers can be regarded as qualitative aspects; namely qualitative ways 
powers are. Accordingly, location and quantitative properties are qualitative aspects of 
powers. This seems quite right (at least to me). Having a certain location or being scalar, for 
instance, do not appear to bestow upon a bearer any distinctive disposition. This is the 
power’s job, as it were. Yet it does not seem quite right to claim that categorical dimensions, 
or qualitative aspects, are more fundamental than powers as Ellis does: 
 
[Categorical properties] must be ontologically more fundamental than the causal 
powers. For without them, the causal powers could have no instances, and so could 
not have existence. Moreover, the instances of the causal powers normally have 
magnitudes and directions, and usually they are capable of acting together to produce 
effects that none could produce alone. But without the categorical properties to locate, 
identity and orient them in space or time, there could be no laws of directionality, 
distribution, of combination of the causal powers. They would be nowhere, nowhen, 
directionless and lacking identity. (Ellis 2012, 18) 
 
If the categorical dimensions that Ellis invokes can be regarded as qualitative aspects of 
powers, then they depend on powers. This is because, on the proposed conception, aspects 
ontologically depend on the properties of which they are aspects of (Chapter 3, §3.2). 
Consequently, the categorical dimensions of powers would be less fundamental than powers. 
This is to say that once we have a power, we get its categorical dimensions. But not the other 
way round. For example, having a certain charge has the feature of certain magnitude. In 
light of the proposed interpretation, we can say that having a certain magnitude is one of its 
qualitative aspects, or categorical dimension. However, having a certain charge is more 
fundamental than the aspect of having a certain magnitude because this aspect ontologically 
depends on the property of having a certain charge. Note that this is not to say that the 
property of having a certain magnitude cannot be fundamental. Rather it is to say that if 
properties such as that of having a certain magnitude are categorical dimensions of powers, 
and if categorical dimensions are plausibly thought of as qualitative aspects, then they are 
less fundamental than the powers of which they are aspects. 
 We can also resist the claim that spatio-temporal or positional properties are more 
fundamental than powers. Examples of spatio-temporal and positional properties are being 
164 
 
spatio-temporally located at a certain space-time point, being oriented toward a certain 
direction, being at a certain distance from a certain point, and so on. The view that positional 
properties are more fundamental than instances of powers rests on a substantivalist account 
of space-time. According to this view, space-time plays the role of a container in which 
things are placed and get their positional properties depending on their position within the 
container: once your remove an instance of power from a certain location L, L remains there.  
 In order to block the fundamentality of positional and spatio-temporal properties, we 
can adopt a different view of space-time. On a relationalist account, for example, positional 
properties depend on the existence of objects and relations among them. On this view, the 
positional properties of powers depend on powers themselves. As such, positional properties 
would be less fundamental than powers. This strategy allows us to accommodate the 
existence of positional properties without undermining premise (1).  
 Another way of resisting the objection from fundamental positional properties is to 
adopt a background-free physics (Bird 2007a, 164–166; 2017; 137–138; e.g. Smolin 1991; 
Rovelli 1997). According to these views, a good physical theory should either eliminate 
space-time or cease to take it as categorically inert. This is to say that the mathematical 
model that describes space-time should be understood as dynamical rather than fixed. 
Namely, it should be affected by the state of the physical system in question. Either way, 
this approach removes the problem: positional properties are not fundamental or if they are, 
they are dispositional. 
 Against premise (2), someone might deny that the actuality of powers is one of their 
aspects. This option is the most dubious for it clashes with the very conception of powers. 
Every power theorist holds that powers are actual properties, irrespective of whether these 
are thought of as tropes or universals. Being actual is a way powers are (Chapter 2, §2.2). It 
is worth noting that premise (2) does not rule out the possibility of unactualised powers. But 
this version of the Actuality Argument must be understood as restricted to those powers that 
are indeed possessed by some bearers. 
 A more promising way to resist the Actuality Argument is to challenge premise (3), 
the idea that actuality is a qualitative aspect of powers. One might argue, by contrast, that 
actuality is a dispositional aspect or, alternatively, that actuality is neither a dispositional 
aspect nor a qualitative one. The first strategy requires us to show that the actuality of a 
power empowers every bearer of that power. Such an option may appear attractive, but it 
faces some worrisome consequences. To illustrate them, it is useful to focus on a particular 
example. 
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 Let us suppose that the actuality of charge is a dispositional aspect of charge. 
Accordingly, let us imagine that a charged particle has the power to generate an 
electromagnetic force and an additional power in virtue of its actuality. This is because if 
the actuality of a power is a dispositional aspect of charge, then it empowers a bearer in some 
characteristic fashion. The problem is that it is unclear what this additional power may be. 
Perhaps it is the power to produce a sensory stimulation when a charged particle is observed 
in certain circumstances (i.e. the power to be observable in certain circumstances). Perhaps 
it is the power to be measurable under certain conditions. Perhaps it is the power to do 
something else altogether. Whatever this power might be, two worries arise. 
 First, it is unclear whether a power of this sort is a genuine dispositional aspect of 
charge in the sense of being determined by charge’s nature. It seems that the actuality of 
every property could be understood as the dispositional aspect in virtue of which a bearer of 
that property can be observed in some circumstances. Actual massive particles, fragile vases, 
and black cats have all the power to be observable in some conditions. It seems odd that it is 
part of the nature of all these different properties (mass, fragility, and blackness) to empower 
their bearers in such a similar way.24   
 Second, if a power’s nature is determined by what that power does, then the actuality 
of a power would partially determine its nature. Canonically, a power’s nature is determined 
by what that power is for. However, the nature, or essence of a thing has little to do with its 
actuality. Someone who defends this strategy faces the challenging task of clarifying how 
the essence of a property can be partially determined by its actuality. In light of such a 
difficulty, the strategy of regarding the actuality of a power as a dispositional aspect is less 
attractive than one might initially suppose. However, I acknowledge that the previous 
challenge can be met in some ways. For instance, someone who follows existentialist 
philosophers such as Heidegger and Sartre may argue that actuality of a thing is prior to its 
essence. It is unclear whether such a strategy can be applied to entities such as properties. 
But I grant that this may be an option to defend the claim that the actuality of a power 
determines in fact its essence. 
 Now let us consider the second strategy against (3), namely arguing that the aspect 
of actuality is neither dispositional nor qualitative.  Someone might argue that “being actual” 
is a mere indexical locution (cf. Lewis 1973, 85–86), which distinguishes certain powers 
from others. For example, “being actual” can be plausibly understood as a predicate for 
                                                          
24 The view is less odd, if one takes all sparse properties to be identical with some fundamental 
properties and maintain that every fundamental property confers upon the bearer the power to be 
observable in some conditions.  
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distinguishing between instantiated and non-instantiated powers in our world. Fortunately, 
an advocate of the Actuality Argument can resist this proposal. For example, she can object 
that there is a qualitative difference between an actual power and its non-actual duplicate. 
Consider for example the actual power to shatter and compare it with its non-actual 
duplicate. The advocate of the Actuality Argument might argue that being actual is a matter 
of how the actual power to shatter is like. This would suggest that the actuality of the actual 
power to shatter is one of its aspects. By contrast, the non-actual power to shatter lacks this 
aspect: being actual is not a way the non-actual power to shatter is (granted that there is a 
sense in which the non-actual power to shatter can be in some ways in the first place). Here 
I acknowledge that opinions about the force of the previous consideration diverge. This is 
related to a more general problem: in the literature, there is no consensus on how to 
understand the notion of actuality. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the 
previous considerations allow us to resist the objection that the aspect of actuality is neither 
dispositional nor qualitative. 
 Overall, the objections against premises (1)-(3) can be successfully resisted. This 
version of the Actuality Argument is a promising way to establish the thesis that all 
fundamental properties are powerful qualities. 
 Now let us turn to the Independence Argument (Chapter 3, §3.2.1). Like the Actuality 
Argument, it can be adapted for establishing the conclusion the all fundamental properties 
are powerful qualities. This argument focuses on the feature of Independence, which 
captures the idea that powers are ontologically independent from the occurrence of their 
manifestation (Molnar 2003, 82–83). In its simplest form, this version of the Independence 
Argument can be reconstructed as follows. 
 
(1) Every fundamental property is a power. 
(2) Every power is ontologically independent from the occurrence of its manifestation.  
(3) The ontological independence of a power from the occurrence of its manifestation 
is a qualitative aspect. 
 
Thus from (1)-(3), we reach the intermediate conclusion:  
 
(4) Every fundamental property has a qualitative aspect. 
 
Now if we consider that powers have dispositional aspects, and if we appeal the definition 
of a powerful quality, we reach the conclusion (6): 
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Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (i) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (ii) P has some qualitative aspects.  
 
(6) Every fundamental property is a powerful quality. 
 
Recall that aspects, on the proposed view, are determined by the nature, or essence of 
properties (see Chapter 3, §3.2). Thus the conclusion (6) can be regarded as stating that all 
fundamental properties have essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. Now let us 
consider the premises of the Independence Argument. 
Premise (1) express the supposition that all fundamental properties are powers. I will 
not rehearse the motivations in favour of the plausibility of (1). Premise (2) expresses the 
feature of Independence. For example, the power to generate an electromagnetic force can 
exist independently from its manifestation. Premise (3) expresses the idea that the 
ontological independence of a power from its manifestation in a qualitative aspect. This 
premise needs to be motivated. 
 The underlying idea traces back to C. B. Martin, who suggests that an unmanifested 
power exists as a “disposition base” (1993, 518). Elsewhere, Martin says that the disposition-
base is actual “readiness” or directedness toward some manifestation; when a power is not 
manifested, it waits “ready to go” (2008, 29; 55). It is plausible to think of the readiness of 
a power as a qualitative aspect: being ready to manifest a power is a qualitative way a bearer 
of that power is like. In contrast, it does not seem quite right to say that existing a disposition-
base is a dispositional aspect of a power. The unmanifested existence of a power does not 
dispose a bearer of that powers to do anything in particular. 
 From (1)-(3) we reach the intermediate conclusion (4): all fundamental powers have 
dispositional and qualitative aspects. Then we can consider the definition of a powerful 
quality and reach the conclusion (6): all fundamental properties are powerful qualities.  
 I will now discuss some possible objections against premises (2) and (3) of this 
version of the Independence Argument (objections against premise (1) can be resisted in the 
same way as for the Actuality Argument for fundamental powerful qualities). Against 
premise (2), one might argue that fundamental powers lack of the feature of Independence. 
For example, Anna Marmodoro claims that:  
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Fundamental powers of elementary particles are continuously manifesting in their 
environment, given the presence of the ambient gravitational force in the universe, but 
also of the other fundamental forces. In complex objects, powers are continuously 
manifesting in the presence of other powers in the same object. (Marmodoro 2017, 62) 
 
For all we know, it is possible that fundamental powers are constantly manifesting. However, 
Marmodoro’s claim does not threaten premise (2). Fundamental powers may constantly be 
manifesting while being ontologically independent from their manifestations. It is in fact 
possible that a change in the circumstances would affect the manifestation of fundamental 
powers but not their existence: were the conditions for the constant manifestation to 
disappear, fundamental powers would still exist. So even if Marmodoro is right, premise (2) 
can be true. In order to reject premise (2), one has to argue that powers cannot exist 
independently from the occurrence of their manifestations. But this would clash with the 
manifest fact the not all powers are constantly manifested. As such, this strategy is seemingly 
a non-starter. 
 Alternatively, one might argue against premise (3), namely that Independence is a 
qualitative aspect of powers. Here there are two available options. The first is to argue that 
Independence is neither qualitative nor dispositional. However, this strategy leaves unclear 
what kind of aspect Independence is. The second is to argue that Independence is a 
dispositional aspect. If Independence were a dispositional aspect of a power, then there 
would be another power possessed by every bearer of that power. Despite the initial 
plausibility, this strategy gives rise to some worrisome consequences. First, it is hard to 
imagine what power a bearer gets in virtue of some of its other powers existing unmanifested. 
Second, if Independence is a dispositional aspect, then it would partially determine the 
essence, or nature, of the power of which it is an aspect of. For example, on this view, the 
essence of charge is determined by the power to exert an electromagnetic force and another 
power that obtains in virtue of its Independence. This sounds implausible as it is unclear, 
once again, what this other power might be. The previous difficulties make this strategy 
unattractive. We are in a better position by accepting that Independence is a qualitative 
aspect of powers.  
 Overall, it is possible to defend the Actuality Argument and Independence Argument 
for fundamental powerful qualities from the objections considered. Therefore, these 
arguments represent a promising way to establish that all fundamental properties are 
powerful qualities. 
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 The previous arguments begin by supposing that all fundamental properties are 
powers and then show that they are powerful qualities. One might wonder whether it is 
possible to construct a similar argument by supposing that all fundamental properties are 
qualities and, if so, what reasons we have for preferring one argument instead of the other. 
As it turns out, it seems so. Call this the “Knowability Argument” for fundamental powerful 
qualities. To construct the Knowability Argument, we need to recall the notion of a 
qualitative property. 
 According to Categoricalism, all fundamental properties are qualitative. All there is 
to a qualitative property is “its identity with itself and its distinctness from other qualities”. 
Another basic feature of fundamental qualities is that they are “intrinsically inert and self-
contained” (Black 2000, 91); they do not point “beyond themselves to further effects brought 
about in virtue of such properties (Armstrong 1997, 80).  
 It is sometimes argued that the previous characterisation makes qualities 
unknowable. Against this objection, Ellis (2012) claims that qualities are in fact knowable. 
In his view, Categoricalism only implies that fundamental qualities “cannot be known 
without the mediation of the causal powers that are located with them” (Ellis 2012, 21). The 
underlying idea is that qualities are knowable via their associated powers. Consider the shape 
of an object, for example. In Ellis’s view, the shape of such an object is a quality. Yet if the 
object is illuminated, it reflects light in certain ways. This gives us a way to know the object’s 
shape. In light of these remarks, we can assemble the Knowability Argument. In its simplest 
form can be presented as follows. 
 
(1) Every fundamental property is a quality. 
(2) Every quality is knowable. 
(3) Being knowable is a dispositional aspect of a quality. 
 
Now we have to recall that qualities have essentially qualitative aspects (Chapter 2, §2.3). 
Namely, the possession of a quality essentially contributes to the make-up of its bearer. This 
is a qualitative aspect of a quality. Thus from (1)-(3), we reach the intermediate conclusion:  
 
(4) Every fundamental property has dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
 
By considering the definition of a powerful quality, we reach the conclusion (5): 
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Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (i) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (ii) P has some qualitative aspects.  
 
(5) Every fundamental property is a powerful quality. 
 
Since on the proposed conception aspects are determined by the nature of properties, the 
conclusion (5) expresses the powerful qualities view. Let us now consider the premises of 
this argument in turn (see Chapter 3, §3.2).  
Premise (1) is the supposition that all fundamental properties are qualities. Premise 
(2) is the claim that qualities can be known through their associated powers. Premise (3) 
demands some defence, but it seems at least plausible to think of the knowability of a 
property as one of its dispositional aspects.  From (1)–(3), we reach the intermediate 
conclusion (4). Once we recall the definition of a powerful quality, we reach the conclusion 
(5). 
 The Knowability Argument is a viable option for defending the thesis that all 
fundamental properties are powerful qualities. However, for reasons that will become clear 
in due course, it is less attractive than the Actuality Argument or the Independence 
Argument. But first, let me defend the initial plausibility of premise (3), the idea that the 
knowability is a dispositional aspect of qualities. 
 We could say that the knowability of a quality gives it the power to be known in some 
circumstances. Albeit contentious, such a dispositional understanding of knowability fits 
smoothly with Ellis’s remarks. Think of a marble. On the proposed view, the sphericality of 
the marble can be known in some circumstances. For example, if light reflects on the marble, 
then we can know its shape. Consider a putative fundamental quality such as charge. If 
charge is knowable, then there is some circumstance that allow us to know charge. At first 
impression, this seems quite right: for instance, measuring devices give us an indirect way 
to know the charge of entities such as particles. More needs to be said about the knowability 
of qualities. But the previous consideration suffices for defending the initial plausibility of 
premise (3).  
 Of course, one can argue against (3), namely by denying that the knowability of a 
quality is a dispositional aspect. For example, someone could argue that this aspect is 
intuitively an extrinsic one. So it does not appear to fit either the category of categorical or 
dispositional aspects. However, the assessment of such a strategy unnecessarily complicates 
the present discussion for we would need to clarify what is for a thing to be knowable. 
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Fortunately, we can avoid this challenge: the most significant worry related the Knowability 
Argument concerns premise (2). 
 Let us follow Lewis (2009) and his plea for humility: suppose that to know a quality 
is to know that what role that quality plays in a scientific theory or daily life, and that this 
suffices for knowing what a quality is (Lewis 2009, 215). To know the quality of charge, on 
this view, is to know that charge is the property that plays the role of disposing bearers to 
generate an electromagnetic force, for instance. 
 Lewisian humility is a plausible view of the knowability of qualities. However, it 
leaves open the possibility that there are unknowable qualities, even as role-occupants. 
Suppose that some qualities are completely inert properties (cf. Lewis’s (2009) notion of 
idler properties). Perhaps they are undetectable epiphenomenal properties of some sort. 
These completely inert qualities would play no role either in scientific theory or daily life. 
If this is a genuine possibility, then premise (2) is false: there can be some unknowable 
fundamental qualities. 
 One way to resist the argument is to deny that the possibility of completely inert 
qualities. An advocate of this strategy could argue that there might be unknowable qualities 
in the sense that we do not have access to them. Yet there is no reason to believe in the 
existence of completely inert qualities. To posit them would offend against ontological 
parsimony. This may be a good reason for resisting the acceptance of completely inert 
qualities, but it does not rule out their possibility. In light of these considerations, we should 
be cautious with respect to the truth of premise (2). 
 A proponent of the Knowability Argument could attempt to downscale the previous 
worry by restricting the attention to fundamental properties. She might concede the 
possibility of completely inert qualities, but deny that these are fundamental. One way to do 
so is to replace (2) with (2*): Every fundamental quality is knowable. The amendment may 
look promising.  
A question remains, however: is being knowable really a dispositional aspect? As 
anticipated, someone might argue that being knowable does not seem to fit either the 
category of categorical or dispositional aspects. Someone else may argue that it does not 
seem that knowability of a property contributes to the make-up of a bearer of that property. 
Others might protest that the knowability of a property does not appear to be one of its 
intrinsic features. Rather it seems to depend on the existence of the property and cognizers 
such as humans, who are capable of knowledge. If no cognizer had been around, talk of the 
knowability of properties would make no sense. Of course, this is a substantive claim that 
needs to be supported with some arguments. I shall not attempt to do so here for it would 
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divert from the purposes of the chapter. It is worth noting, however, that this objection is a 
serious threat to the Knowability Argument.  
It seems to me, however, that even if we concede the being knowable is a 
dispositional aspect, the Knowability Argument would still face the previous problem: it is 
possible that there are fundamental and yet completely inert (and therefore unknowable) 
properties. So there are good reasons for being wary of the truth of (2) as well as (2*).  
Lewisian humility does not rule out the possibility that some fundamental qualities 
are in fact unknowable. The moral is that Knowability Argument is a viable option for 
establishing that all fundamental are powerful qualities, but this argument appears to be 
unsound. Yet there might be other more promising arguments for fundamental powerful 
qualities that assume Categoricalism. Thus there is still hope for someone who spurns the 
assumption that all fundamental properties are powers. 
 
6.3 Consciousness and Powerful Qualities 
 
6.3.1 “What it is like”-ness 
 It is a manifest fact of our world that some entities are conscious. The attentive reader 
of these lines is conscious and so am I who is writing them. Plausibly, also Fido the dog and 
Luna the cat are conscious—though in a different way as compared to humans. Any ontology 
that aims to account for everything that exists has to accommodate this fact. As I shall 
understand it, this is the problem of accommodating consciousness in the physical world. 
 As is customary, let us distinguish between “easy problems” and “the hard problem” 
of consciousness (Chalmers 1995). The easy problems concern the task of specifying the 
details of the various cognitive mechanisms and functions associated with conscious states 
such as memory and attention. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of 
accommodating the phenomenal character, or “what it is like”-ness of conscious experience 
in the physical world. There something it is like to feel a sharp pain in your hand, to 
experience stifling anxiety, and to think of a beloved one. Each of these experiences has a 
distinctive phenomenal character. To put it differently, there is something it is like to have 
them.  
Call phenomenal consciousness the awareness of the “what it is like”-ness of 
experience (Block 1995). The hard problem of consciousness is hard because it is unclear 
how to accommodate the existence of phenomenal consciousness in the physical world.  
We can reformulate the hard problem of consciousness in terms of properties. Let us 
assume that a property is phenomenal just in case there is something to possess it (cf. 
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Chalmers 2010, 106). Let us also assume that conscious experiences are those that involve 
the instantiation of phenomenal properties. In a slightly more precise way, we can relate the 
possession of a phenomenal property and its “what is it like”-ness as follows.  
 
Phenomenal Property: P is a phenomenal property if and only if there is something it 
is like to have P. 
 
It can be argued that the proposed definition is not particularly illuminating. However, it 
avoids any substantial commitments on the nature of phenomenal properties and their 
bearers. Of course, a complete account of phenomenal properties requires us to specify these 
details. But for present purposes, we can hold this level of generality. An example will 
illustrate the definition. Imagine that Mary sees a red rose. During such an experience, she 
instantiates the property of seeing a red rose. Plausibly, there is something it is like to see a 
red rose for Mary. This, according to the proposed definition, makes the property of seeing 
a red rose a phenomenal one. 
 Having introduced the notion of a phenomenal property, we can now regard the hard 
problem of consciousness as the problem of accommodating phenomenal properties in the 
physical world. There are two main strategies to address this problem (provided that we 
acknowledge that this is indeed a problem and that we should attempt to solve it): the first is 
to take phenomenal properties to be fundamental, the second is to show that the existence of 
phenomenal properties can be accounted in terms of fundamental non-phenomenal 
properties such as physical ones.  
A view of in the spirit of the first strategy has been put forward by Bertrand Russell 
(1927). He argues that physics characterises fundamental entities and properties in 
dispositional terms. The charge of a particle, for example, is described as its disposition to 
exert a force when it interacts with other particles. In same vein, inertial mass is described 
as the disposition to resist acceleration of a physical entity. These descriptions leave open 
the possibility that fundamental physical properties may have some non-dispositional 
features. Among these, there may be features of phenomenal properties. Chalmers labels 
views in the vicinity of Russell’s one “type-F Monism” (2010, 133) (some advocates of type-
F views are Chalmers 1996; Strawson 2008b, 19–74; Feigl 1958; and Coleman 2015). 
The second strategy is perhaps the most popular one. There are a number of ways in 
which it is possible to spell out the relation between non-fundamental phenomenal and 
fundamental non-phenomenal properties (see Chalmers 2010, Ch. 6 for an overview). As I 
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter (§6.1), the Dual-Aspect Account does not force 
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to embrace a particular one. However, in §6.3.3, I will offer some considerations in favour 
of the first. In that section, I will argue that the first strategy escapes the difficulty of bridging 
the gap between the non-phenomenal and the phenomenal. This a significant merit for it is 
unclear whether this gap can be bridged in the first place. But the reader who regards the 
view that phenomenal properties are fundamental as implausible should not be alarmed: the 
ontology of powerful qualities does not entail that there are fundamental phenomenal 
properties.  
 In this section, my aim is to show that a conception of powerful qualities is well-
suited to articulating a type-F view. In particular, I will argue that the Dual-Aspect Account 
(Chapter 4) offers a fruitful framework for the friend of type-F monism. In the literature, 
there are several examples of how the ontology of powerful qualities may elucidate certain 
questions concerning the philosophy of mind. For example, Jonathan Jacobs (2011) and 
Dave Robb (2017) argue that a conception of powerful qualities allows us to elucidate the 
notion of a mental property and its features. John Heil (2003; 2012) and Henry Taylor (2013) 
invoke the powerful qualities view to defend a certain version of Physicalism. Alexander 
Carruth (2016) discusses the implications of the Identity Theory with respect to the 
possibility of (philosophical) zombies. Strawson (2008b) advocates a version of type-F 
monism, but he does not explicitly link it with his commitment to the Identity Theory 
(2008a). By discussing how the Dual-Aspect Account can be incorporated into a type-F 
monist view, I will attempt to fill the gap left by Strawson (and other powerful qualities 
theorists who endorse a type-F view). To highlight the merits and demerits of a powerful 
qualities-based type-F view, I will present firstly a powerful qualities-based version of 
Physicalism (for short, Powerful Qualities Physicalism). 
 
6.3.2 Powerful Qualities Physicalism 
 Under the banner of Physicalism, there is a family of diverse views which share the 
idea that the physical grounds, in some sense, the mental (Dasgupta 2014). The difference 
between these views lies in how they spell out the relation between the physical and the 
mental. The powerful qualities theorist who embraces Physicalism endorse a particular view, 
which goes under the name of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Place 1956; Smart 1959; 
Armstrong 1968; Lewis 1994; Heil 2003). On the Mind-Brain Identity Theory, every 
phenomenal property is strictly identical to some physical property or collection of physical 
properties. To use the previous example, Mary’s phenomenal property of perceiving a red 
rose would be identical with some of her physical properties.  
175 
 
 To avoid confusion with the Identity Theory of powerful qualities, I will use the term 
“Physicalism” to refer to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. My purpose in this section is to 
illustrate how Powerful Qualities Physicalism looks like, and discuss its strength and 
weakness. However, I shall not discuss the question of whether Physicalism, in its powerful 
qualities-based version or other ones, is true. 
 A prominent advocate of Powerful Qualities Physicalism is Heil. For example, he 
says: 
 
I prefer to think that the qualities of conscious experience are perfectly ordinary 
qualities of brains. By “perfectly ordinary” I mean that the qualities owe their existence 
to the properties of the components of brains and their arrangements. Experiential 
[phenomenal] qualities are not “higher-level” properties, nor are they, in the usual 
sense, ‘emergent’. Their status is no more remarkable than the status of the qualities 
like sphericity, liquidity, or warmth. (Heil 2003, 235) 
 
Your visual experience of a tomato is a mutual manifestation of dispositions present 
in structured light radiation and reciprocal dispositions in your visual system. […] If 
your visual experiences have qualities, these qualities are present in your brain: they 
are qualities of neurological goings-on that constitute manifestations of dispositions 
that themselves constitute your visual system. (Heil 2003, 233) 
 
Recall that “qualities”, on the Identity Theory, are powerful qualities. Thus the previous 
passages suggest that Heil holds the view that the phenomenal properties conscious 
experience are identical with the physical powerful qualities of brains. Unfortunately, the 
details of how the Identity Theory and Physicalism can fit together are missing. While I will 
attempt to fill this gap, certain issues will remain unaddressed: an elaboration and defence 
of Powerful Qualities Physicalism would be the subject of a different investigation. 
 A preliminary requirement for Powerful Qualities Physicalism is the adoption of a 
conception of phenomenal properties that leaves open the possibility that they can be 
physical. Unsurprisingly, Physicalism (understood as the Mind-Brain Identity Theory) is 
hopeless if one defines a phenomenal property as non-physical. The proposed definition of 
Phenomenal Property meets such a requirement. 
The next step is the hardest one: we have to establish that every phenomenal property 
is a powerful quality. This proposal has been made explicit by Henry Taylor, who claims 
that:  
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On the powerful qualities view, the qualitative/categorical and the dispositional are 
identical. So, a qualitative/categorical property just is a dispositional one, and vice 
versa. Applying this faithfully to the hypothetical position [i.e. the view phenomenal 
properties are physical], we can see that such a position would claim that phenomenal 
properties have ‘entirely’ physical natures. The phenomenal property itself is identical 
with a physical one, it is just that this property can be thought of under a phenomenal 
concept (such as ‘pain’), or a physical one (such as ‘nociceptors firing’). (Taylor 2013, 
99) 
 
More recently, Dave Robb has offered a similar proposal:  
 
On the identity theory [of powerful qualities], any given quale [phenomenal property] 
will be some physical property that is unproblematically efficacious with respect to 
behaviour. (Robb 2017, 212) 
 
Unfortunately, neither Taylor nor Robb offer an explicit argument for the identity between 
powerful qualities and phenomenal properties. To construct such an argument, let us assume, 
quite plausibly, that a phenomenal property is a powerful quality just in case it is 
dispositional and qualitative. Then we can argue that all powerful qualities are physical. So 
if phenomenal properties are powerful qualities, then they are physical. Call this the Identity 
Argument. In its simplest form, it can be reconstructed as follows. 
 
(1) A property is a powerful quality if and only if it is dispositional and qualitative. 
(2) Every phenomenal property is dispositional and qualitative. 
 
From (1)–(2), we reach the intermediate conclusion:  
 
(3) Every phenomenal property is a powerful quality. 
 
Then, a physicalist can invoke the premise that: 
 
(4) Every powerful quality is a physical property. 
 
From (3) and (4), we get that: 
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(5) Every phenomenal property is a physical property. 
 
Premise (1) expresses the conception of properties as powerful qualities. Premise (2) 
conveys the idea that phenomenal properties are dispositional and qualitative (Heil 2003, 
232–235; Jacobs 2011; Taylor 2013; Robb 2017). Premise (4) captures the commitment to 
Physicalism. From these premises, the Identity Argument establishes that phenomenal 
properties are powerful qualities.  
 Crucial to the Identity Argument is premise (2). The task of showing its truth is 
particularly challenging and cannot be adequately addressed here. However, a few remarks 
in favour of the plausibility of (2) will suffice for the purpose of outlining Powerful Qualities 
Physicalism. 
 Phenomenal properties are paradigmatic examples of qualitative properties: to have 
them is a matter of how a conscious being is like. But this notion of qualitativity is too 
generic. Even the property of being charged is qualitative for it is a matter of how a particle, 
for example, is like. Arguably, we should preserve the idea that phenomenal properties are 
particular kinds of qualitative properties. For example, we should maintain a distinction 
between properties such as that of being in pain and being negatively charged. A 
straightforward strategy to accomplish this aim is to specify the qualitativity of phenomenal 
properties. By considering the definition of Phenomenal Property, someone could say that 
the qualitativity of phenomenal properties involves essentially the “what it is like”-ness of 
experience. Those who embrace the first option may claim that phenomenal properties are 
essentially associated with the “what it is like”-ness of experience, whereas other qualitative 
properties are not. Someone who embraces this approach can argue that being in pain is 
essentially associated with the “what it is like”-ness of pain experience, whereas there is no 
“what it is like”-ness associated with the property of being negatively charged. 
Another option is to impose some restrictions on the kind of entities that can bear 
phenomenal properties. For example, someone can argue that an entity may instantiate 
phenomenal properties just in case it is a “subject of experience”, namely it is capable of 
entertaining conscious experiences (cf. Strawson 2008b, 152). On this strategy, one could 
argue that particles are not subjects of experience and therefore cannot instantiate 
phenomenal properties. Both strategies have costs and benefits that cannot be compared 
here. It suffices to note that the previous strategies offer a way to defend premise (2).  
 In absence of details, however, the truth of (2) relies on speculation. On closer 
inspection, it might be that the “what it is like”-ness of phenomenal properties cannot be 
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understood in terms of qualitativity. Such a possibility would undermine the viability of the 
Identity Argument. 
 Premise (2) also raises another class of worries that concern the dispositionality of 
phenomenal properties. We can plausibly regard the dispositionality of phenomenal 
properties as involving a conscious being’s disposition to have access to certain information 
about her conscious states or to manifest certain behaviours (cf. Robb 2017, 212–213). For 
example, the dispositionality of the phenomenal property of being in pain might dispose 
someone to make certain verbal reports about the pain sensations. The potential objection 
here is that the dispositionality of phenomenal properties does not seem to be essential, 
whereas it is for powerful qualities. This is because powerful qualities are essentially 
dispositional and qualitative. Therefore, as the objection goes, we should not identify 
phenomenal properties with powerful qualities. For example, one could argue that in every 
possible world there is something it is like to be in pain. Yet, in some possible worlds, being 
in pain may dispose to exhibit an avoidance behaviour from the source, whereas it may 
dispose to do the opposite in others.  
 The previous worries do not undermine premise (2) conclusively. Therefore, there is 
no evident reason for thinking that (2) is false. We could tweak the notion of dispositionality 
to ensure that a phenomenal property has a certain qualitativity and a certain dispositionality 
in every possible world. It is up to the friend of Physicalism to carry the burden of defending 
this view. My point here is that the Identity Argument represents a strategy for establishing 
Powerful Qualities Physicalism. 
 The Dual-Aspect Account offers a way to improve the Identity Argument. By 
appealing to the notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects, we can specify further the 
conditions for a phenomenal property to be a powerful quality. From the viewpoint of the 
Dual-Aspect Account, a property is a powerful quality just in case it has some dispositional 
and qualitative aspects:  
 
Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects. 
 
Recall that to say that a property has some dispositional and qualitative aspects means that 
a bearer of that property has certain powers by virtue of it, and it qualitatively contributes to 
its make-up (cf. Martin and Heil 1999, 45–47). 
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Dispositional Aspect: a property P has some dispositional aspects if and only if there 
is a power or cluster of powers that is possessed by every bearer of P.  
 
Qualitative Aspect: a property P has some qualitative aspect if and only if the 
possession of P qualitatively contributes to the make-up of every bearer that 
of P.  
 
If we adopt the Dual-Aspect Account, then we can claim that a phenomenal property is a 
powerful quality just in case it has dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
 Unfortunately, the adoption of the Dual-Aspect Account does not remove the worries 
related to premise (2). On the Dual-Aspect Account, it is possible to hold that the “what it is 
like-ness” of phenomenal properties is a qualitative aspect, while a dispositional aspect could 
be, for example, the disposition to make certain verbal reports about our occurrent conscious 
experience. But the question of whether the “what it is like”-ness of phenomenal properties 
can be adequately understood in terms of qualitativity remains. Similarly, one can still argue 
that the disposition to make certain verbal reports about an occurrent experience (or to 
exhibit a certain behaviour) is not an essential dispositional aspect of phenomenal properties 
(the same objection can be raised against other putative dispositional aspects of phenomenal 
properties). 
 In spite of the previous difficulties, Powerful Qualities Physicalism is an attractive 
option for the friend of Physicalism (see Heil 2003; Taylor 2013; and Robb 2017 for other 
merits of this view). The conception of powerful qualities offers a promising framework for 
accommodating the qualitativity of phenomenal properties. Of course, this is not to say that 
the view is exempt from problems. In addition to the previous worries related to the Identity 
Argument, the standard arguments against Physicalism also apply to Powerful Qualities 
Physicalism. 
 It seems to me, however, that there is a different and more significant reason for 
favouring a different view. To illustrate it, let us focus again on fundamental properties. 
From the viewpoint of Powerful Qualities Physicalism, every phenomenal property is 
identical with some physical powerful quality. The version of powerful qualities view that I 
wish to defend here is a view of fundamental properties. On this version, Powerful Qualities 
Physicalism turns out to be the view that every phenomenal property is identical with some 
physical fundamental powerful quality. This raises some significant worries. 
Canonically, the putative fundamental physical properties are microphysical. 
Jonathan Schaffer (2003, 499) suggests that this view traces back Isaac Newton, who 
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proposes that “the smallest particles of matter cohere” to “compose bigger particles” (1704, 
394). Here are some other representative quotations that capture this view: 
 
“Matter, so it seems, consists of just two types of elementary particles: quarks and 
leptons. These are the fundamental building blocks of the material world.” (Coughlan 
and Dodd 1991, ix) 
 
The bottom level is usually thought to consist of elementary particles, or whatever our 
best physics is going to tell us are the basic bits of matter out of which. All material 
things are composed. As we go up the ladder, we successively encounter atoms, 
molecules, cells, larger living organisms, and so on. (Kim 1998, 15) 
 
[Physicalism is] the doctrine that actually (but not necessarily) everything non‐
microphysical is composed out of microphysical entities and is governed by 
microphysical laws (Pettit 1994, 253) 
 
Accordingly, for example, the phenomenal property of being in pain would be identical with 
some putative fundamental microphysical powerful qualities such as mass, charge and spin. 
If we embrace this view of fundamental properties and the version of powerful qualities that 
I wish to defend, a question arises: are microphysical properties phenomenal? 
 A negative answer requires the powerful qualities physicalist to account for the fact 
that not every entity has phenomenal properties. Here it is important to recall that I am 
considering Physicalism in its Mind-Brain Identity Theory version (Place 1956; Smart 1959; 
Armstrong 1968; Lewis 1994; Heil 2003). If Powerful Qualities Physicalism is true, it seems 
that the phenomenal property of being conscious is identical with some fundamental 
microphysical powerful qualities. Yet only Mary has the phenomenal property of being 
conscious, whereas electrons do not appear to have it. Physicalists (not only powerful 
qualities physicalists) differ on how to accommodate this fact. For example, one could deny 
that Physicalism amounts to micro-physicalism (Hüttemann and Papineau 2005), namely the 
view everything “non microphysical is composed out of microphysical entities and is 
governed by microphysical laws” (Petitt 1994, 253). Another strategy is to reformulate 
Physicalism in terms of supervenience rather than identity (cf. Wilson 2005). Here it is not 
possible to explore the various options on the table. It is sufficient to mention that the 
powerful qualities physicalist’s strategy is to invoke the notion of an arrangement. For 
example, Heil claims that: 
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Conscious systems might reasonably be thought to require particular sort of highly 
complex arrangements of the fundamental things. Consciousness is one of many kinds 
of state into which such systems are capable of entering. Their occupying a conscious 
state, their being conscious, is a matter, not of emergence, but of their constituents 
being organized as they are, including all their various interrelation with one another 
and with their extra-systemic environments. (Heil 2012, 240) 
 
Dynamic arrangements of the fundamental things serve as truthmakers for all the truths 
that have truthmakers, including all the truths concerning conscious experience. If you 
organize these fundamental things in a particular way, the result will be an arrangement 
of which it is true that this is a tomato, this is red, this is spherical. If you take the very 
same fundamental things and organize them differently, you will produce an 
arrangement of which it is true that this is a sentient being undergoing a particular kind 
of experience. (Heil 2012, 247) 
 
It is not my aim to defend the plausibility of this strategy. However, it is worth noting that 
the appeal to arrangements raises a number of challenging questions. To begin with, the 
resulting view may not be Physicalism anymore: the mental would not be strictly identical 
with the physical, but rather with arrangements of physical entities. Are these arrangements 
physical? If they are not, this strategy threatens the spirit of physicalism: we accommodate 
the mental in the physical world by burdening us with some other non-physical entities, 
namely arrangements. The task of showing that arrangements are indeed physical encumbers 
the powerful qualities physicalist who adopts this strategy.25 
 A positive answer to the question of whether microphysical properties are 
phenomenal has an odd consequence: it seemingly requires us to accept, for example, that 
Mary and an electron have some phenomenal properties. This is anything but problematic in 
the case of Mary. There is something it is like for Mary to be conscious, feeling pain, and 
remembering a fond memory. In contrast, the possibility that there is something it is like for 
an electron to entertain certain conscious experiences raises incredulous stares. Panpsychists 
such as Strawson (2008b; 2016) embrace this consequence and claim that the resulting view 
                                                          
25 I acknowledge that there are, in the logical space of possibilities, views of non-fundamental powerful 
qualities that may escape some of the worries that I discussed. However, it is worth recalling that the 
aim of this work is to answer the question of ‘what is the most adequate conception of fundamental 
properties to make sense of our world?’ For this reason, I restrict my attention a version of fundamental 
powerful qualities view. 
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is a promising theory of consciousness and its place in nature. As I will argue in the next 
section, Powerful Qualities Panpsychism appears to have some important advantages with 
respect to Powerful Qualities Physicalism. 
 
6.3.3 Powerful Qualities Panpsychism 
 Etymology would suggest that Panpsychism is the doctrine that everything has a 
mind. However, its advocates are committed to the weaker thesis that “some microphysical 
entities are conscious” (Chalmers 2016a, 24). In same vein, Galen Strawson depicts it as the 
view that some fundamental microphysical entities are “intrinsically experiential, 
intrinsically experience-involving” (Strawson 2008b, 70). If Panpsychism is true, then 
quarks and photons are in some sense conscious. A distinctive feature of conscious 
experience is that there is something it is like to be conscious. The “what it is like”-ness of 
consciousness can be understood in terms of phenomenal properties. Therefore, we can think 
of Panpsychism as the view that some fundamental microphysical entities have phenomenal 
properties. 
 Panpsychism is often dismissed as a crazy view. It is therefore useful to spend a few 
words in favour of its plausibility. Let us follow Chalmers by distinguishing between 
macroexperience and macrophenomenal properties, and microexperience and 
microphenomenal properties (2016a, 24). Macroexperience is the kind of experience that 
non-fundamental macrophysical entities such as humans can enjoy. It involves 
macrophenomenal properties such as that of being in pain or having a pleasant sensation. 
Microexperience is thought of as the kind of experience that microphysical entities such as 
quarks and photons can enjoy. Supposedly, it involves microphenomenal properties: 
properties by virtue of which there is something it is like to have a microexperience 
(Chalmers 2016a, 24). Such a distinction allows us to refine Panpsychism as the view that 
some fundamental microphysical entities have microphenomenal properties. 
 It is worth noting, however, that even if quarks and photons entertain 
microexperiences, it does not follow that they instantiate microphenomenal properties. We 
do not know whether there is a distinctive phenomenology of microphenomenal entities. So 
it remains possible that quarks and photons may instantiate macrophenomenal properties 
such as that of being in pain like us. Consequently, the appeal to microphenomenal properties 
may not be the best way of formulating Panpsychism. But it seems very plausible, as David 
Chalmers puts it, that microexperience “is very different” and “almost certainly much 
simpler” than human experience (Chalmers 2016a, 25). Since my aim is to show how the 
Dual-Aspect Account can elucidate a version of Powerful Qualities Panpsychism, I will set 
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aside this worry. I leave the task of justifying the claim that microphysical entities instantiate 
microphenomenal entities to the friend of this view. 
 The panpsychist holds that her view is preferable to physicalist views of 
consciousness. Let us consider an argument provided by Galen Strawson (2008b; 2016). 
According to Strawson, any view that attempts to give an account of how the non-
experiential, or non-phenomenal “gives rise” to the experiential faces an impossibility which 
is analogous to explaining how non-spatial features give rise to spatial ones (Strawson 
2008b, 63–65). According to Strawson, a view that holds that it is in fact possible that non-
spatial phenomena give rise to spatial ones “should be rejected as absurd” (Strawson 2008b, 
63). According to Strawson, a view that holds that is in fact possible that non-experiential 
phenomena give rise to experiential ones is “exactly on a par”, and therefore it should be 
rejected as absurd (ibid.). 
 Strawson concedes that there are cases in which a kind of phenomena can give rise 
to a different kind of phenomena. To use his example: “you can get liquidity from non-liquid 
molecules as easily as you can get a cricket team from eleven things that are not a cricket 
team” (Strawson 2008b, 63). But the case of experientiality is a special one: it is impossible, 
Strawson contends, that non-experiential features give rise to experiential ones. 
 The notion of “giving rise” that Strawson has in mind is a kind of emergence: if a 
phenomenon Y is emergent from a phenomenon X, then Y is wholly dependent on X to the 
effect that “all features of Y trace intelligibly back to X” (Strawson 2008a, 65). This is to 
say that “there must be something about X and X alone in virtue of which Y emerges, and 
which is sufficient for Y” (ibid.). Strawson argues that in the case of experientiality this 
criterion of intelligibility cannot be met. However, the appeal to the notion of emergence is 
somewhat misleading. His argument targets any view that that attempts to bridge the 
mental/non-mental divide. So it does not target only emergentist views of consciousness (for 
an overview on  the topic of emergence and the mind-body problem, see Alexander 1920; 
Broad 1925; Smart 1981; Van Cleve 1990; O’Connor 1994; McLaughlin 1997; Silberstein 
1998; Kim 1999; Wilson 1999, 2015b; Van Gulick 2001; O’Connor and Wong 2005). 
 Strawson’s argument is contentious of course. The notion of “giving rise” in question 
needs to be spelled out more precisely.  Presumably, anti-panpsychists would argue that 
there is a “giving rise” relation that meets Strawson’s intelligibility requirement (2008b, 70). 
For the sake of argument, let us suppose that Strawson is right. We should therefore explore 
a different strategy to accommodate the experiential in the physical world. As it happens, 
the panpsychist believes that her view is up to the task for it escapes the impossibility of 
bridging the mental/non-mental divide.  
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 In what follows, I will show how the version of the powerful qualities view I wish to 
defend here offers a promising framework for elucidating a version of Powerful Qualities 
Panpsychism. In particular, I will argue that the Dual-Aspect Account (Chapter 4) provides 
the panpsychist with a way to illuminate the notion of a microphenomenal property. On the 
resulting conception, every microphenomenal property has dispositional and 
microphenomenal aspects. By doing so, I will show how the Dual-Aspect Account fares well 
with Heil’s third requirement for a successful ontology, namely its applicability to illuminate 
other philosophical puzzles (2012, 288). 
 On Powerful Qualities Panpsychism, some microphysical entities have 
microphenomenal properties that possess dispositional and microphenomenal aspects. On 
this view, as I will explain, a quark may have a microphenomenal property by virtue of which 
it has some powers and there is something it is like to be a quark. Presumably, the reader 
who thinks that Panpsychism is a crazy view would think the same of Powerful Qualities 
Panpsychism. My hope is that the theoretical merits of Powerful Qualities Panpsychism will 
induce such a reader to reconsider her judgment.  
 Powerful Qualities Panpsychism escapes an important worry that Panpsychism faces: 
it is possible that microphenomenal properties are causally inert and therefore undetectable. 
Panpsychism does not rule out this possibility. The panpsychist might downscale this worry 
by claiming that microphenomenal properties “serve as the grounds for macrophenomenal 
properties” (Chalmers 2016a, 27). By virtue of playing this grounding role, 
microphenomenal properties would not be completely inert. However, the notion of ground 
in question does not seem to be a causal one. For example, Chalmers thinks of it as an 
obtaining relation between truths (2016a, 25). Accordingly, we could say that truths about 
macrophenomenal properties obtain in virtue of truths about microphenomenal ones. It 
appears that causally inert microphenomenal can play this grounding role. Therefore, we 
should explore a different strategy to address this worry. 
 Powerful Qualities Panpsychism is a more promising option. On this view, the 
microphenomenal properties have dispositional features that empower their bearers in 
distinctive ways. So microphenomenal properties would not be causally inert. For example, 
if a photon were to possess a microphenomenal properties, it would have some powers by 
virtue of it (perhaps the power to affect measuring devices) and some microphenomenal 
features by virtue of which there is something it is like to be a photon.  
 Now a question arises: is there any argument for the truth of Powerful Qualities 
Panpsychism? Fortunately, yes. Here is a simple one: 
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(1) If the powerful qualities view is true, then all fundamental properties have 
essentially dispositional and qualitative aspects. 
(2) Among the qualitative aspects of fundamental properties, there are 
microphenomenal aspects. 
(3) Some fundamental microphysical entities have fundamental powerful qualities. 
 
If (1) and (3), then: 
 
(4) Some fundamental microphysical entities have essentially dispositional and 
microphenomenal aspects. 
 
Call microphenomenal aspect the aspect of microphenomenal properties by virtue of which 
there is something it is like to be a microphysical entity. The previous argument links the 
powerful qualities view with the idea that microphenomenal aspects are a kind of qualitative 
aspect in order to establish Powerful Qualities Physicalism. The soundness of this argument 
is of course contentious. For the purposes of this section, I will focus on (2). However, a few 
remarks in favour of (1) and (3) are needed. 
 In Chapter 4, I argued at length that a powerful quality is best understood as a 
property having dispositional and qualitative aspects. These aspects are ways of being of the 
property that supervene upon it. On the proposed conception, which holds the standard view 
that what supervenes is no addition to being, aspects can be regarded as ontologically 
lightweight higher-order properties (See Chapter 3, §3.2 for a detailed characterisation of 
the notion of an aspect). I have already discussed some of the arguments in favour of the 
truth of the powerful qualities view (§6.2). Here I shall not repeat them. 
 Premise (3) is prima facie credible. I often mentioned charge and mass as putative 
examples of fundamental powerful qualities. They appear as properties that at once bestow 
upon their bearers distinctive powers such as that of producing electromagnetic or 
gravitational force, and contribute qualitatively to their make-up. By being charged and 
massive, a fundamental particle has a certain quantity of matter and charge. Of course, we 
cannot settle the question of what the fundamental microphysical entities are from the 
armchair. Yet the empirical adequacy of the powerful qualities view is a point in favour of 
its adoption.   
 The crucial premise is (2), which captures the idea that the qualitative comprises the 
phenomenal, or experientially qualitative. The former is a matter of how a thing is like by 
virtue of having certain actual properties. The latter is a matter of how a thing is like by 
186 
 
virtue of being conscious, or experientially aware. How can we establish the truth of premise 
(2)? 
 A straightforward strategy would be to tweak the notion of qualitativity for including 
the “what it is like”-ness of phenomenal properties. Qualitativity and “what it is like”-ness, 
or experientiality are cognate notions. For example, Sam Coleman claims that:  
 
“Sufficient consideration of the notion of the intrinsically qualitative shows it to be 
indistinguishable from the notion of qualitative experiential.” (Coleman 2009, 94)  
 
In favour of such a claim, Coleman offers two main considerations, which can be 
summarised as follows. 
 
(1) To think of something as intrinsically qualitative (rather than qualitative relative 
to something else) is “ipso facto to think of a phenomenal quality” (Coleman 2009, 
94).  
 
To clarify (1), let us consider the example proposed by Coleman. Think of an experience of 
phenomenal redness and then “consider the sensation only in respect of its redness” (ibid.). 
According to Coleman, the phenomenal redness so considered is clearly qualitative; it is a 
matter of how something it is like. 
  
(2) To say that something is qualitative is to say that there is an answer to the question: 
“what is it like?” which is, as Coleman puts it, “our best way of drawing attention to 
the qualitative, conscious-experiential properties” that a thing enjoys (2009, 96).26 
 
                                                          
26 Coleman offers a third consideration in favour of the claim that qualities are indistinguishable from 
phenomenal properties. He says that the qualities and phenomenal properties share “an essentially 
exclusive nature” (2009, 102). That is, distinct qualities cannot be occupy the same location.  One thing 
cannot be red all over and blue all over at once. However, it is unclear how to precisely understand this 
claim. Coleman’s meaning of location is akin to “the space of possibilities” or “metaphysical space” 
(ibid.). Therefore, Coleman’s claim is that two qualities cannot occupy the same metaphysical space for 
their nature is such that they exclude any overlapping (Coleman 2009, 102–103). The same would hold 
for phenomenal properties. For example, to use Coleman’s example, in grasping phenomenal redness, 
we “understand that it is qualitatively red and not any other way” (2009, 103). The idea is that a location 
in the metaphysical space occupied by a phenomenal property cannot be occupied by other ones. It is 
unclear whether Coleman’s remarks help us linking qualities and phenomenal properties. Many non-
qualitative properties seem to possess such an exclusive nature. For example, being unbreakable and 
being disposed to shatter seem to exclude each other. 
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According to Coleman, the previous considerations support the idea that “something being 
a certain qualitative way with respect to absolutely nothing but itself just is the idea of the 
experientially qualitative” (2009, 97). This view seems to imply that the mass and charge of 
a quark, for example, contribute to its make-up in experiential terms: there is something it is 
like to be charged and massive for the quark. 
 If we were to follow Coleman (2009), we would reach the surprising conclusion that 
the powerful qualities view amounts to Powerful Qualities Panpsychism: if the qualitative 
and the experiential (the phenomenally qualitative) are the same, then the qualitative aspects 
of powerful qualities would be phenomenal. Thus if microphysical entities have powerful 
qualities, they also have phenomenal aspects. 
  A conception of powerful qualities is tailored to Coleman’s view. He does not deny 
that microphysical properties are dispositional (2009, 87–88). On his version of 
Panpsychism, charge disposes to generate an electromagnetic force and gravitational mass 
disposes to generate a gravitational force. But the nature of charge and gravitational mass is 
not exhausted in their dispositions; it comprises phenomenal features as well.   
 On closer inspection, however, there are reasons to reject the identity between the 
qualitative and the experiential. If we adopt it, an implausible proliferation of phenomenal 
properties takes hold. Recall that qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like (in terms of 
its make-up) by virtue of possessing some actual properties. A marble has the property of 
being spherical, which is clearly qualitative in this sense. However, it seems implausible, 
even for the panpsychist, to claim that there is something for the marble to be spherical. In 
general, it is desirable to preserve a distinction between the qualitative and the experientially 
qualitative (cf. Carruth 2016). This allows us to escape the implausible consequence that 
being spherical, which is a paradigmatic quality, is a phenomenal property of a marble. Even 
Coleman acknowledges this distinction. Elsewhere, he says that “the basic building blocks 
of the physical world are qualitative without being yet phenomenally qualitative (i.e. 
intrinsically conscious)” (Coleman 2015, 66).  
 Crucially, the panpsychist does not need to rule out that fundamental entities have 
some qualitative and yet non-experiential properties. This is because the truth of the version 
of Panpsychism under scrutiny only requires that some fundamental entities have 
microphenomenal properties. Unfortunately, considerations in favour of this view remain 
speculative. It is up to the panpsychist to provide more compelling reasons for thinking that 
fundamental properties have, as I put it, qualitative and experiential aspects. 
 Now let us return to the Dual-Aspect Account. While it does not help us adjudicating 
the question of whether Powerful Qualities Panpsychism is true, this account has another 
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merit: it has the theoretical resources for capturing the distinction between qualitativity and 
experientiality.  
We can distinguish between qualitative aspects and experientially qualitative, or 
phenomenal ones by considering their different contribution to the make-up of a bearer. A 
property has a qualitative aspect if its possession contributes to the make-up of a bearer of 
that property in a non-experiential way. By contrast, we can say that property has 
phenomenal or microphenomenal aspect if its possession contributes to the make-up of a 
bearer in an experiential way. The distinction allows us to discriminate between qualitative 
properties, such as that of being spherical, and phenomenal ones, such as that of being in 
phenomenal pain. The distinction leaves open the possibility that a property may have 
qualitative and phenomenal (or microphenomenal) aspects. For example, the panpsychist 
could say that charge qualitatively and experientially contributes to the make-up of a quark: 
by being charged, the quark has a qualitative, occurrent make-up and, simultaneously, there 
is something it is like for it to be charged. 
More precisely, we can relate the possession of a property having a phenomenal or 
microphenomenal aspect and the “what it is like”-ness as follows. 
 
Phenomenal Aspect: a property P has some phenomenal or microphenomenal aspects 
if and only if there is something it is like to have P for every bearer of P. 
 
We are now in a position to elucidate Powerful Qualities Panpsychism. This is the view that 
some fundamental microphysical entities have some (i) dispositional, (ii) qualitative, and 
(iii) microphenomenal aspects. If Powerful Qualities Panpsychism is true, then putative 
fundamental microphysical entities such quarks and photons have powerful qualities that (i) 
empower them in a distinctive way, (ii) qualitatively contribute to their actual make-up, and 
(iii) there is something it is like to have these properties. The Dual-Aspect Account allows 
us to make Powerful Qualities Panpsychism more precise. This is a point in favour of its 
applicability.   
 Overall, Powerful Qualities Panpsychism appears to be an attractive option: (i) it 
escapes the objection that impossible to bridge the mental/non-mental divide (Strawson 
2008b, 63–65); (ii) it preserves the distinction between qualitativity and experientiality; and 
(iii) it captures the dispositionality of microphysical properties in terms of dispositional 
aspects. The Dual-Aspect Account offers a fertile ground from developing such a view. 
 Unfortunately, Powerful Qualities Panpsychism faces a major challenge that affects 
every form of Panpsychism: the so-called combination problem (Seager 1995). Given our 
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focus on properties, the combination problem can be understood as the problem of 
explaining how the microphenomenal properties combine into the macrophenomenal ones 
that humans and other animals can possess (see Chalmers 2016b for other versions of the 
combination problem). The difficulty rests on the idea that phenomenal properties “don’t 
sum”, so to speak. Paraphrasing William James, “take a hundred” of phenomenal properties, 
“shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can” and yet “each remain the same” 
phenomenal property it always was (James 1895/1950, 160). If James were right, we would 
not be able to get macrophenomenal properties by combining microphenomenal ones for 
each microphenomenal property would remain the same. As it stands, the Dual-Aspect 
Account seems unable to provide us with any insightful way to address the combination 
problem.  
 The panpsychist holds that her view is preferable to Physicalism for it evades the 
alleged impossibility of bridging the gap between the conscious and non-conscious. 
However, in the absence of combination principles that govern the passage from the 
microphenomenal to the macrophenomenal, it is unclear whether the combination problem 
can be solved. As Chalmers puts it: “a reasonable goal here is to either solve the combination 
problem or prove that it cannot be solved” (2016b, 180). It is beyond the scope of this work 
to achieve either of these goals. My aim in this section was different, namely to show how 
the ontology of powerful qualities is a natural ally for the friend of Panpsychism. In 
particular, I showed how the metaphysics of aspects I defended in this work allows us to 
improve the precision of such a view. This is yet another merit of the Dual-Aspect Account. 
  
6.4 Taking Stock 
 
6.4.1 Review 
 In what follows I shall review the main claims that I have defended in this dissertation 
and offer a brief summary of each chapter. To conclude, I will point out some topics that 
require further investigation in light of what has been discussed so far. To begin with, the 
central thesis that I have defended is that:  
 
(1) All fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-qualitative, or 
powerful qualities. 
 
The thesis (1) offers an answer to the first question that I examined in this dissertation: “What 
is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties?” I argued that we ought to adopt 
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a conception of powerful qualities in the interest of capturing the world as we find it in 
everyday life and scientific investigation. 
 The second question that I examined was “What is the ‘big picture’ world-view that 
we get according to such a conception?” I devoted this chapter to describe it. Throughout 
the dissertation, I argued that the powerful qualities view’s big picture world-view is 
preferable to those offered by its main rivals: Dispositionalism and Categoricalism.  
 In Chapter 1, which served as an introduction to the dissertation, I laid out the 
assumptions and motivated the importance of investigating a theory of fundamental 
properties. 
 In Chapter 2, I illustrated two important conceptions of fundamental properties: 
dispositional and categorical. In §2.1 I discussed the significance of what is at stake with the 
distinction between them. As I explained, the choice between dispositional and categorical 
properties leads to two opposing views about the world and its laws of nature. In §2.2. I 
focused on Dispositionalism, the doctrine that all fundamental properties are essentially 
dispositional, or powers. Here I presented its merits and discussed some standard objections 
against it. In §2.3, I offered an overview of Categoricalism, the view that all fundamental 
properties are essentially qualitative, or qualities. As for Dispositionalism, I assessed the 
merits of Categoricalism and discussed some standard objections against it. In §2.4, I 
discussed a misleading characterisation of the power–quality distinction. In particular, I 
argued that on some interpretations, the distinction between powers and qualities fail to 
demarcate a real, ontologically robust distinction between two kinds of fundamental 
property. 
 In Chapter 3, I illustrated and defended the metaphysics of powerful qualities. In 
§3.1, I argued that if we aim to capture the world adequately as we find it, then we need a 
conception of properties that do not separate the dispositional from the qualitative. The 
powerful qualities view serves this purpose well. In §3.2, in order to elucidate the idea of 
powerful qualities, I introduced the novel notion of an aspect. In slogan form: aspects are 
ways of being of properties. More precisely, aspects can be understood as higher-order 
properties with some important qualifications: (i) the aspects of a property supervene upon 
it (and therefore do no constitute a genuine addition to being with respect to properties); and 
(ii) it is the nature of a property that determines the aspects it has. In the same section I 
motivated and defended these commitments.  
The second central claim that I have defended in this dissertation is that:  
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(2) Powerful qualities are best conceived of as properties having dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. 
 
In §3.3, I presented the Identity Theory, which is the canonical version of powerful qualities. 
As its name suggests, the Identity Theory is committed to a distinctive identity claim 
between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. However, this is not the only 
commitment of the identity theorist. The Identity Theory is best understood as holding the 
following claims. 
 
Powerful Qualities View: all fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-
qualitative. 
 
Partial Consideration: every sparse property can be considered as dispositional or 
qualitative. 
 
Inseparability: the dispositionality and qualitativity of every sparse property cannot be 
separated in reality.27 
  
Identity: a property P’s dispositionality is P’s qualitativity, and each of these is P.  
 
The Identity claim is controversial. On a canonical understanding of the qualitative as non-
dispositional, it implies that a property is at once dispositional and non-dispositional. Of 
course, this would be contradictory. However, the identity theorist does not think of 
qualitative as non-dispositional. This allows her to evade the charge of contradiction. Yet 
the question of how to make sense of Identity remains. As it happens, the identity theorist 
hints at different readings. In order to disambiguate the Identity Theory, I proposed a 
distinction between an ontological sense and a conceptual sense of Identity. 
 According to an ontological sense, Identity can be reformulated in terms of aspect as 
follows:  
 
                                                          
27 In its canonical form, the powerful qualities view is a doctrine about fundamental properties. 
However, the powerful qualities theorist extends Inseparability to sparse, non-fundamental properties 
as well as fundamental ones. Here I acknowledge a distinction between sparse and fundamental 
properties (Schaffer 2004). Sparse properties are those invoked by all scientific disciplines such as 
physics, chemistry, biology, and so on. The fundamental ones are only those invoked by fundamental 
physics. On this conception, fundamental properties are a subset of the sparse ones.  
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Identityo: there is no real distinction between a property P’s dispositional aspect and 
P’s qualitative aspect, and each of these aspects belongs to one and the same 
property P.28 
 
In the conceptual sense, there are two possible interpretations of Identity: 
 
Identityc: the dispositional way of conceptualizing a property P and the qualitative way 
of conceptualizing P are ways of conceptualizing one and the same property 
P. 
 
Identityd: the dispositional description of a property P and the qualitative description 
of P denote one and the same property P. 
 
The proposed readings of Identity offer a way to resist the contradiction objection against it. 
However, in §3.4, I showed that each of the proposed readings, on closer inspection, is open 
to further objections. We should therefore explore an account of powerful qualities that is 
not committed to Identity. Crucially, the view that all fundamental properties are powerful 
qualities is independent from the view that a property’s dispositionality is identical with its 
qualitativity. It is therefore possible to articulate an alternative, more promising account of 
powerful qualities that is not committed to Identity. This has been the third main claim that 
I have defended in this dissertation. 
 
(3) The view that all fundamental properties are powerful qualities is independent from 
Identity. 
 
In Chapter 4 I illustrated an alternative and more promising account of powerful qualities. I 
called it “Dual-Aspect Account” for the notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects play 
a central role in this view. In §4.1 I laid out the metaphysical backbone of the Dual-Aspect 
Account. There I offered some considerations in favour of the adoption of two-category 
ontology of substances, or property-bearers, and properties. In §4.2 I defended the Dual-
Aspect Account from the objection that powerful qualities do not have aspects (Heil 2003, 
118–120). I argued that such an objection targets only an ontologically robust conception of 
                                                          
28 Recall that a powerful quality may have more dispositional and qualitative aspects (Chapter 3). The 
identity claim in question concerns every aspect dispositional and qualitative aspects a powerful quality 
has. 
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aspects, according to which aspects are first-order properties. Here I also distinguished the 
Dual-Aspect Account from other dual aspect views of properties such as that of Kristina 
Engelhard’s (2010) and Henry Taylor’s (2018). From the viewpoint of the Dual-Aspect 
Account, aspects are not first-order properties. As such, it is possible to resist the previous 
objection. I then proposed to formulate the notion of a powerful quality as follows. 
 
Powerful Quality: a property P is a powerful quality if and only if (1) P has some 
dispositional aspects and (2) P has some qualitative aspects. 
 
In §4.3, I discussed commonalities and differences between the Dual-Aspect Account and 
the Identity Theory. Overall, the Dual-Aspect Account is preferable to the Identity Theory 
for two reasons: first, it avoids the commitment to Identity, which does not seem to hold in 
any of the proposed readings; second, it improves the precision of the claims held by the 
powerful qualities theorist. 
 According to Heil, the success of an ontological view can be informally measured in 
three respects (2012, 288): (i) its internal coherence, (ii) its applicability to illuminate other 
philosophical puzzles, and (iii) the plausibility of its resulting big picture world-view. By 
avoiding the commitment to Identity, the Dual-Aspect Account meets (i). I devoted the 
remainder of the dissertation to show that the Dual-Aspect Account fares well with (ii) and 
(iii). 
 In Chapter 5, I showed the applicability of the Dual-Aspect Account with respect to 
the topic of resemblance. Any satisfactory view of properties must provide the conditions 
for resemblance among properties. I argued that the Dual-Aspect Account offers a 
serviceable machinery for analysing resemblances among properties. In §5.1 I identified two 
resemblance relations that any account of properties ought to accommodate: exact 
resemblance and partial resemblance. In §5.2 I discussed a comparison between the analysis 
of resemblance respectively from the viewpoint of the Identity Theory and the Dual-Aspect 
Account. I argued that the Dual-Aspect Account is preferable for its greater precision in 
specifying the conditions for exact and partial resemblance. In the same section, I examined 
a comparison with David Armstrong’s theory of partial resemblance (1989a, 102–107; 1997 
51–57), which differs greatly from the one offered by the Identity Theory. I argued that the 
Dual-Aspect Account could claim two advantages: (i) it allows us to specify more precisely 
the conditions for resemblance among properties in term of aspects; (ii) it allows partial 
resemblances among simple properties. 
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 In Chapter 6, I discussed three arguments in favour of the thesis that all fundamental 
properties are powerful qualities. In §6.1 I laid out the purposes of the chapter. In §6.2 I 
considered the Actuality Argument, the Independence Argument, and the Knowability 
Argument for fundamental powerful qualities. The Actuality Argument and the 
Independence Argument begin by supposing that all fundamental properties are powers and 
establish that they have qualitative, non-dispositional features: their actuality and the 
ontological independence from their manifestations. As such, fundamental properties would 
turn out to be powerful qualities and not powers. The Knowability Argument begins by 
supposing that all fundamental properties are qualities and shows that they have dispositional 
feature. Therefore, the fundamental properties would be, also in this case, powerful qualities. 
Moving on, I discussed the ‘big picture’ world-view that emerges from the Dual-Aspect 
Account. As a test case, I focused on the question of how to accommodate phenomenal 
properties in the physical world. In §6.3, I first sketched a version of Powerful Qualities 
Physicalism. Then I outlined a version of Powerful Qualities Panpsychism. The Dual-Aspect 
Account entails neither view. However, it permits to make both views more precise. While 
the decision rests on independent factors, this has been sufficient to show the applicability 
of the Dual-Aspect Account and offers fertile ground for future investigations. Overall, the 
Dual-Aspect fares well with the requirements for being a successful ontology: it is therefore 
a serious contender among theories of fundamental properties. 
 
6.4.2 Further work: Fundamentality 
 In this dissertation, I assumed that the fundamental properties of our world are those 
that that “suffice to characterise things completely and without redundancy” and “figure in 
a minimal basis on which all else supervenes” (Lewis 1986a, 60; 2009, 205). It is worth 
noting, however, that this is only one among many conceptions of fundamentality (see 
Wilson 2014, 2016; Bennett 2017; Tahko 2018 for an overview). Thus the question of 
whether some accounts of fundamentality are better-suited to accommodating the ontology 
of powerful qualities remains. This investigation may unveil the incompatibility between the 
Dual-Aspect Account and some conceptions of fundamentality. However, this requires us 
firstly to elucidate the notion of fundamentality. It was not possible to fulfil this task in this 
work. Moreover, certain standard views of fundamentality have recently faced serious 
objections that target the canonical formal features of fundamentality relations: irreflexivity, 
asymmetry, and transitivity (Jenkins 2011; Schaffer 2012; Wilson 2014; 560, 2016, 192–
193; Barnes 2018; Bennett 2017, 138; Bliss 2018; Tahko 2018). Therefore, we should 
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investigate further whether the adopted conception of fundamentality is indeed a suitable 
one. 
 
6.4.3 Further work: Compositionality 
 According to some powerful qualities theorists, the building blocks of reality are 
fundamental propertied-substances (Chapter 4). Such substances are “mereologically 
simple”: they lack substantial proper parts (Heil 2012, 19). However, the powerful qualities 
theorist does not deny the existence of intuitively composite objects such as humans, chairs, 
and tomatoes. For example, Heil says:  
 
If substances are simple, then tomatoes are not substances. Indeed, most of the objects 
that we talk about, manipulate and investigate scientifically are not substances. In 
saying that tomatoes are not substance, I am not suggesting that talk of tomatoes is 
false or misleading. I am not a “nihilist”, not an “eliminativist” about tomatoes. To get 
a feel for what I am saying, think of Locke. For Locke the only genuine material 
substances are the corpuscles, Newtonian atoms. Tomatoes are particular dynamic, 
interrelated arrangements of corpuscles. […] This tomato is … a fleeting, dynamic 
arrangement of substances, a particular way the substance—the corpuscles—are 
interactively arranged at a particular time. (Heil 2012, 19; emphasis added) 
 
You could say that a complex is a particular way, the complex making up a tomato is 
the red way, but in that case the “way” is the ways these constituents [simple 
substances] are organized. The tomato’s “being the red way” just is a matter of the 
tomato’s constituents being as they are organized and interrelated as they are. (Heil 
2012, 21; emphasis added) 
 
According to this view, ordinary macroscopic objects are what you get when you arrange 
fundamental propertied-substances in certain ways. As discussed in §6.3.2, Heil (2012) 
invokes the notion of an arrangement to account for the existence of consciousness from a 
physicalist perspective. Unfortunately, details about the formation of such arrangements are 
missing. This leaves unanswered several important questions: what are the conditions for 
arrangement formation? In virtue of what substances can arrange with other substances? Is 
the notion of an arrangement formation an irreducibly compositional one? 
 On the powerful qualities view, it is possible to answer the first two questions by 
appealing to the dispositionality of fundamental propertied-substances. William Jaworksi 
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(2016), who endorses the Identity Theory, offers a similar strategy. According to him, some 
fundamental powerful qualities have the power: 
 
[T]o configure (or arrange, order, or organize) materials. Each structured individual 
organizes or configures the materials that compose it. I configure the materials that 
compose me, and you configure the materials that compose you. Describing the way 
each of us configures our respective materials is something that hylomorphists say is 
an empirical undertaking—in our cases, an undertaking left largely to biology, 
biochemistry, neuroscience, and other biological subdisciplines. Collectively, these 
disciplines are likely to deliver long, complicated descriptions of cells, tissues, and 
organ systems, along with their characteristic activities, capacities, and interrelations. 
(Jaworski 2016, 95) 
 
The resulting view offers an elegant account of the existence of structured, or composite 
objects. However, it is unclear to what extent it fits with the Dual-Aspect Account. The 
question, and indeed a good one, of whether compositional notions such as that of an 
arrangement can be adequately understood in terms of dispositionality remains to be 
explored. 
 
6.4.4 Further work: Consciousness 
 In this chapter I sketched how it is possible to accommodate the existence of 
phenomenal properties in the natural world from the viewpoint of the Dual-Aspect Account. 
However, several important issues have been intentionally set aside. Perhaps the most 
pressing one concerns the bearers of phenomenal properties. 
 The question that needs to be further investigated is: what kinds of entity can 
instantiate phenomenal properties? Philosophers of mind disagree. To avoid unnecessary 
complications, I assumed that phenomenal properties can be instantiated by entities like 
humans and other animals such as Luna the cat and Fido the dog. But this assumption is 
controversial. In §6.3.2 I submitted that phenomenal properties can be plausibly regarded as 
powerful qualities by tweaking the notion of qualitativity. It is therefore possible to claim 
that that some entities can instantiate phenomenal powerful qualities during conscious 
experiences. However, it is far from being clear whether this approach is viable for those 
who take phenomenal properties to be properties of experiences (e.g. Dennett 1991; 
Chalmers 1996; Strawson 2008b, 152–153; Kriegel 2015). We should explore the possibility 
of regarding the phenomenal properties of experience as powerful qualities. If we take 
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seriously the idea that phenomenal properties are the mark of conscious life, this 
investigation cannot be ignored in future.  
 
6.4.5 Conclusion 
 The overarching goal of this dissertation was to defend a novel theory of fundamental 
properties that captures adequately the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific 
investigation. I argued that the ontology of powerful qualities, primarily championed by John 
Heil (2003; 2012) and C.B. Martin (2008), offers a promising framework for this purpose. 
Throughout the chapters that compose this work, I defended the thesis that: 
  
(1) All fundamental properties are essentially dispositional-and-qualitative, or 
powerful qualities. 
 
I argued at length for the superiority of the powerful qualities view as compared to its main 
rivals: Dispositionalism and Categoricalism. However, I also argued that it is difficult to 
make sense of the Identity Theory, which is the canonical version of powerful qualities. I 
then presented the Dual-Aspect Account as a promising alternative. By introducing the 
notions of dispositional and qualitative aspects, I showed that:  
 
(2) Powerful qualities are best conceived of as properties having dispositional and 
qualitative aspects. 
 
And: 
 
(3) The view that all fundamental properties are powerful qualities is independent from 
Identity. 
 
Once Identity is abandoned, a more promising view of powerful qualities emerges: the Dual-
Aspect Account. Of course, some of its applications remains to be explored in future works. 
In this dissertation, I have not done more than defending the tenability of the Dual-Aspect 
Account and showing some of its most important merits. But this has been sufficient for 
establishing that the Dual-Aspect Account is a serious contender among theories of 
fundamental properties. 
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